

THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW.

VOL. IX.—JULY, 1884.—No. 35.

THE BEGINNINGS OF GEOGRAPHY.

THE ten-year-old boy who glibly rolls off the names of the five continents, and the little maid who gravely informs her teacher that the earth is a globe, little dream how much time and toil and thought was required to gain what to them seems elementary knowledge. A glance at the map makes all clear to them; here are the round hemispheres, there lie Europe, Asia, Africa, America, Australia; what can be plainer? Had they to trace them, not on a map, but in nature, they should appreciate very differently the knowledge they now hold so cheap. It was only at the price of disappointments, sufferings, and dangers, that Columbus discovered America; whilst Captain Cook paid for the discovery of Australia with his life. But, compared to the men who laid the foundations of geographical science, Cook and Columbus had easy tasks before them. Centuries of exploration on sea and land, the work of the merchant and the mariner, of the soldier and the missionary, had been digested by the scholar, and the results laid down in books and on maps. Mathematicians, astronomers, and physicists, had invented more and more perfect methods of determining the navigator's position on earth. When Cook and Columbus found new countries, they had little difficulty in recognizing them as new. How different the conditions under which the first geographical observers worked! How great their difficulties! How slow must have been their progress! In our days, when geography, as well as other branches of physical science, advances with giant strides,

when Nordenskjöld has at last forced the northeast passage, when Burton and Speke and Baker have wrested from Africa the mystery of centuries, we tend to belittle what men have done before us, and we forget that we are only reaping the fruits of seed sown centuries ago. Problems, once solved, are treated as if they had never existed; and self-satisfied superficiality often takes the place of solid knowledge. To master a science it is often useful, not to say necessary, to retrace our steps, and to realize the difficulties surmounted in its infancy.

The earliest beginnings of geography, as of other sciences, are wrapped in darkness. The torch of history that illumines the past had not yet been lit. However, with a slight effort, we may realize the task set before the primitive geographer. To become acquainted with his abode, and with its surroundings and relations to the country but a few miles away, it was indispensable to refer these to some fixed points equally within sight wherever he went. On the earth such points are seldom to be found; a few hours' travel so changes the physiognomy of things around us, even of hills and mountains, as to make them almost unrecognizable. How easy it is to lose one's bearing in a pathless country, he knows full well who has wandered on the prairies or in the forest. And in the days of our primitive geographer roads were scarce and forests plentiful. Luckily, where earth fails, the heavens offer an unerring guide. Go where you will, the sun always rises and sets in the same quarters of the heavens. The glories of dawn and sunset were surely the first of nature's great panoramas that attracted man's eye. They must have early suggested themselves as aids to the traveller, to guide him and determine the direction of his wanderings. If any proof were needed to show this, language supplies it. In every part of the globe, and among peoples of all races, language describes the east and west as the points where the sun rises and sets. The Latin *oriens* and *occidens* speak for themselves. Our own terms, *east* and *west*, hardly differ from these in meaning. *East*, the English form of the German *ost*, is a word closely connected with the Latin participle *ustum*, from *uro*, "to burn." It therefore fitly designates the quarter of the heavens which day by day is ablaze with the splendor of the rising sun. Our term *west* is the same word as the Sanskrit *vasta*, "a house, a home." In the conception of our Teutonic ancestors the *west* was the home of the sun, where he sank to rest every night. The sun, therefore, so to say, taught the primitive geographer two of the four points of the compass. The remaining two were not so easily determined. Homer, who speaks of the east as the direction "towards the dawn and the sun," and of the west as the part lying "towards darkness," has no terms for the true north and south.

He knows the north-northeast wind, the blustering Boreas, and opposite Boreas, Notus, the south-southwest wind. He also knows the seven bright stars that circle around the pole, and to which he gives the same names by which we know them to-day,—“the bear” and “the wagon.” Still it is very uncertain that the Greeks, in the ninth or tenth century before our era, had a precise knowledge of the points that they afterwards described as “towards mid-day,” and “towards the bear.” This is certainly a suggestive fact. Here was a people intellectually gifted as no other, observant and quick-witted, and yet, after travelling for thousands of miles and for hundreds of years over plains and mountains, over land and water, it failed to arrive at a clear and full knowledge of the cardinal points in the heavens; so hard was it to make the first step in geography.

No doubt, even in his infancy, man soon found his way from encampment to encampment, from village to village, nay, from country to country, and from harbor to harbor. Guided by such knowledge of the points of the compass as he had acquired, he gradually formed in his mind a picture of his home, of the hills and the streams in its neighborhood, perhaps even of the more distant points which he reached in his hunting or fishing excursions. He gradually recognized their relations. But it was by no means easy to judge correctly of the direction of the river-courses and mountain-chains, of the outlines of land and sea. About 100 A.D., more than fifty years after the invasion of Britain by Claudius, the great Roman historian, Tacitus thought that the eastern coast of England ran parallel to Germany, and that Wales lay over against Spain. And yet Tacitus was a man of uncommon ability and cultivation, and had unusual means of access to the best sources of knowledge, for his father-in-law was the conqueror of the island, Julius Agricola. Into how much grosser errors must the men have fallen who first explored the Eastern continent! Moreover, mistakes once made were handed down from father to son, whilst years and centuries were needed to extend perceptibly the geographical horizon even of the brightest and most active peoples; for those early days were not the days of the Sir John Franklins and the De Longs. No one loved geography for geography's sake. Men went to distant places, even in their own country, only under the stress of necessity, or the impulse of the nomadic instinct. There were no missionaries that sought the ends of the earth to carry thither Christ's Gospel; no geographical societies that sent forth explorers ready to face death in the cause of science. War and commerce were the chief promoters of geography, and warrior and merchant were geographers only by

accident. Slow, indeed, and painful must have been the progress made under their auspices.

Without the testimony of history we have striven to reason out, as far as possible, a picture of what the infancy and earliest progress of geography must have been. Henceforth history will be our guide in tracing its further fortunes. Except, perhaps, some documents incorporated into the Mosaic writings, no records are as ancient as the Egyptian monuments. Their early chronology, it is true, is far from settled; still, according to the lowest estimates, they carry us back two thousand years beyond Moses, and fifteen hundred beyond Abraham. The most ancient Egyptian annals, so far deciphered, are very scant and unsatisfactory; they say so little of Egypt itself that we must not expect them to say a great deal of other countries. Nor is their silence of much moment; had they come down to us in full they would probably have taught us little about the non-Egyptian world. Even in the days of Sankh-ka-ra, the last king of the eleventh dynasty, whose date is set down by Brugsch at 2500 B.C., and who certainly is not later than Abraham (2000 B.C.), Egypt knew very little of the peoples that dwelt beyond her own boundaries. This Pharaoh's armies advanced southwards into Nubia, whilst trade had made him acquainted with the western and southern coasts of Arabia and the land of Punt; that is to say, the opposite coast of Africa, just below the Gulf of Aden. Perhaps the reader will recognize Punt most easily as the part of the coast of Africa somewhat north of Zanzibar, the starting-point of so many recent expeditions for the exploration of Central Africa. Gradually Egyptian commerce extends northward and eastward, to Edom and Midian. From the latter country, it is interesting to learn, Pharaoh's ships brought the pigment with which Egyptian beauties painted green stripes under their eyes to enhance their good looks. About the same time the monuments of the twelfth dynasty (2466-2266 B.C.) afford clear evidence of Egypt's intercourse with Syria and Phœnicia, thus confirming the history of Abraham's travels and adventures in Egypt, whither, Holy Writ tells us, he went to procure corn. Of course, when the Semitic *shasu*, or shepherds, made themselves masters of Egypt, the connection between the Nile land and the Semitic countries of Western Asia became still more close, and its knowledge of them more complete and comprehensive. But for a long time Asia remained the limit of Egyptian geographical science. Even the greatest of the Pharaohs, Thothmes III. (1600 B.C.), whose obelisk adorns the New York Central Park, and Ramses II. (1300 B.C.), the Sesostris of the Greeks, the king who so grievously oppressed the Israelites, although they penetrated deep into Western Asia, conquered its coast as far as Asia Minor, imposed tribute

on the Assyrian kings of Niniveh, and subjugated Cyprus, seem to have known nothing of Europe. Some three to four hundred years afterwards Homer knows not only the Nile, but hundred-gated Thebes, more than three hundred miles from its mouth. Schliemann's discoveries at Mycenæ also prove that the Greeks at a very early period became acquainted with the products of Egyptian art, and the same tale is told by other Greek antiquities. Still it does not follow of necessity that the subjects of the Pharaoh knew much, or in fact anything, of Greece, much less of the rest of Europe. Indeed, if we may believe Herodotus, they knew very little of Europe even in 666 B.C. At that time Psammetik, Prince of Sais, by the jealousy and superstition of the other petty princes of Lower Egypt, had been dethroned and driven into the marshes of the lower Delta. An oracle had foretold that he would become king of the whole land by the aid of bronze men coming forth from the sea. As he wandered an exile near the sea-coast, news was brought him that a vessel had been stranded, and that bronze men were coming toward the land. They proved to be Greek heavy-armed foot-soldiers. Psammetik at once recognized in them the men of bronze spoken of by the oracle, engaged their services, and, through them, hired other Greek mercenaries, who made him king of all Egypt. The story supposes that the Egyptians, in 666 B.C., knew little, if anything, of the European nation nearest to them. In fact, Greek writers tell us explicitly that from the days of Psammetik dates the closer intercourse between the two countries.

Here, then, we have hastily sketched the growth of geographical knowledge in a country whose contemporaneous monuments, we are told, reach back four thousand years before our Lord. Its inhabitants were an ambitious, enterprising, and intelligent race,—the people, indeed, to which we must trace back the seeds of most of our knowledge, the inventors of the art of writing and of the alphabet, as well as of geometry and the art of surveying. Still the lapse of three thousand three hundred years and the conquests of twenty dynasties had failed to make them acquainted with more than two of the continents of the Old World, though the third lay at a distance of not more than six hundred miles from the mouth of the Nile. Besides, though they knew parts of Asia and Africa, there is no reason to suppose that they knew anything of their geographical character as continents. The Egyptians, in fact, until Alexander's conquest, linked their fate for centuries with that of the Hellenic world; notwithstanding their hoary antiquity and their intelligence, notwithstanding their favorable position and great progress in the arts, they were mere infants in geographical science.

If this be true of the Egyptians, it would be folly to expect more from the second great people of the East, the Assyrians. Egypt, situ-

ated at the southeast corner of the Mediterranean, had in this sea a ready means of reaching the three continents of the Old World. The Assyrians were an inland people; and even if we regard the Babylonians as one nation with them, the only body of water on which they bordered was the Persian Gulf. Unlike the Mediterranean Sea, which is a bond of union between the three continents of the Old World, the Persian Gulf begins and ends in Asia; it is practically an Asiatic inland sea, next to valueless for enabling people dwelling on its shores to extend their geographical knowledge.

The Assyrians and Babylonians, it is true, did not confine themselves to their own country; they were conquerors like the Egyptians. But the course of Pharaonic conquest had been eastward, until they subdued even Niniveh and Babylon; when the star of Assyria rose in the Eastern world, the Ninivite conquerors turned towards the west and south, and swept kings and nations before them until they set their heels on the necks of the haughty Pharaohs, who had been their masters. Notwithstanding all the light, however, that recent researches have thrown on Assyrian history, we fail to find any evidence that the great Assyrian kings, Esarhaddon and Ashurbanipal (681-647 B.C.), or the great monarch of Babylon, Nebuchodonosar, knew any more of Europe than Thothmes III. and Ramses Sesostris.

Geography owes very little to the people whose sacred writings, until quite recently, afforded us the only reliable knowledge of ancient Oriental history—to the Jews. In spite of their nomadic descent,—for Abraham has not inaptly been compared to a Bedouin sheik,—in spite of the roaming tendencies which distinguish them to the present day, they knew little of any land not directly contiguous to their own. Their captivity and consequent wandering widened their knowledge somewhat, for they not only learned to know the nations among which they dwelt, but became acquainted with the geographical learning which these nations possessed. But the science of the Jews never went beyond that of the Assyrians and Egyptians. Nor is this a matter of surprise. The Jews believed that by Divine Providence they were set apart from other nations, and they regarded the Gentiles, if not with contempt, with a religious fear and loathing, that for the most part smothered any interest in foreign lands and foreign peoples. Moreover, wonderfully gifted as they were, they seem not to have taken kindly to the physical sciences in the days of their national existence. Notwithstanding their exclusive tendencies, however, they must be admitted to have shed great light on one department of our science—on ethnological geography. Even we of the nineteenth century must admit our deep obligations to them. In the

tenth chapter of Genesis we find a table of nations descended from Noah's three sons, Sem, Cham, and Japhet. This list, according to the best modern authorities, sets forth both the ethnological relationship and the geographical position of many nations spread over a large area in Asia, Africa, and, perhaps, in Europe. They extend from Ethiopia (Cush) and Egypt (Misraim), northward and westward, to the Ionians at the extremity of Asia Minor (Javan), and eastward to Media, between the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf. The table includes all the races which modern science classes as Semitic, the greater part of the Hamitic peoples, and a fair proportion of Indo-Europeans. The modern scientific terms, Semites (from Sem) and Hamites (from Ham or Cham), prove how correctly Holy Writ has handed down to us the affinities of these nations. In fact, writers most hostile to the divine character of the Sacred Books admit the substantial accuracy of this interesting old fragment of ethnological geography. To appreciate duly its importance, we should bear in mind that it occurs in the oldest part of the Bible, in the Book of Genesis, written or compiled by Moses 1500 years before our Lord. In the next place, we should remember that the learned men of Greece and Rome, admirable as were many of their scientific achievements, hardly attempted to classify the relationships of the nations they knew, and that, when they did so, it was on a small scale, and rarely with success. Add that fifty years ago, and perhaps even later, modern science, unenlightened by this passage of Scripture, could not have reached a moderately successful solution of the question of the relationship of the Oriental races. Is it likely, then, that a Jewish savant, a member of an unscientific and systematically self-isolating race, could have solved it by dint of his scientific knowledge? Must we not rather conclude, either that Moses had before him historic documents surpassing in antiquity and correctness all the records of other nations, or that he derived his knowledge directly from a higher source?

The interest connected with this piece of Biblical geography has led us somewhat aside from the main course of our investigation of the question, how long it took to establish the division of the Eastern world into three separate continents. We have seen that neither Egyptians nor Assyrians, nor Hebrews, made the discovery. To the Phœnicians, the Canaanites of Scripture, early geography is more indebted than to any other people of Asia. Unfortunately, we know but little of their history; for their records have perished. What we know of them has come down to us mainly through Greek channels. Thence we learn that long before the Hellenes planted their African and Italian colonies, Tyre and Sidon had sent forth their fleets and founded towns on the coasts of the

Mediterranean. Gades, the modern Cadiz, was settled by the Tyrians, probably more than a thousand years before our era. In the East, Sidonian sailors explored the shores of the Red Sea for the Pharaohs of the eighteenth and nineteenth dynasties (1300 B.C.). Three hundred years later Hiram, King of Tyre, the ally of Solomon, seems to have controlled the trade with Ophir, or India. About the year 600 B.C., Herodotus tells us, a Phœnician squadron, in the service of the Egyptian King Necho, circumnavigated Africa. The voyage lasted three years. To procure the necessary provisions, they landed on the coast at the proper season, sowed corn, waited till it was ripe, and then continued their voyage. One circumstance reported by the hardy mariners so staggered the old Greek historian that he rejected the whole tale. The Phœnicians related that, after they had sailed down the eastern shores of Africa for a certain distance, the sun appeared no longer on their left, but on their right. Strange to say, this incident so marvellous to the father of history, is to us the strongest argument in favor of the truth of the story. Whether the story of Necho's expedition be true or not, it shows that the Phœnicians sailed along the shores of Africa past the Equator. Hanno, a Carthaginian captain, whose records—we might almost call them a log-book, so concise is his account—we possess in a Greek translation, sailed through the Straits of Gibraltar, along the western coast of Africa, past Cape Verd to Sierra Leone. This voyage took place between 500 and 600 B.C. About the same time another Carthaginian, Himilko, explored the western coast of Europe, and reached Albion and Ierne, *i.e.*, Britain and Ireland. From what has been said, it is apparent that the Phœnicians and their colonists were bold and enterprising explorers. No other Asiatic nation was their peer in geographical knowledge. Their voyages extended from India, in the far east, to the Cassiterides, or Tin Islands (some group of islands off the coast of Cornwall), in the west, whilst in the east and south, the mouth of the Indus and Sierra Leone were reached by their mariners, if they did not double the Cape of Good Hope. Thus the Phœnicians knew a great part of the three eastern continents, and were especially well acquainted with their dividing waters. Did they systematize their knowledge? did they recognize the existence of the three divisions of the Eastern Hemisphere? We cannot decide; it seems almost impossible that they should not have done so, and yet we have not the slightest evidence of the fact. At all events, a glance at the map will show that the Mediterranean is the boundary between Europe, on the one hand, and Africa and Asia, on the other. No people was likely to recognize the division of the Old World into three or even into two continents, that had not a fairly full knowledge of that continent-

dividing basin. Such knowledge was first possessed by the Phœnicians and the Greeks, and the Phœnicians, as colonizers and explorers, long preceded the Greeks. We must not confuse, however, what might or should have been, with what was. Whatever the merits of the Phœnicians as geographers, when we question history, whether they discovered the tri-partition of the Eastern Hemisphere, she gives no answer. Guided by her testimony, we must award the credit of this great discovery to the Greeks.

In the present age, when the learned world resounds with the eulogy of the Hellenic intellect, when it falls little short of deifying Greek genius, what need to waste flowers of rhetoric in praising its achievements in the field of geography! The plain facts will speak more eloquently than high-flown rhapsody. Still, we must not forget that as we inherit all the learning of Greece and Rome, so Greece became the heir of all the knowledge of the Egyptians, the Babylonians, and the Phœnicians. Her sages, inspired by the love of knowledge, travelled over land and sea to carry home the wisdom of Thebes and of Babylon, whilst Tyre and Sidon more obligingly brought to Hellas their science with their wares. How early Greece borrowed Phœnician geographical science is clear from the Greek translation of the "*Periplus*" of Hanno, which we have mentioned above. Of course it was not translated immediately after its composition; there is good reason to believe, however, that it was translated before the time of Herodotus (450 B.C.). At all events, notwithstanding the selfish policy of the Phœnicians, it is certain that the Greeks derived much geographical information from them. But whatever their debt to the Phœnicians, the Greeks themselves were successful explorers. As early as the seventh century before Christ, they founded Cyrene in Africa, and from that time forward colony followed colony in Southern Italy, and as far westward as Marseilles (500 B.C.) in Gaul, and Ampurias in Spain. In the year 509 B.C., by order of Darius Hystaspes, Skylax of Karyanda, in Karia, starting from Kaspatyros or Kas-papyros (thought by some to be Cabul), sailed down the Indus, exploring that river and its mouth, and then the shores of the Persian and Arabian Gulfs, till he reached Egypt. A part of the same ground was covered by Nearchos, the admiral of Alexander the Great, in 326 B.C. His voyage terminated at the mouth of the Euphrates. Many other hardy Greek captains might be added; we shall add the name of only one more, Pytheas, of Marseilles, whom Forbiger places about 334 B.C. This bold navigator, who was also a good mathematician and astronomer, setting out from his native city, sailed along the eastern coast of Spain, passed by the Straits of Gibraltar into the Atlantic, and following the coast-line of Spain and France, reached Britain. He sailed northward

along its eastern shore till he reached the Island of Thule, the northernmost point reached by the ancients. What place is meant by Thule, whether Iceland, or one of the Shetlands, or Norway, our scanty information forbids us to decide. At all events, Pytheas thence sailed southward, and entered the Baltic, being the earliest seafarer who, as far as we know, entered that sea. If, in addition to these naval expeditions, we call to mind Alexander the Great's wonderful campaign, in which he overran all Western Asia, from the *Ægean* to the Indus, we cannot fail to appreciate the great additions made by the Greeks to man's knowledge of our globe. But the great glory of Greece consists not in merely adding to man's knowledge of places,—they were the first, as far as we know, who systematized that knowledge; in other words, they founded scientific geography. It is to them, also, that history awards the discovery of the division of the Eastern Hemisphere into three great parts or continents; it is to them that Asia and Europe, as continents, owe their names.

And here it is necessary to show how important a part in geography, and, we may add, in history also, names play. Often men's first knowledge of a country is comprised in the name of some small, perhaps some outlying, district; as they penetrate further and further, the name is made to assume a broader meaning, and finally the unity of name often brings home to their consciousness the unity of the land. Take, for example, the name of Greece herself. The Greeks were a small tribe on the coast of Epeiros opposite Southern Italy; they were the first Hellenes, whom the Italians knew in what was afterwards called Greece. Soon they became acquainted with cognate Hellenic tribes, to which they applied the well-known name, until it covered all the Greek tribes. Tacitus tells us that the German name had a similar origin, and the process was repeated after the collapse of the Roman Empire. When the modern European nations were formed, the Franks applied to all the Germans the name of the tribe nearest to them—the Alemanni. In like manner the name of England—land of the Angles—conceals the fact that a large part of the Teutonic conquerors of Britain were Saxons and Frisians.

Trace in the same way the history of the names Asia and Europe (for Africa is a word unknown to the Greeks, who called that continent Libya), and we arrive at the same result. We begin with Homer. His geography, it is well known, covers Western Asia and Southeastern Europe. He has no name for either continent. The lands to the east he describes as the lands "lying towards the dawn and the sun," those to the west, the lands "lying towards the darkness." Still the word "Asia," or rather the adjective "Asian," is found in the *Iliad*; but it is an epithet given to a dis-

trict on the Kayster in Asia Minor. In Pindar and Æschylus (about 500 B.C.) it retains the same narrow meaning. In fact, even in Roman times Asia was used both in a wider and a narrower sense; for, besides the continent, it also designated a part of Asia Minor, which was organized into a Roman province. Perhaps the latter use was a reminiscence of its early restricted meaning. At all events, as the name of a continent, Asia was not used by the Greeks until about the beginning of the fifth century before Christ. The history of the geographical name Europe is strikingly similar. It occurs first in the Homeric hymn to Apollo, a composition which, in spite of the title, is later than Homer by some two hundred years. There it designates the Grecian mainland as opposed to the peninsula of Peloponnesos. Step by step it extends, until it also becomes the name of a continent.

It would, no doubt, be very interesting and instructive to know the original meaning of the words Asia and Europe. In his *Handbook of Ancient Geography*, Kiepert indorses an attempt to trace them to the Semitic languages. Asia is there derived from the Assyrian word *açu*, "the dawn, or east," and Europe from *ereb* or *irib*, "darkness, or west." The meanings are so strikingly to the point as to put us on our guard. In fact, the etymologies are not without difficulties. The Semitic *ereb* or *irib* is surely much more closely represented by the Greek *ἐρεβος*, "darkness, hell," than by *Europe*; we must not fail to mention, however, that many scholars consider *erebos* an Aryan word, identical with the Sanskrit *rajas*, and the Gothic *requis*. Besides *Europe*, in its vowels, is so distant from *ereb* or *irib*, that it might cast serious doubt on their identity, did we not know how words are mangled in their transit from one language to another. For *açu* the difficulty is of another kind. The word means "east," and, if identical with Asia, was first applied to Asia Minor; we should infer, therefore, that it was first so applied by a people living to the west of it; that is to say, in Europe. Now we know of no Semitic people that dwelt in Europe in those early times. There remains a possibility that the Phœnicians, when sailing up the Ægean, bestowed the name on the country to their right. Unfortunately the word *açu* occurs neither in the few remnants of Phœnician which have come down to us, nor in the *Hebrew*, the language most closely related to the Phœnician. The proposed derivations, appropriate as they appear, must, therefore, be pronounced far from certain.

Whilst Asia and Europe are indebted for their names to the Greeks, Africa owes its name to the Romans. The Afri were a tribe or people which dwelt in modern Tunis; when Rome erected the conquered territory of her great rival Carthage into a province, it was named Africa, after this people. In the course of time,

like Asia and Europe, the name Africa spread far beyond the district originally so called, until at last it embraced the whole continent from the Mediterranean to the Cape of Good Hope.

We have thus given a brief and general sketch of the history of the three names, Asia, Europe, and Africa; we have shown that in each case they were at first the name of a district, which gradually widened its meaning until it designated a continent. But let us not be misunderstood. When the early Greek writers speak of the continents of Asia and Europe, they do not mean what we mean by those terms. With us the dividing line between Europe and Asia runs mainly from north to south, following the direction of the Ural Mountains, and the Black and Ægean Seas; according to Hekataios, of Miletos (500 B.C.), and Herodotus (450 B.C.), this dividing line ran from east to west. Beginning at the Straits of Gibraltar, it followed the line of the Mediterranean, the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora, the Bosphorus, the Black Sea, the river Phasis (now Rioni), and the Caspian; Herodotus carries the boundary still further east along the course of the Araxes, perhaps the Jihon. The reader has, no doubt, remarked that water-courses were considered to be the only true boundaries between the continents. If, now, the Europe of Hekataios and Herodotus be compared with the Europe of modern geography, it will be found to include, besides the modern continent so called, all the northern part of Asia. Hence Herodotus judges Europe to be much larger than Asia and Libya (Africa) together, and sharply criticizes his predecessors for holding the contrary opinion. To make amends to Asia for despoiling her of the great Siberian plains in the north, in the earliest Greek writers, the whole of Libya was added on in the west. Even Hekataios seems still to have held this erroneous view; nay, there were geographers at a much later period who taught that there were only two continents. It seems strange that the historian Sallust, one of Cæsar's generals, who was well acquainted with Africa, where he had held high command, should hesitate to decide the question, whether Africa is a continent or only a part of Asia. But, though later writers are thus found to advocate ancient error, just as, nowadays, we find here and there some erratic savant upholding the heliocentric system; still we must consider the problem of the tripartition of the Eastern Hemisphere finally solved in the time of Herodotus (450 B.C.). True, the father of history does not, by any means, seem convinced of the correctness of this view, and in one passage he speaks of Libya as a projecting headland of Asia; but whatever his doubts,—and some of them were perhaps justified, considering the evidence placed before him,—he was forced to bow to the prevailing opinion, and this opinion remained that of the Greek scien-

tific world. Subsequent geographers partly changed the boundary lines, but indorsed the view in the main.

If we reckon from the beginnings of the Egyptian kingdom, the first civilized power established on the shores of the Mediterranean, it required upwards of 3500 years to prove so elementary a fact in geography as the tripartition of the Old World.

It seems hardly possible that this demonstration was made without the use of maps. To recognize the unity of a large, irregularly shaped continent, to realize that Spain, for instance, is a part of the same whole as Turkey, supposes a clear picture of that whole before the mind's eye. That men succeeded in forming a purely mental picture even of a single continent seems quite unlikely. At all events, we know that at least a hundred years before Herodotus, the Greeks knew how to construct maps; for to Anaximander of Miletos (610-546 B.C.), the disciple of Thales and the reputed inventor of the sun-dial, classical antiquity ascribes the honor of having drawn the first map of the world. It would be rash to infer that maps were not made elsewhere before his time. The division of the Holy Land among the twelve tribes of Israel, as Kiepert justly remarks, could scarcely have been accomplished without the aid of at least a rude map. Moreover, Lepsius has shown conclusively, that the Egyptians, who were great surveyors, and to whom the Greeks were indebted for their first knowledge of geometry, made rudimentary maps. But Anaximander's map was not a mere plan of a city, or of a district; it professed to be a picture of the world, and was certainly an ambitious undertaking. Of the manner of its execution we know nothing. The next map-maker that we know of is Hekataios of Miletos. It seemed not improbable that it was his map which Aristagoras, the contemporary tyrant of that city, took to Sparta. Herodotus tells the story in his usual lively way. The Milesian tyrant, anxious to induce King Cleomenes to invade the Persian empire, procures an interview. "At their interview," says the historian, "Aristagoras, according to the report of the Lacedæmonians, produced a bronze tablet, whereupon the whole circuit of the earth was engraved, with all its seas and rivers." After assuring Cleomenes that it was easy to conquer the Persians, who were an unwarlike people, he dwelt upon their wealth. "All this," he continued, "if you only wish it, you may soon have for your own. The nations border on one another in the order which I will now explain. Next to these Ionians (here he pointed with his finger to the map of the world which was engraved upon the tablet that he had brought with him), these Lydians dwell; their soil is fertile, and few people are so rich in silver. Next to them come these Phrygians," and thus he went on until he came to "Kissia, this province, where you see the river Choaspes marked, and like-

wise the town of Susa upon its banks, where the great king holds his court, and where the treasuries are in which all his wealth is stored. Once master of this city, you may vie with Jove himself in riches. Cleomenes replied: 'Milesian stranger, three days hence I will give thee an answer.' When they met again, Cleomenes asked Aristagoras: 'How many days' journey is it from the sea of the Ionians to the king's residence.' 'Three months,' was the answer. Cleomenes caught at the words, and preventing Aristagoras from finishing what he had begun to say concerning the road, addressed him thus: 'Milesian stranger, quit Sparta before sunset; this is no good proposal that thou makest to the Lacedæmonians to lead them a distance of three months' journey from the sea.' " Aristagoras' map, we are told, was the first ever seen in Sparta.

We have called the drawings of Anaximander and Hekataios maps; in truth they did not deserve the name. What really makes a map are the imaginary lines representing on the one hand the equator and its parallels, on the other the great circles radiating from the poles and cutting the equator at right angles. These lines are based on two hypotheses: 1st, that the earth is round, for if it is not, the meridians should be parallel, not converging; 2d, that the points on its surface correspond to certain points in the celestial sphere. The points in the heaven are always in the same relative position to each other, and though variable as compared to the earth, their motion is entirely regular and constant, so that for certain fixed times they will correspond to certain fixed places on earth. We know that this motion is merely apparent, due to the axial revolution of the earth; but for geographical purposes the old theory, that it is real and caused by the turning of the celestial sphere around the earth, was of equal service. Now as the sphericity of the earth had not been established in Anaximander's and Hekataios' (500 B.C.) time, of course a true map was impossible. Their charts were rather pictorial representations, or topographical plans, and such they must remain until science had proved that the earth is round. Before we pursue further our purpose of showing how difficult and lengthy a task it was to construct a map, even approximately correct, we must briefly glance at the history of the question of the earth's roundness.

To-day every school-boy and school-girl would be astonished that any one should be ignorant of this, to him or her, elementary truth. Still the sphericity of the earth, if one of the first, is one of the most important steps in the progress of astronomical geography. It is one of the first steps in science which admits the principle that "all things are not what they seem," and that the evidences of the senses must be corrected and explained by the superior wis-

dom of reason. To us who have inherited all the wisdom of our forefathers, the matter appears simple enough; not so to the peoples of early antiquity. They had used their senses much, and their reason, it is probable, comparatively little; they had lived by means of the senses, had enjoyed themselves mainly through them,—they had found them always correct. What a shock it must have been to be told that the land which they saw lying before them, plain or undulating, or in gentle slopes or abrupt crags, that the great sea which stretched before them an unbounded level expanse, were the surface of a sphere. The first propounders of this doctrine must have seemed to their contemporaries impostors or visionaries. What views the popular mind entertained on the form of the earth, when they thought of the subject at all, is perhaps learned most readily from mythology. There the earth is conceived as a round disk, resting either on mighty pillars, or on the back of an elephant, or on that of a huge tortoise; or it swims on water that surrounds it on all sides and in its turn supports the heavens. Some fancied the earth of the form of a round shield with a boss projecting from its centre. The historian Tacitus, though he lived one hundred years after the beginning of our era, and long after the Greeks had proved the earth's sphericity, in his description of Northern Britain, still seems to hold to this idea. If now the inquiry be made, how long men groped in the darkness of these errors, we shall find again that the truth was established at a very late day.

Anaximander, according to some Greek writers, or even Thales (about 620 B.C.), according to others, was the first to teach that the earth is a ball. The claims of Thales are wholly unsupported; whilst the advocates of Anaximander are contradicted by statements that he held the earth to be a cylinder. On the whole, it seems probable that the doctrine was first propounded by some philosophers of the Pythagorean school, about 500 B.C. The same view of the earth's form seems to be implied in some passages of Plato (430–348 B.C.). It was Plato's scholar Aristotle, who first systematically established it, using many of the arguments still popularly in vogue. This great thinker was not only one of the foremost intellectual philosophers, a critic and a profound writer on rhetoric, but also the founder of natural history and a distinguished physicist and astronomer.

In Bk. II., ch. 14, of his treatise on "the Heavens," he gives his reasons for asserting the earth's roundness. His first proof is the downward tendency of bodies in all places; then he tells us that in lunar eclipses the earth's shadow thrown on the moon is round, whence we must infer that the earth is a sphere. "Again," he continues, "by the appearances of the stars it is clear, not only

that the earth is spherical, but that its size is not very large. For when we make a small remove to the south or north, the circle of the horizon becomes markedly different; the stars vertically over us undergo a great change, and are not the same as those that travel to the north and to the south. For some stars are seen in Egypt or in Cyprus, but are not seen in the countries to the north of these; and the stars that in the north are visible while they make a complete circuit, there undergo a setting. From this it is clear not only that the form of the earth is round, but also that it is a part of a not very large sphere." Later philosophers added new arguments. Thus Pliny (70 A.D.) adduces the proof that ships, when they go to sea, disappear downwards. He also points out that mountains and other inequalities on the earth's surface are proportionately so small as not to alter the spherical form of the earth appreciably.

Closely connected with the question of the earth's form is that of its size. Nowadays everybody knows that it measures about 25,000 miles in circumference, that its diameter is about 7900 miles, and that the equatorial diameter is about twenty-six miles longer than the polar. We realize with difficulty that there was a time when even the most learned knew nothing of these measurements. Still we see at once that to measure the earth's circumference is in many respects a tougher problem than to establish its sphericity. A direct solution, by going around our globe with the surveyor's chain, is not to be thought of, even at present; much less could it be accomplished in the days of the great Greek geographers: an indirect method, therefore, must be found. The problem was hardly formulated when the Greek mind grappled with its solution. Aristotle, as we have just seen, teaches that, compared with the vast heavenly sphere, our earth is but a small globe. In a subsequent part of the chapter we have quoted, he tells us that mathematicians had set down the earth's circumference at 40,000 geographical miles. We are not informed by what methods they arrived at this result, which is so far from the truth that it seems a guess rather than an attempted solution. Luckily history, has preserved a full and interesting account of the first fairly successful attempt to determine our problem on scientific principles. To Eratosthenes (276-196 B.C.), the librarian of the third Ptolemy at Alexandria, and the founder of scientific geography, belongs the honor of having done this.

It had been noticed that at noon of the summer solstice (June 21st) the sides of a deep well at Syene (now Assouan), in Southern Egypt, cast no shadow, the sun's rays penetrating unhindered to its bottom. The sun, therefore, stood perpendicularly overhead, in other words, Syene lay under the tropics. Eratosthenes next

measured the shadow cast by the pointer of a sun-dial, on the same day and hour, at Alexandria, which was assumed to lie on the same meridian; by means of this he calculated the distance between Alexandria and Syene, and found that the circular distance between the two cities was $\frac{1}{50}$ th of the circumference of the earth. Now the linear distance between the two cities was set down at 5000 stadia, hence the entire circumference of the earth would measure 50 times 5000 stadia, that is to say, 250,000 stadia, about 25,000 geographical or some 30,000 statute miles. In fact, it measures only about 25,000 statute miles, Eratosthenes having gone astray not quite 20 per cent. This error was due not to any mistake in principle, but to several accidental causes. In the first place, the distance between Syene and Alexandria was less than 5000 stadia; lengthy distances were rarely, if ever, determined by the ancients with precision, as they were usually computed by days' journeys. Then the two points assumed were really not on the same meridian. Other slighter errors it is unnecessary to mention. We cannot proceed to other subjects without paying to the learned Alexandrian geographer the tribute of our admiration. Our minds are justly filled with wonder when we learn of the marvels of modern astronomy, the measuring and weighing of the sun and planets, the determination of their chemical constituents, the calculation of the fabulous distances of the fixed stars. But these triumphs of science are, after all, only the necessary sequence of prior achievements. No doubt, what Eratosthenes did was in itself infinitely more simple; but then it was the first great step in the march of applied mathematics. When we bear in mind how small man is, how limited the sphere of his sensations, and how great is the earth and how difficult the correct measurement of even a small part of its circumference, we cannot withhold our admiration from the man who saw in the stars, billions of miles remote, the means of measuring the earth on which he lived, and who read in the heavens the answer to his problem.

We are now prepared to continue our sketch of geographical chart-drawing, which we shall trace to the time when science was able to present men with a fairly accurate map, for until then geography must be accounted in its childhood. Imagine the science of map-making to have perished; suppose that all the great discoveries of geography until the present day were preserved; what would be their value? What could they teach us? They would be a mere farrago of unrelated facts. The map alone enables us to bring order out of chaos, to systematize what was isolated, to create a science of geography on a grand scale. It has already been stated that until the third century before Christ, the so-called world-charts were really only rude representations or topographi-

cal plans of the world. We have used the term "world," the Greek said οἰκουμένη, *i. e.*, inhabited world; the rest he did not care for; it was either too hot or too cold to serve as man's home; his οἰκουμένη comprised in fact all the world worth the name, and this view is still expressed in our use of the word "œcumenical," *i. e.*, universal. For the Greeks, therefore, a map of the world meant a map of the inhabited land. Of course, with the progress of geographical discovery, the *oikoumene* extended or changed in some of its details, but from the days of Dikaiarchos (310 B.C.) to Ptolemy (150 A.D.), Greek geography retained the same idea of the general form of the inhabited earth; Ptolemy as well as Dikaiarchos conceived it to be an irregular quadrilateral, similar to a Macedonian chlamys or shawl, whose length from east to west bore to its width from north to south the proportion, according to some, of two to one, according to others of five to three. To us, who know the true dimensions, this seems very strange, especially when we include in our view of the world the western hemisphere. Still, geography has preserved traces of the old mistaken conception to this very day. For why do we call the distance from east to west longitude, *i. e.*, length, and that from north to south latitude, *i. e.*, width? Error often strikes its roots so deeply into the soil of human science that, in spite of its being laid bare, it seems almost impossible to eradicate all its shoots.

The first to introduce into his map of the world, as above described, a line to guide the student in his estimate of distance and direction, was Dikaiarchos of Messina (326–286 B.C.), a worthy pupil of the great Aristotle. To him is awarded the credit of making the first attempt to measure mathematically the heights of mountains. He went far astray in his calculations, but he had pointed the way to the successful men who followed him. A similar criticism applies to his improvement of the world-map. He did not succeed in solving the problem of dividing up the plan of the earth's surface, by lines arbitrary and yet fixed; he did little more than suggest that such a problem existed. The lines he introduced on his map, as far as we know, were not intended to bear any reference to the great lines astronomy had established in the heavens, the equator and the tropics. He aimed solely at cutting the inhabited earth (*oikoumene*) into halves by a line running from east to west. This line started from the Sacred Promontory, now Cape St. Vincent, and crossed Sardinia, Sicily, Peloponnesos, Rhodes, Karia, Kilikia, the Taurus range, and the Gulf of Issus, the angle of the Mediterranean made by the coasts of Syria and Asia Minor; thence it was carried further eastward to the Thian Chan on the western border of China; it roughly corresponds to the 36° parallel of north latitude, and was called by

later geographers the earth's diaphragm. Whether Dikaiarchos gave it this name, is not known. It is not a little singular that this line should have unintentionally run so nearly parallel to the equator; indeed, the coincidence is so remarkable as to justify a suspicion that Dikaiarchos really did intend to draw a parallel to the equator. Howsoever we may judge on this question, there is no doubt that the next great cartographer purposed to draw real parallels on his map. We mean of course Eratosthenes, the same great Alexandrian geographer who first measured the earth's circumference. His chief parallel in the main coincided with Dikaiarchos' diaphragm, beginning at Cape St. Vincent and crossing the Sicilian Straits, Peloponnesos, Rhodes, and the Gulf of Issus. Through Rhodes he drew a perpendicular to the line just described, and thus established the first meridian, which passed through Syene, Alexandria, Rhodes, and Constantinople. It is not improbable that in choosing this line he again followed the footsteps of Dikaiarchos. At all events the importance of the points it struck, and the fact that Alexandria was one of them, fully justified the choice. It retained this preëminence until Marinus of Tyre (about 150 A.D.), the immediate predecessor of the great Ptolemy. It is true that both of Eratosthenes' cardinal lines were drawn far from correctly; the Sicilian Straits, for instance, were brought fully two degrees too far south, whilst scarcely two of the principal points of his perpendicular are really on the same meridian. In drawing his other meridians he made equally gross mistakes. The Straits of Messina and Carthage he placed on the meridian of Rome; in reality Carthage lies two degrees to the west, and the Straits of Sicily three degrees to the east of Rome. These errors, however, must not lead us to undervalue the work of the old Alexandrian. His successors in antiquity often did worse, and no further back than two hundred years ago the best geographers might have learnt from Eratosthenes. In 1668, for example, Sanson of Paris published a map in which the Mediterranean extends 60° (about 2900 miles) from east to west; Eratosthenes gives the same distance at about 2650 miles. The true measure is a little more than 2000 miles.

But in pronouncing judgment on the merits of Eratosthenes and the ancients in general, another consideration must not be overlooked. Their means, methods, and instruments for fixing the longitude and latitude of places were very simple, not to say rude. The astronomical observatory at Alexandria had none of the wonderful optical and mechanical instruments that are found to-day at Greenwich and Washington. Eratosthenes' only instrument for determining latitude was the sun-dial, or gnomon. By measuring the length of its shadow and comparing the results

obtained at different places, their latitude might be arrived at. In calculating the latitude of Alexandria by this method, Eratosthenes made an error of only seven minutes. Another method of determining latitude was based on the duration of the longest day in different places. At the equator, of course, day and night are always equal; as we proceed northward the days of the summer solstice increase in length, until at the North Pole there is but a single day six months long. By carefully observing this phenomenon at various places, geographers were enabled to compute their distances from the equator; this method was adopted by the astronomer Hipparchus (150 B.C.) in constructing his series of *climata*, or zones of latitude.

The means of reckoning longitudes were far more defective. With the aid of data furnished by the electric telegraph our schoolboys solve a problem which for centuries almost defied the greatest scientists of antiquity. The telegraph gives us the difference of time between two places; the schoolboy multiplies by fifteen, and reduces hours to degrees of longitude. But Eratosthenes not only had no telegraph; he had not even a satisfactory timekeeper. His only chronometers were sun-dials and water-clocks. Before the invention of the telegraph, a good watch carried from place to place told the difference of time. Sun-dials cannot be carried in the pocket, and, besides, as they point the time by means of the shadow due to the interception of the sun's light, any removal from place to place will cause the shadow, and, therefore, the time to vary. So the geographer had to fall back on the water-clock. This instrument was constructed on the same principle as the well-known hour-glass, water being substituted for sand; but some were so made as to record all the hours of the day. In Eratosthenes' time the water-clock was in its infancy, for it had not been invented until 245 B.C., by the Alexandrian Ktesibios. It was, therefore, in all probability very clumsy and cumbersome, and far from accurate for long periods of time. About a generation after Eratosthenes, Hipparchos, the greatest astronomer of antiquity and a geographer of great merit, suggested that longitude might be determined by comparing the hours at which eclipses occur at different places. No doubt occasionally, but very rarely, this suggestion was carried out. How unreliable were the results is best shown by an example. Eleven days before the great battle of Arbela (331 B.C.), in which Alexander the Great finally crushed and destroyed the empire of the Persian king Darius, an eclipse of the moon was observed as a dreadful portent by the two contending armies. The eclipse took place at the fifth hour, about eleven o'clock in the morning. On the same day, at the second hour (about 8 A.M.), the eclipse was seen at Carthage. The dif-

ference in longitude, accordingly, would amount to 45° ; the real difference is 34° ; that is to say, the observations were an hour astray.

But aside from the errors in longitude due to this cause, Eratosthenes' map was essentially defective in its construction. On our maps the meridians converge and meet at the poles, and the earth is thus represented as a globe. Not so on the chart of the Alexandrine geographer. His first meridian, as we have seen, passed through Alexandria; his other meridians, instead of curving and converging at the pole, were drawn as straight lines and parallel to the first meridian. As a consequence, seas and lands assumed shapes that were utterly false. We shall try to give an idea, though it will be very imperfect, of Eratosthenes' map of the Old World. Imagine a picture of the Eastern Continent from the Straits of Gibraltar to the mouth of the Ganges, and from the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb, at the mouth of the Red Sea, to a line slightly north of the Black Sea, so that it will form an irregular quadrilateral rounded off on the west. To fit it into this outline, Northern Europe is flattened down so that the northern point of Scotland, for instance, is brought within about 9° of the Sea of Azof, whilst Africa, below Cape Guardafui, trends almost directly westward, instead of stretching southward, for 25° more. The map is cut by eight parallels of latitude, not at equal distances from each other, but drawn to suit the convenience of the geographer. The second parallel, for example, which passed just below Cape Guardafui, was at a distance of about 340 geographical miles from the third, drawn through Meroë in Ethiopia, just above Khartoum, whilst the two northernmost parallels were about 1150 geographical miles apart. Perpendicular to these parallels of latitude, and likewise at unequal distances from each other, he drew seven straight lines, as substitutes for our meridians. Besides these lines Eratosthenes adopted the circles which divide the earth into zones, —the equator, the tropics, and the Arctic circle. These had probably been first proposed by the Eleatic philosopher Parmenides, an elder contemporary of Socrates (420 B.C.). To the torrid zone Eratosthenes assigned 48° , to the temperate 30° , to the frigid 36° . It must be added that he did not, as yet, divide the circle into 360° , but followed the system of Eudoxos of Knidos (370 B.C.), who divided it into sixty equal parts.

The division into 360 parts is due to Hipparchos, whom we have already mentioned. This great astronomer, like most Greek philosophers, did not confine his interest and his work to one science, and contributed not a little to the progress of geography and especially of cartography. He was a severe and sometimes an unjust critic of his great predecessor Eratosthenes. He sought to attain

greater accuracy in the location of places, and as has already been stated, suggested the observation of eclipses as a means of determining longitude. He improved Eratosthenes' map by adding two or three parallels of latitude. He seems to have aimed at a more regular distribution of these lines, and in carrying out this aim was guided by the length of the solstitial day. But not even Hipparchos succeeded in carrying out a system that was strictly consistent; for long after him the parallels of latitude were drawn at unequal distances from each other. Some modern authorities, among them Kiepert and Vivien St. Martin, award to Hipparchos the credit of being the first to introduce into his maps of the world converging meridians. Their judgment seems to be based on a passage of Strabo (Bk. II., p. 117), in which that writer expresses the opinion that meridians ought to converge, though, on a plane map, he thinks, it is unimportant to make them do so. Strabo, who lived under the emperor Augustus, is the author of a work on geography which evinces no less industry than ability. It is in the main descriptive; for Strabo, whilst a thorough master of the mathematical geography of his day, wrote for what we nowadays call "the general public," and moreover seems to have preferred the descriptive and historical side of his subject. His views on mathematical geography, which can hardly be said to be an advance on those of Hipparchos and Eratosthenes, are, therefore, in all likelihood borrowed. If, therefore, Strabo holds that the meridians of a map ought to converge, this opinion is, in all likelihood, taken from some earlier geographer. Now, between Hipparchos and Strabo we hear of no geographers of eminence, and at first sight Kiepert and Vivien St. Martin seem justified in making Hipparchos the source of Strabo's views on the correct construction of meridians. On the other hand, Strabo himself tells us that Krates of Mallos, a philosopher who lived about the same time as Hipparchos, constructed a terrestrial globe, about ten feet in diameter, on which the meridians united in two points—the poles. Might not the opinion of Strabo we are now discussing be inferred from what he knew of Krates' globe? Might not some other geographer unknown to us deserve the credit claimed for Hipparchos?

It is hardly safe, therefore, from the above premises, to infer that Hipparchos, as a matter of fact, constructed maps with converging meridians? Hipparchos, it must be borne in mind, was primarily an astronomer and may have expressed his views on astronomical geography, have written a criticism of Eratosthenes, nay, proposed improvement in his maps without going to the trouble of constructing any map of his own. Indeed, in another passage (Bk. II. ch. 38 or p. 98), Strabo finds fault with Hipparchos for merely criticising Eratosthenes, and charges that instead of correcting the

latter's errors, he refers his readers to the maps of the ancients, which, in Strabo's opinion, stood in even greater need of correction. So much is certain, however, that even if Hipparchos made this great improvement, it was not followed up by his successors. Strabo himself, we have seen, considered it unessential to draw his meridians so as to converge at the poles. Marinus of Tyre (150 A.D.), a learned and industrious scholar, who did much to correct and complete the maps of his day, made no effort to perfect them in this respect. To him was due an innovation, which, though based on a false assumption, maintained itself until very recently: the present movement for a common prime meridian shows that it would have been better to retain it. We have seen that the cartographers of Alexandria chose for their prime meridian that of Rhodes, which also passed through Alexandria, Meroë, and Byzantium (Constantinople). Marinus, in the belief that the Canaries were the western limits of the habitable earth, placed his first meridian on the Island of Ferro, and not more than thirty years ago all German maps were drawn with that as the first meridian. France, England, and the United States had already adopted the meridians of Paris, Greenwich, and Washington, the homes of their national observatories, as their prime meridians, and now the Germans, imitating their example, compute longitude from the meridian of Berlin. National vanity, in this as in many other cases, did not benefit the cause of science; the multiplication of prime meridians confuses the student of geography, and plagues the scholar with time-wasting reductions. Hence the cry for a common prime meridian, which found voice in a bill recently passed in Congress. Why not honor the great fathers of Geography by going back to the prime meridian of Rhodes or of Ferro?

The universal adoption and long survival of the prime meridian of Ferro was due to the influence of one great man, Claudius Ptolemaios, popularly known as Ptolemy. He was the worthy successor of Eratosthenes and Hipparchos, and lived at about the same period as Marinus (150 A.D.), though his geographical work was somewhat later and largely based on the labors of his contemporary. For, like Hipparchos, Ptolemy was primarily an astronomer, and to him the Ptolemaic system which places our earth in the centre of the universe, revolving about it, owes its name. Modern science has subverted his astronomical theory, but still gratefully acknowledges her indebtedness to him as a geographer. Indeed, it was fortunate that so great a man should close the long and illustrious succession of ancient scholars that reared and adorned the edifice of geography. For Ptolemy, being the last great geographer of antiquity, remained for centuries the guide of succeeding ages. In mediæval times, as Aristotle was *the philosopher*, so Ptol-

emy was *the geographer* by eminence; his book was the universal text-book, his authority was almost beyond dispute. Now, whatever Hipparchos' merits are in the premises, it was Ptolemy who permanently introduced into the map of the world the converging meridian. Indeed, in his great work on geography he gives directions for making a projection of the globe in two ways, the first by means of straight, the second by means of curved lines. The results of a correct method became at once apparent, for Ptolemy's maps are a vast improvement on those of his predecessors. The direction of the land and sea lines, the boundaries of countries, and the locations of cities are all given with far greater accuracy. Hence his work, though a mere skeleton, consisting of a list of names with their longitudes and latitudes, is still in many respects the most important ancient work on geography. Accompanying this work, or perhaps it would be more correct to say, underlying it, is an atlas of twenty-seven maps, one of the globe and twenty-six of the several countries that compose it. The first map is that of England and Ivernia or Ireland, the last that of Taprobane, or Ceylon. His meridians were drawn at regular distances of five degrees from each other, whereas his predecessors, as we have seen, drew them at random. The parallels of latitude he increased from eight to twenty-one in his geography, whilst in his astronomical work, called by its Arabian title *Almagest*, he raised the number to thirty-eight. They were no longer drawn at will, but fixed according to the duration of the longest day in different parts of the earth. In the *Geography* the first fourteen are drawn so that the longest days under two successive parallels differ from each other by fifteen minutes; for the next five the difference is half an hour, and for the last two, a full hour.

We see, then, Ptolemy improved the construction of maps in every respect; he adopted a correct method of projection, introduced regularity in the position of his meridians and parallels, located positions more correctly, and added to the number of places located. It must be regarded as a great gain for the history of science that fairly authentic copies of his charts have come down to us. Of all the maps drawn by the Greek cartographers, his were the only ones that have had this good fortune. For us, therefore, they possess a double importance: first, as representing the great Ptolemy's own work; secondly, as samples of Greek map-drawing. We know from them that the Greeks gradually learned to construct maps approximately similar to those of the present day; as perfect, in fact, as the science and exploration of their time allowed them to be drawn.

We have now traced the history of the map, until it had become in all its essentials a real map. We cannot forbear adding a few

words on the contributions of Rome to our science ; the more so, as in some particulars, they are very peculiar and characteristic. The Roman genius was essentially practical. Whilst the Greek cultivated science for its own sake, the Roman looked only to what was useful to him. Now geography, it will be said, is undoubtedly a very useful branch of human knowledge, that ought to have been especially useful to the Romans, whether we look at them as a military or as a commercial people. And truly the Romans did not fail to recognize this, and they expended both much money and much labor to improve geographical knowledge. But all their toil had an immediately practical aim. They did not care whether the earth was round or flat, whether it measured twenty or thirty thousand miles in circumference. All they looked to was to have a compilation of places and distances to guide their generals and their merchants. They recked not whether they had maps scientifically constructed or not ; they were satisfied to know that place A was so many miles to the right or left of B, that there was a road to take them from the one to the other, and a river or mountain to retard their march or voyage. In short, their geography was, in most respects, sheer utilitarianism. Of course a nation that aimed at, and to a great extent achieved, universal empire, a nation especially so systematically skilful in joining together the farthest parts of their empire by a network of roads that justly challenge the admiration of this age of mechanicians and engineers, must have added largely to man's knowledge of the earth. The Romans made their way to many places unknown to the nations which had preceded them in the course of empires ; and in the case of localities known before, they substituted precise measurement for clever guesswork ; military operations require precise topographical knowledge. No one knew this better than Julius Cæsar, who had led his legions to victory on three continents. Consequently scholars are disposed to accept as authentic the statement of a late, and otherwise by no means weighty, Roman writer on geography, Julius Æthicus, that Cæsar planned and inaugurated the scheme of compiling and constructing a great map of the world. In the very year in which he fell by the daggers of Brutus and Cassius, we are told, he appointed four Greek geometers to survey the Roman world. Nor did his death prevent the execution of the work, for, according to Æthicus, it was completed in thirty-two years. Now Agrippa, the prime minister, general, and admiral of the Emperor Augustus, planned a similar map ; but, like Cæsar, he was not destined to see its completion. In one respect, however, he was luckier than his predecessor. When the map was finished and set up in the portico of Polla, it was known as Agrippa's map. Some critics, not unnaturally, have been of the opinion, that this

map of Agrippa, was the very map planned by Cæsar, the direction of which fell into Agrippa's hands after Cæsar's death. As to the manner in which this work was executed, modern scholars are by no means agreed. Some hold that it was painted on the walls of the porch of Polla, and, as a proof, point to a passage in Varro's treatise on farming. At the opening of this book, the old Roman, who, in the judgment of his countrymen, was the most learned of his nation, surpassing even his friend Cicero, meets in the temple of Tellus his father-in-law, C. Fundanius, studying a map of Italy painted on the wall. It will be remarked that this map, like Agrippa's, was exposed in a public building; hence, they infer, Agrippa's map, like that spoken of by Varro, was painted. Others, however, maintain that the map was engraved on marble slabs, which were fitted together and attached by metal nails or clamps to the wall of the building. At first sight this seems an extraordinary manner of drawing and mounting a chart. Still the advocates of this view have in their favor the oldest map of which we possess any fragments. This map was a plan of the city of Rome, of which, by the way, about two years ago, a new fragment was discovered during the excavations in the Roman Forum. According to Jordan, who has written a learned work on the subject, it was set up in a chapel sacred to the Goddess Roma, about 211 A.D., in the joint reign of Severus and Caracalla. The slabs of marble on which it is engraved are three inches thick, and, according to Jordan's computations, covered 300 square metres; that is to say, above 3000 square feet. Of course its width far exceeded its height, for if it had been square, it might have been more than fifty feet high, and would have been utterly useless. As the question stands, we cannot decide whether Agrippa's map was painted or engraved on marble; but we may fairly infer that, like the plan of Rome, its length was out of all proportion to its height. A clearer and more definite conception of it may probably be derived from a curious document which, by so eminent an authority as Kiepert, is regarded as an indirect copy of Agrippa's map. We mean the famous *Tabula Peutingeriana*, or *Peutinger's map*, so called after Conrad Peutinger, of Augsburg, in whose library it was found towards the end of the sixteenth century. Eleven of the twelve parchment charts, of which it consisted originally, are still preserved in the Imperial Library at Vienna. The present copy was made by a monk in the thirteenth century from an original dating back to the reign of the Emperor Alexander Severus (A.D. 222-235). To describe it is by no means easy. As in the case of Agrippa's wall-map, its length is out of all proportion to its width; in other words, the countries are represented on a much larger scale for the direction from east to west, than for the direc-

tion from north to south. For instance, the dimensions of Germany from north to south are to those from east to west as one is to fifteen. Italy, whose general direction is from north to south, is made to run from west to east, being wedged in between France and Dalmatia. As a consequence, the countries of the Eastern Hemisphere appear on the charts stretching in long, narrow ribbons from west to east. The names of countries, tribes, and cities are marked, and the Roman roads, leading from place to place, carefully laid down, with the distances added in figures. In fact, it is very much what a modern railway guide would be, if the stations, instead of being printed under one another, were placed side by side, with lines between, to indicate the roads. We must not, however, forget to add, that the chief features in the physical aspect of the country,—seas, rivers, and mountains,—were also set down. From the above description, imperfect as it is, it will be perceived at once that a Roman map, if map it should be called, differed widely from a Greek one; the latter was the creation of science, the former a soldier's or trader's guide.

Here, then, we close our sketch of early geography. Upwards of four thousand years had rolled by from the establishment of the Egyptian monarchy to the days of Ptolemy. Nations had traded, and warred, and explored, had risen and perished; enthusiastic men of science had braved the perils of the waves and the wilderness, or sacrificed their lives to investigation and study, and still, even in Ptolemy's day, geography had passed but little beyond its infancy. The great Ptolemy, were he to come to life again, must confess his ignorance before a modern school-boy. Yet he would have no reason to blush, for manfully and skilfully had he and his predecessors struggled to extend the domain of science with the slender means at their command. On our part we should thank Providence that, without any effort of our own, we have inherited all the treasures of science, accumulated at immense cost by the generations before us. If we thoroughly realize this, we will neither despise them nor unduly boast of our own merits. On the other hand, we may point with just pride to the great geographers of our own day: to Carl Ritter, who, so to say, re-created the science; to Alexander von Humboldt, who did so much to extend and systematize it; and to Petermann, the prince of cartographers. Nor should we omit from our roll of honor the gallant men who risked or sacrificed their lives for the advancement of geography, the Sir John Franklins and De Longs, that found a cold grave amid the Arctic snows; the Livingstones and Spekes, the Bakers and Camerons and Stanleys, that have revealed the mystery of more than sixty centuries to their contemporaries. And as merit, if coupled with modesty and humility, deserves all the more admiration, let

us not forget the hundreds of missionaries, no less disinterested, no less noble, no less devoted to science, than the heroes whose names fame trumpets forth, missionaries who, whilst bringing Christ's gospel to the heathen, and transforming savages into civilized beings, at the same time have ever had at heart the interests of geographical science.

OF THE NATURE OF THE HUMAN SOUL.

St. Thomas Aquinas. Sum. Theol. I. Pars.

The Metaphysics of the School. By Rev. Thomas Harper, S. J.

(CONCLUSION.)

BY substantial simplicity the human soul is essentially different from the body; its cognitive power assumes a marvellous comprehensiveness; its perfection by far transcends the realm of bodily substances; its nature presents itself to our mind as a new sphere above this universe, resplendent with unseen beauty, variety and excellence. Yet, by proving the soul not to be composite, we have not fully set forth its essence, nor sufficiently evinced its elevation above the material. Though distinct from matter, may it not be dependent on matter in its very existence, requiring this as its natural subject? So, indeed, many have thought. Just as the materialist does not distinguish the principle of rational life from the material forces, so the sensationalist confounds it with the sensitive faculties; whence it comes that the one identifies man with matter, and the other with the brute. Nor are views of that kind heard of only in our days; they were entertained in antiquity, as well as in our times, and brought into systems by the Grecian no less than by our modern philosophers.

These opinions, however, have in no age been universal among the learned. Thinkers of a sounder tendency have always combated them with solid reasons. Prominent among the opponents of sensationalism were, before the dawning of the Gospel, Plato and Aristotle, with their respective schools; in the Christian ages, after the Fathers of the Church, St. Thomas, with the Scholastics. The ideas chiefly of the latter it will be most proper somewhat to develop, in order to throw full light on this important question. They distinguish three kinds of substantial forms. There are forms which are such acts of a compound substance that without the composite they

cannot exist at all, since they have their being only with dependence on matter, their fellow-constituent.

There are others which are essential acts of a compound, yet can exist also without it, by themselves, having their existence independently of the material element together with which they constitute a substantial whole. Others, finally, are acts to themselves, because they are complete substances, and hence do not enter into composition, but exist exclusively in themselves. The first mentioned forms are called by the Scholastics material, not because they consist of matter, but because they depend in their existence on it as on their subject. The other forms are termed immaterial, because they are in their existence independent of matter, one kind of them not even being united with it, the other, though joined to it, still not being sustained by it. Again, the material forms are considered as non-subsistent, because they are such constituent parts of a substance that they can exist only in a composite in union with their copartner. The immaterial forms, on the contrary, are called subsistent, since they can exist by themselves and apart from any other substantial entity. There is, however, among them a remarkable difference with regard to their way of subsisting. Those forms which, being acts of themselves and integral natures, exist exclusively by themselves, evidently have a complete subsistence; the others, which are by their nature acts of a compound, yet can exist also apart from it, have an incomplete subsistence. For subsistence is the mode by which the substance exists in its own right and becomes incommunicable to another; but substantial forms which are naturally constituents of a composite are communicable to a whole and by right belong to it; they are, consequently, subsistent only in a limited sense as far as they have their existence independently of a subject which receives or sustains them, and, therefore, can exist also by themselves, though as incomplete substances.

These definitions supposed, the Scholastics generally maintain that the vital principle of brutes is a material or non-subsistent form, but that the soul of man is immaterial and, though incompletely, subsistent in itself.¹ It is in this sense that the scholastic philosophy treats of the immateriality of the soul, or of its spirituality, for the two terms coincide as to their real meaning, since, as we have no immediate insight into the spiritual, we define it negatively by conceiving it as something independent of the material.

Let us now at once put forth arguments for this essential attribute of our soul, by which it is distinguished from that of the

¹ See St. Thos. Sum. Theol., p. i.; qu. 75; art. 2 ad 1.

brute. Of course, immateriality is not directly and in itself perceivable to us; just as little is substantial simplicity, and as, in general, the intrinsic constitution of things is hidden from our immediate view. But we have a medium of demonstration in our own actions; for by action the nature or essence of a thing manifests itself. Hence from the property of the nature the property of the action is legitimately concluded, as from the source we may know the quality of that which flows from it; and *vice versa*, from the property of the action we conclude the property of the nature, as from the mirror we derive the figure of the object shining on it. However, to obtain a thorough knowledge of the essence of a being, we must search into all its actions; for only, when taken all together, do they represent its entire perfection; singly they reflect but particular powers of it. Relying on this undeniable truth, we lay down the following axiom: If in a living being there are no actions but such as spring from an organic faculty, that is, from an animated organ, its soul is a substantial form not subsistent in itself, but dependent on matter in its very being; for, as are the actions taken collectively, so is the nature of the substance. If, on the contrary, there are in a living being operations which cannot be elicited by a bodily organ or exclude the concurrence of the body, its soul must be independent of matter and subsistent in itself; for, as the principiate, so also is the principiant. All our argumentation, then, hinges upon that one question, whether man's rational activity is organic or not, whether exercised by the soul alone, or by the soul conjointly with the body; for all our other vital functions, as sensation and vegetation, are organic, according to general consent. So the Scholastics have looked on this subject. St. Thomas, treating of the immateriality or subsistence of the soul, first proves the intellect to be inorganic and then reasons in the following manner: "The intellective principle, the mind or intellect, performs its operations by itself without the body. But whatever is active of itself is also subsistent in itself; for every being is a principle of operation, inasmuch as it is reduced to act (perfection), and hence operates in the same manner as it is. Whence it follows that the human soul, which we call mind or intellect, is incorporeal and subsistent in itself."¹

To speak first of cognition, whence may we prove intellection to be inorganic? From the nature of cognition and from the things known to us. Cognition consists in the expression of the similitude

¹ S. Theol. p. i.; qu. 75, art. 2: "Ipsum igitur intellectuale principium quod dicitur mens vel intellectus, habet operationem per se, cui non communicat corpus. Nihil autem potest per se operari, nisi quod per se existit. Non enim est operari nisi entis in actu. Unde eo modo aliquid operatur, quo est; propter quod non dicimus, quod calor calefacit, sed calidum. Relinquitur igitur, animam humanam, quæ dicitur intellectus vel mens, esse aliquid incorporeum et subsistens."

of the object within and by the faculty of the cognitive subject. It is, therefore, necessary that the same form exists in the subject knowing and in the object known; yet it is not requisite that the same form should exist in both of them in the same manner. Nor does this imply any contradiction. The features of a man exist both in himself and in his image; but certainly they exist differently in him and in the marble, or the wax, or the photograph, or the painting which bears his likeness; for in him they are living, and in the things just mentioned they are lifeless. Likewise is the form of the tree which we see not in the same way in nature as in our eye. Since, therefore, it is not impossible that one and the selfsame form should exist differently in two subjects, we must not wonder that this in reality takes place in cognition. We may even infer that it generally must be so. The cognizant subject and the object known are evidently in most cases of a different nature. But it is an axiom that whatever is received in a thing exists there in accordance with the nature of that thing, since there must be a strict proportion between the recipient and the reality received. Consequently, a form also exists differently in the cognitive principle and in the objective. However, though the difference of the manner in which the common form exists does not impede cognition, still it determines the perfection and specific peculiarity thereof. In proportion as the form has in the cognitive faculty a superior or inferior mode of existence, the object is represented more or less perfectly, under a wider or a narrower aspect, from a higher or a lower point of view. Conversely from the different manner in which one and the selfsame object is known by different subjects we conclude the different manner in which the objective form exists in them; for as the form is in all the same, it cannot found in them a diversity of cognition but by the diverse manner of its existence. It is, no doubt, for this reason that the same body is differently perceived by the eye and by imagination.

From these premises we may now with certainty infer, not only what objects an organic faculty is able to represent, but also in what manner it can represent them. Considering, on the other hand, the objects which are known to our mind, and the respect in which they are attained, we shall discover the nature of the intellectual principle. And then comparing organic and inorganic cognition, sense, and reason, we shall be convinced that there is a diametrical opposition between them.

First, the organic faculty cannot at all know spiritual objects, because it cannot receive their forms. For an organ is composed of both body and soul, and is, consequently, a material or bodily subject. But the immaterial cannot possibly exist in the material, the latter not being proportioned to the former. Likewise, if we con-

sider cognition as active, it is evident that the material faculty cannot produce an immaterial form to represent by it a spiritual object; for there would be no proportion between cause and effect. But by the intellect we are cognizant of spiritual objects. Certainly, we have an idea of the spirit, and know to some extent what it is and is not; we have some knowledge of God and divine things, however inadequate it be. The intellect, therefore, we must conclude, is of necessity a spiritual principle, for only, if such, can it be fit to produce and receive spiritual forms. This proof, short and simple as it is, has compelling evidence for all who bear in mind the true nature of cognition. Hence we do not consider it necessary to dwell on it any longer, and address ourselves immediately to the consideration of the manner in which the organic faculty and the intellect represent their objects.

The senses are exclusively cognizant of bodies and do not attain but certain material qualities of them. This is a necessary consequence of the essential properties of any organic power whatever. In the latter, soul and body, the formal and the material elements, concur to action. Now, the body being made of matter, and consequently inert, cannot pass into action, unless acted upon by an exterior cause; and hence does not coöperate towards the cognition of an object by which it is not determined. Nor can we say that the body need not be acted on by the object, but may be moved to operation by the soul; because in such a supposition we should not have one organic, but two distinct faculties, of which the one is immaterial, the other material. Furthermore, on the organic faculty the outward body, which is its proper object, can impress only material qualities as such. For, on the one hand, it can produce no other than material forms, as its effects cannot transcend its own perfection; and, on the other hand, as St. Thomas remarks,¹ the sentient body cannot admit a substantial form of another body without being destroyed. Wherefore the organic faculties can receive but accidental material forms, and much more are they unable, on account of the impenetrability of their subject, to take in complete bodily substances. Thus it is absolutely impossible for the senses to penetrate into the nature of bodies; they cleave to their surface, their material qualities and modifications. Not so is it with the mind. The intellect can perceive all things and attain to their intrinsic constitution. Nay, the very aspect under which it takes cognizance of its objects is their essence. Indeed, we can intellectually know all that is, though we perceive the bodily first, and the spiritual secondarily and analogically; and that which we try to grasp in them by scientific

¹ Sum. c. gent., lib. ii., c. 49: "Nullum corpus potest alterius corporis formam substantialem recipere, nisi per corruptionem suam formam amittet."

inquiries, or apprehend by immediate intuition, is their nature and entity. The formal object itself of the intellect, for so is the aspect called under which it views things, is not material at all, because it is so wide and universal that it comprises the spiritual no less than the corporeal, and extends to a depth and height which no organic power can reach. The mind, therefore, must be an immaterial principle, which, even when it perceives material objects, moulds them so that they have an immaterial mode of existing. Nor do we, in saying so, incur any contradiction. For the superior includes the inferior, and the universal the particular. Consequently the spiritual, which is higher and more comprehensive, implies the material, and the form that exists in a spiritual manner eminently contains that which exists in a bodily manner. On this account, though the material or organic faculty cannot perceive the immaterial, still the immaterial faculty can represent the material object.

From the aspect under which the sense and the intellect take cognizance, we deduce several properties which the objects, as known by both the one and the other, must necessarily have. The sense or organic faculty perceives things as extended. The reason is, because the act or form by which it represents them is extended. For the extended form in the cognizant subject corresponds to an extended form in the object, and the extended act, that is effected by many parts distinct from, and outside one another, represents also the object only as extended.¹ This we have proved above sufficiently, when speaking of simplicity. Nor can, for the same reason, unity be perceived by an organic faculty; for the several parts of an object are severally apprehended by the parts of the organ without being collected in any one of them. True, the soul that animates all our nerves and fibres is simple, but the soul alone is not the sensitive principle, this is the composite of both the formal and the material element; and hence, in the sentient subject the parts of the object known exist extended and not concentrated in one simple point. The human mind, on the other hand, not only perceives things which have no extension, as, simple substances, pure and abstract forms, but also reduces the bodies to unity, and, in general, is able to gather and compare all its notions and judgments.

Again, the senses perceive the bodies, their proper object, as existing and actual. The reason thereof is obvious. The exterior senses are cognizant of the exterior body only when determined by it, and therefore perceive it as acting or making an impression on them. Yet, no doubt, what is apprehended as acting, is known

¹ See St. Thom. Sum. c. gent. lib. ii., c. 49, n. I.

also as existent and actual. The interior sense has a fourfold function. It either perceives the bodies as acting on it through the exterior senses, wherefore it sees, as it were, colors, and hears sounds; in which case it evidently perceives its object as existent. Or it reproduces the former sensitive impressions as they were first received or formed, and in this case again it perceives its objects, not indeed as acting on it at present, but as they were active in the past, and so also beholds them in their existence and actuality. Or it decomposes the images produced by former sensations and again combines the component parts to new likenesses; and if this happens it is evident that the union thus effected is not real without ourselves, but that all the elements of the whole feigned are real, and have resulted from acting and existing bodies. Or, lastly, it discovers a new quality, that of convenience or inconvenience, in the object which it supposes already perceived by the exterior senses, and hence as existent. The intellect, on the contrary, has knowledge not only of the present and the past, but also of the future, of that which exists and that which will never exist, of the actual and the possible; it conceives the essence of things so that it prescind from their existence, and, in general, does not perceive its objects as acting on it.

Another peculiarity of the senses is that they perceive only the individual. So it must be, considering the fact that their object is the existent that acts on us. For, indeed, all that exists, and all that acts, is individual. A second reason of this property of sensuous cognition is the extension of its objects. What is extended, its parts excluding one another by resistance, repels from itself also other beings, and is thus portioned off and divided from them even as to space. Now, is a thing so determined and distinguished not individual? The senses, moreover, perceive but the contingent, for the bodies and their qualities can and cannot exist. But the intellect knows the necessary; for it attains the essences of things, which, belonging to the metaphysical order, have absolute necessity. Besides, the senses are forced to perceive the object according as it makes an impression on them, since their cognition is determined by it; hence they can neither make abstraction, but must at once represent all that the outward body imprints on them, nor can they correct the appearance of things, however contrary to truth, but must report them as they seem. Quite differently acts the intellect. It corrects the impression made on the organ; for it conceives the bodily objects to be under certain circumstances otherwise than they exhibit themselves; it judges the sun and the stars to be infinitely larger than they appear, and the earth to move, though it seems to stand; and it accounts for such judgments by compelling reasons. The intellect

is capable also of abstraction. In fact, it separates nature or substance from the accidents, quantity from quality, and one quality from another; it considers all objects, even the simple, under manifold respects, gives them several predicates common to many, or peculiar to individuals, and thus ranges them in certain classes, genera, and species. From all that we see that in the cognition of the material itself there is an essential opposition between the intellect and the organic faculties. The senses are so confined to the bodies which exist in nature that they can neither go beyond them nor represent them in another than a material manner; the intellect views the bodies under a universal, necessary, and immaterial aspect, and gives them attributes attainable to no sentient power.¹

The last difference between the organic and inorganic faculties is that the one can reflect on itself, and the other not. By reflection the cognitive principle returns from an outward thing to itself and makes itself its own object. No faculty, of which matter is a component, can do so. For in a power of that kind the material element is neither determined by the soul, because this alone does not act in sensation, nor by itself, because it is inert, and, consequently, is acted upon by an exterior cause; and this cause, which is a body, is the object of cognition, since what determines a cognitive faculty is the thing known by it. This being so, the senses, and, in general, all organic faculties, cannot turn back upon themselves, but always have an object which is outside them. This impossibility of reflection by an organic power can be inferred likewise from the aspect under which we know ourselves. By consciousness we attain, though indistinctly, our own nature and substance as the source and subject of our acts. So far the senses cannot reach, they can neither know the substance of things nor distinguish the properties from their substratum, nor penetrate from the effect to the cause, nor, dividing united elements from one another, perceive their mutual relations; for all that is far above the material qualities, which are the proper object of sensuous cognition. Since, then, our mind perfectly returns to itself and is cognizant of its own acts and substance, it cannot be organic; it must needs be a cognitive principle free from all materiality, entirely independent of matter in its operation.²

¹ St. Thom. S. theol., pet. qu. 84, art. 1.

² "The exterior sense," says S. Thomas (S. Theol., p. i., qu. 87, art. 3, ad 3), "is perceptive inasmuch as its organ is altered by a sensible object. But a material being is altered, not by itself, which is impossible, but by some other thing. Therefore, the exterior sense, does not perceive itself, but is perceived by the interior sense, which, on its part, it alters and determines. Of course the same reason holds true also of the brain, the interior sense, which consequently cannot turn back upon itself either. Indeed, in other places S. Thomas maintains the impossibility of any

To sum up what we have said of the intellect and the organic faculty, it is evident they are in every regard opposed to one another. The one perceives of its object but material qualities, the other essence and being; the one remains at the surface, the other penetrates to the nature of things; the one is confined to the cognition of the material world, the other is unrestricted in its knowledge and comprehends all without exception; the one is cognizant of the bodies as existent, concrete and individual, the other gathers from them the abstract, the possible, the necessary, and the universal; the one is unfit to reflect upon itself, the other is self-conscious. If we further examine why the organic cognitive principle is so limited in cognition and bound down to the material, we find as the last reason that matter enters into its composition; wherefore, it can produce and support only material forms. If this be so, must not the intellect, so contrary to the sense, be independent of matter? Must it not be immaterial, and must not this immateriality be the cause of its wonderful knowledge, broad conceptions, judgments, and reasonings? Must it not be a spiritual power, in which spiritual forms are received and all things are represented by spiritual likenesses, and, for this very reason, more universally, more comprehensively, more thoroughly?

It is, however, not from the intellect alone that we infer the spirituality of the soul; we arrive at the same conclusion when we reason from the attributes of the will. What is, first, the will's formal object? The good in general, all good, not a certain kind or degree alone of good. For the will is a tendency to happiness, and this consists in the embracing of good without restriction. In this boundless extension of all good also the merely spiritual

kind of sensitive reflection taken in its proper sense. In his commentary on the Third Book of the Sentences (Dist. 23, qu. 1, art. 2, ad 3), he says that no organic faculty can know its own acts, because for this it would be necessary that the material organ, by the concurrence of which reflection is exercised, should intercede between the cognitive faculty and the material organ by which the direct act was elicited; which is undoubtedly the case, inasmuch as the organ and through it the faculty of reflection should be acted on and determined by the organ of the direct perception as by its object. But this is evidently impossible, because the material organ of both acts is the same. In the Theological Summa (p. i., qu. 14, art. 2, ad 1), he asserts that the cognitive powers which are not subsistent in themselves, cannot reflect or be self-conscious, which he says to be evident from the senses. As a reason of his assertion he assigns that non-subsistent forms are not concentrated, but poured out on matter, which certainly means that they cannot act without matter, and, consequently, not become cognizant without being determined by an outward object.

If in other places St. Thomas says that the senses know their act, yet not their essence, he asserts, not reflection in its proper sense, which is a cognitive act distinct from the perception of the outward object, but reflection improperly so-called, or as others say, reflection *in actu exercitato*, inasmuch as every cognitive faculty in the object apprehended, perceives its own act as in its effect. For if we see a mountain, a river, a city, these very objects as *seen* by the direct act imply *our seeing*.

is contained, the divinity, the ideals abstracted from all matter, morality, virtue, justice. Nay, according to the nature of the will, we take the infinite, which is supereminently, and above all else, spiritual, as the last end of all our love and desire, because in it alone we find unlimited goodness; to it we direct all our actions, and to it we subordinate all other objects agreeing with our inclinations; and from it as from the supreme standard we judge what is morally lawful or forbidden. To the attainment of the infinite good we make subservient the use or enjoyment of material things; we even despise sensual gratifications in proportion as we long for full happiness in God, and the more we thus spurn the earthly, the more is the energy of our soul intensified. Our will, therefore, we must conclude, is a power impregnated with the spiritual and perfected by the supersensible.

Of what nature must such a principle of human volition be? The will presupposes a spiritual faculty, because it tends only to the good apprehended by cognition, and no cognitive power but a spiritual can reach the infinite. The will is spiritual itself. For it consists, particularly when put into action, in an inclination or adaptation to a suitable object, which it tends to and finally embraces, in a capacity to be filled out with the things affected. But must there not be proportion between the object and the inclination to it, the capacity and its complement? The one, therefore, being immaterial, the other must of necessity be so too. Besides, appetite tends to such good as conduces to the perfection of the subject in which it is. Yet the spiritual is by no means the perfection of an organic being, as it cannot be received in that being, just as little as the sound enters the eye, or the color the ear. No organic faculty, then, can tend to the spiritual, and much less can it renounce for the same the sensual, being made for the sensual and impelled to it by an inborn tendency.

A still more striking proof of the immateriality of the will is taken from its freedom. That our will is free is a fact testified by our own consciousness and by the consent of all nations and all ages; of it neither the demonstrations of the learned can give us more certainty, nor the objections of the skeptics raise a serious doubt. True, the materialists deny it, saying that it is unaccountable to science and entangled in inextricable difficulties. But, if not materialistic, at least sound philosophy explains it sufficiently, deriving it from the nature of the will and the intellect. And even were it not so, what then? Would, therefore, freedom not be real? If we were to disown the existence of all that we cannot fully account for, how many things as evident as the sunlight should vanish away? Can we unfold the mystery of the growth of plants and animals, the process of cognition in all its details, the

nature of bodies and their forces? Who will answer in the affirmative? Shall we, therefore, say that all those things do not exist? The reality of freedom being set beyond all doubt, we must solve the question, whether it be compatible with materiality or not. Is the free will an organic faculty? By no means. Matter is implied as a necessary element in every organic power, and is in it, neither deprived of a share in operation, nor put into action by the form by which it is quickened, since both these constituents are so dependent on each other as to make up one complete active principle. But matter is inert and follows necessary laws. Hence the organic faculty, in accordance with the nature of such a component, cannot act, unless determined from without, and when acted upon, cannot but react, vitally indeed, but in proportion to the impression received. Just the reverse takes place in the rational will. We can react or not react, when acted upon by an outward agent; we can act in contravention to the impression or can follow the weaker of two and resist the stronger; we can reject what is agreeable to the senses and choose what is repugnant to them. So broad is our freedom of choice. Carefully examined into, it is found to arise from the unlimited expansion of the will. This latter is so constituted that nothing is adequate to it but the infinite, for the reason that it is a tendency to all good without restriction. Being of such a nature, the will is moved or attracted of necessity by the infinite alone, for only the adequate object necessarily sways a power; and is, on the contrary, allured, but not necessitated, by finite things. Allured by them it is, because, being good, they contribute in some way to our happiness; but it is not necessitated, because they are deficient and not necessary to our felicity. Wherefore, that the will is an immaterial faculty, follows quite evidently from its freedom.

Thus both intellect and will, in all their operations, are proved to be spiritual. As such, they manifest themselves by the manner in which they act, and by the object which they regard or pursue. The one, viewing the things under the aspect of being, and hence having the fitness to know all truth; the other, tending to the good in general, to the enjoyment of unlimited goodness, they both bear in their very nature a relation to the infinite, a capacity to embrace God, the boundless ocean of all that is true and good. A tendency of this kind is, undeniably, above and independent of matter; for, whatever implies matter as its constituent is weighed down to the material, and cannot rise above it, neither by cognition nor by appetite. The soul, thus enabled to lift itself up to the Divinity, not only bears no resemblance to earthly things, but is a likeness of the Divine Spirit. For a likeness, as St. Thomas remarks, is that which is formed to the imitation of another being, so as to ex-

press the specific nature of that being, though in an imperfect manner. To God the highest kind of life, the intellectual, is peculiar, and this He has communicated to the soul in its creation, implanting in its nature the fitness and the irresistible tendency to know Him as the Infinite Truth, and to love him as the Infinite Good.¹

What beauty of the human mind is thus disclosed to us, and in what exalted dignity does it appear? Yet, what contrast also between man, as revealed to us by the reasoning of Christian philosophy, and again as shown in the light of materialistic tenets? Here he is lowered to the brute or to matter, endowed with but material forces, and with cognition that is rather fiction than representation of truth; there, he is the likeness of the Deity, his mind being raised above all that is visible, impelled to the infinite and made akin to the increate spirit. Whence is this difference of views and conclusions arrived at? Sound metaphysics and materialism do not take their departure from different points; no, they both start from the human activity, as known by experience. But the Christian philosopher endeavors without prejudice to analyze the facts given to him, and, having obtained a sufficient knowledge of their nature, to trace them back to their true source, and from this to ascend to the first cause and supreme principiant. In this way he not only finds the soul as a substance independent of matter, but also God as its Creator, as its highest object and centre, as its archetype, as the pure and infinite ocean of being, from which life has been poured out on it. But the materialist enters upon the question with the preconceived notion that there cannot be anything but matter, which he can reach with his instruments of observation and measure according to mathematical formulas. The non-existence of the soul is for him a foregone conclusion, and the method adopted by him beforehand involves the impossibility of arriving at the spiritual. Accordingly, he will never meet the soul, any more than the miner will ever reach the heavenly stars; he will look on psychological phenomena as on insolvable riddles, and the highest intellectual endowments of human nature he will either flatly deny, or with hypocritical language and ambiguous terms apparently acknowledge, but in reality bring down to the level of organical forces. A sad degradation of man, indeed, treacherously attempted under the guise of profound learning, and perfidiously covered with false, yet much vaunted, freedom and enlightenment! But, let us turn away from the results of godless science, and return to our spirit as manifested in a brighter and more gladdening light.

¹ Sum. theol. p. I, qu. 92, art., 1, 2, 4, 6, 8.

IV. THE UNION OF THE HUMAN SOUL WITH THE BODY.

We have thus far considered the human soul in itself. We proved it to be a substance not composite, but essentially simple, united with the body, but not dependent on the body in its being; incomplete, because a partial constituent of our nature, but still subsistent in itself, because fit for separate existence. And this simple immaterial substance is the source of wonderful activity; for, able as it is to express in itself all being, it penetrates by intellection all things, yet reposes in nothing but the infinite, and, being qualified to aspire to all good, it can love and desire whatever has any degree of perfection, but rests only in the embracing of the unlimited and essential goodness. The human soul thus essentially differs from any other. Plants and brutes have no vital action that does not flow from an organic faculty, and, therefore, their vital principle is, though distinct from matter, still dependent on it or material. Substantial simplicity, then, immateriality and aptitude for intellection and free volition, unbounded in their sphere, are peculiar to man's principle of life. But, these conclusions being reached, it is now time to consider our soul in its relation to the body. Without having treated of it also in this regard, we would not yet have distinguished it from all other entities, as is required for the scientific explanation of its nature. It is its union with the body that gives it distinction from the substances above us, from the pure spirits, as immateriality and simplicity make it distinct from natures below us.

Here, however, the doctrine expounded seems to entangle us in great difficulties. From the tenets set forth in the beginning of this essay, it follows that the human soul must be regarded as the substantial form of our body. Yet can it be such, if once conceived as spiritual, subsistent, and independent of matter? Many philosophers have answered in the negative. Plato and his school have denied the rational soul to be the essential form of the human composite; in their opinion, it is, after a long pre-existence, thrown into the body as in a prison, in which it dwells as its motor. Some philosophical systems of our times know of no other connection between soul and body than that of mutual influence or mutual presence. Leibnitz construed their union into a harmony, established by Divine intervention between their actions. Others granted the information of the body, but, to account for it, postulated two or even three souls,—a rational, an animal, and a vegetable one.

This opinion has been revised in our days by Günther, who supposes in man two vital principles, the spirit (*πνεῦμα*) as the source of the intellectual, and the soul (*ψυχή*) as that of sensitive life.

To elucidate the scholastic system with regard to this point, we shall first show the oneness of the human soul. Above we have proved from the oneness of the living being the oneness of the vital principle, and we have for this purpose also appealed to the contradiction which is involved in the admission of several substantial forms in the same thing. This, undoubtedly, holds good also of man. Hence, indeed, St. Thomas infers the oneness of the human soul.¹ In following this course, however, do we not rely on an opinion rejected by good authorities, as, for instance, the Scotistic school? And do we not, moreover, beg the question? We are to demonstrate the information of the body by the soul, and now do we not deduce the oneness of the soul from the Scholastic tenet that in the same being only one substantial form is possible? A few remarks will suffice to answer these objections. The several souls admitted in man by the modern systems mentioned above, are as to their nature either complete or incomplete; if complete, they must be considered as pure forms; if incomplete, they belong to an entire essence, not as material, but as formal constituents. So, in fact, Plato, Günther, and others have viewed this point under discussion; they termed the sensitive soul the form of the body; the rational they thought to have the nature of a pure spirit. But, if this be so, the several souls admitted in man are substantial forms. Whether they are considered as informing the body or not, does not matter at all; nay, if information is denied, it is much easier for us to argue. For, in this supposition, what shall unite the several vital principles to one living being? No doubt, the body, their common dwelling-place. But, who will say that several living substances are reduced to oneness by existing in the same house? Yet, the body, it is answered, is more than the simple abode of the soul. Well, suppose it to be whatever you like, it can never produce vital union. For it has of itself no unity, as may be understood from the dissolution to which it falls a prey as soon as the vital principle has departed from it. No, it is not the body that gives unity to the soul; on the contrary, the soul gives unity to the body by quickening it and shaping it into a perfect organism fitted for immanent activity. So, if we admit several souls in man, we have several substantial forms constitutive of several natures, without any union at all. From this it may also be understood that the opinion of the Scotists is not opposed to us in this question. They gainsay the Thomistic proposition in its generality concerning the impossibility of many substantial forms co-existing in the same subject, but they never asserted the possibility of many souls existing in the same living body, being full well aware that, at least in this case, all essential unity would be neces-

¹ S. theol., p. I., qu. 76, art. 3 ab initio; Sum. c. gent., lib. II. c. 58, n. 2.

sarily destroyed, because diverse principles of immanent action cannot but diverge from one another and constitute diverse living and acting beings.

We now proceed to confirm and illustrate the oneness of the human soul, thus far deduced, *à priori*, by two arguments taken from experience and consciousness. If we reflect on ourselves, we do not attribute our vital operations to several subjects, but all to one and the self-same. It is the same *Ego* that we perceive to be intelligent and sentient, to grow and physically develop itself. Now this oneness, forced on our consciousness, cannot be accounted for by saying that several vital principles harmonize in us, or are subordinate to one another, for harmony and insubordination do not make unity in existence, just as little as they effect that the master and the servant, the rider and the horse, are one and the self-same being; they unite actions, but not natures, which stand by themselves, and are intrinsically independent. Nor is any one conscious of such loose union of his constituent parts, or conceives himself to be a spiritual being that keeps a brute subject to itself; everybody rather knows himself to be perfectly and strictly one in life and in existence. Consequently, in one human being there is but one vital principle; for, where life is but one, there the vital source too must needs be one.¹

Another proof is afforded by the dependence which exists between the evolution and the exercise of vegetative, sensitive, and intellectual life in man.² Our cognitive faculties, whether rational or sentient, are not developed and adapted to action before the body is evolved by vegetation, and whenever the bodily organism is hurt or weakened, cognition is impaired or entirely impeded. As far as operation is concerned, vegetation must precede sensation to form its organs, and sensation is prior to intellection, in order to offer the mind its proper object with which to begin thinking. And, conversely, sensation serves vegetation, since the appetite is stirred up and directed by it in the pursuit of the necessities of subsistence, so much so, that with our feeling life itself would soon be extinct. Again, the prevailing operation of the one kind opposes that of the other. If vegetation or sensation are predominant, intellection is lamed; intense mental activity, on the other hand, is detrimental to vegetation and slackens sensation and sensual appetites. Likewise, who does not know that the exertions of the intellect and will modify the body in many respects, and that, *vice versa*, climate, food, health, age, sex have a remarkable influence on the mind? How shall we account for all these phenomena of daily occurrence? By the oneness of the soul. If there

¹ Sum. c. gent., lib. ii., c. 58.

² S. Theol., p. i., qu. 76, art. 3.

were many souls in man, each the principle of a different life, there would be no such mutual dependence among our faculties. The rational soul, being not only independent of the body, but not even really united to it, would be of itself a complete spiritual substance, and, consequently, also an entire principle of spiritual activity. But if such, it cannot be made dependent on a sensitive or vegetative principle in its evolution without a startling contradiction. Neither can that which is material act on the spiritual substance, because no agent can produce an effect above its own sphere; nor can the spirit be prevented from intellection and volition, or be determined to it by the sentient faculties, because as it is raised above them and is complete in itself, so it must act of itself and independently of them. With similar difficulties we meet if we consider the vegetative and sensitive souls. It is an essential property of every principle of immanent action, that, in developing and perfecting itself, it is like a centre from which operations proceed and to which they return. The vegetative soul, therefore, which is only such, evolves but vegetative organs, and cannot at all perform vegetative functions for another body. And the sensitive soul which is only sensitive, cannot terminate in another one's vegetation or feel hunger and thirst for another being. This is an absolute impossibility founded in nature itself. For these reasons the mutual dependence of intellectual, sensitive, and vegetative life peremptorily requires one sole vital principle. From two irrefragable proofs we thus infer the oneness of the soul, from the oneness of our self or substance, and from the mutual dependence of our operations. Our oneness in being could not subsist if there were several souls in us, each one complete in itself; our actions could not be reduced to such unity as is shown by their mutual dependence, if our faculties proceeded from several vital principles, of which each is in its existence independent of the other and by itself a source of action.

After this preliminary statement, it will no more be difficult to prove that in man the rational soul is united to the body as its substantial form. In all living beings of the material universe the body is the material, the soul the formal element; the body is potential, the soul is the act. In man, the highest living substance of this world, there is but a rational soul and none besides; this is, consequently, in him the substantial form of the body. We must, however, demonstrate this important truth not only by inference from general actions, but also by a closer examination of our own being, because, from the latter, as we already suggested, some particular difficulties are raised against the theory of information. To this end, let us first show that soul and body form in man but one complete nature or substance, and one person. One

and the selfsame nature is constituted by soul and body, if from their union results one intrinsic principle of action, for thus we have above defined nature. Now this in reality is the case. There are in man actions which spring only from both of them united. Sensation (and the same is to be said of vegetation and locomotion), is not the action of the soul alone, nor of the body alone, but of the composite of them. In sensuous cognition and apposition the body has its share, for those acts are aroused in us by the determinations which are impressed on it by the outward object; they are strictly commensurate to a bodily organ; they imply in it some physical and chemical changes; they are extended over it, and hence become fit to represent extended things. Still the body alone cannot feel; it is of itself absolutely incapable of vital action; the soul must also concur with it, or rather join it, complete and elevate it to a higher grade of perfection competent with such immanent activity. Sensation in man, therefore, proceeds from the soul as from its main source. Yet from what soul? From the rational, for there is no other one in us. The body, then, and the rational soul make up in us one principle of action, and consequently one nature. As, furthermore, nature is in us identical with substance, it follows that they also constitute one complete substance, but are themselves severally incomplete. For, what is not a full principle of action, what is still in need of another element, is unfinished in itself and but a part of a whole; and what, on the contrary, is an entire nature, having all its powers fully constituted, is a whole of itself and naturally destined to no further union, particularly if a source of immanent activity.

This being proved, it is evident that soul and body form also one person. What do we understand by a person? A rational nature which subsists completely in itself, and is hence incommunicable as a part to a whole. Such is the composite formed of the rational soul and the body. Being singly incomplete in themselves, they constitute one entire rational nature, and consequently one substance completely subsistent in itself and naturally incommunicable to another self. This we perceive also by our consciousness. It is the very same ego, the same subject which we know to be intelligent, sentient, and vegetative, and to which we attribute all our perfections, both of the body and of the soul, however different from one another.

On the ground of these positions, it will be easy directly to show how the rational soul is united to the body as its substantial form. First, by what we said thus far all contrary opinions are already refuted. For they all overturn either the oneness of our vital principle, or the substantial and personal union of soul and body. They all divide man into two subsistent principles, which move or act on

one another, or agree in their actions, but do not unite themselves to one nature and substance, of which, as of the whole or the supposit, all that each of them does or possesses is predicated. Such views are fundamental to Plato's system, that supposes the soul imprisoned in the body as its motor; to Günther's theory, admitting two principles of life, the *πνεῦμα* and the *ψυχή*; and to Leibnitz's pre-established harmony. In a similar dualism any other opinion opposed to information must result. For whenever we suppose two principles, each already determined to a species and qualified for activity, we have two natures and two complete substances. To combine two elements into one nature, it is necessary that the one is yet undetermined, the other determinant; the one passive, that is, in need of its ultimate perfection; the other active, that is, conferring on the former the last complement, by which it becomes a subject fitted for action. This, however, is nothing but the theory of matter and substantial form. In addition to this, all our preceding conclusions are as many positive proofs for substantial information. Man, we said, is one nature, consisting of soul and body. What part has each component in this whole? The body is that component which we have in common with all corporeal beings, and is, as to its elements, even transmitted from them into us. The rational soul is that component which is peculiar to us, distinguishing us from the inanimate, the plant, and the brute, and constituting us in our own species. The body is of itself unfit for any vital actions; the soul is the source of vitality, the principle which by its union shapes the body into the human, the most perfect of all organisms, and endows man with activity proper to him, with vegetation, sensation, and intellection, raising him thus to the highest grade of life. This being so, is not the body the material, the soul the formal element of the human substance? Does not the one coincide with the very definition of matter, and the other with that of form?¹

We reach the same conclusion if we begin with analyzing the notion of form. The substantial form, says St. Thomas,² has two characteristic marks. The first is, that it gives substantial entity to the thing in which it is, not by acting on it, but by communicating itself to it. The second, which follows from the first, is

¹ S. Theol., p. i., qu. 76, Art. I.

² Sum. c. gent., lib. ii., c. 68, n. 2: "Ad hoc, quod aliquid sit forma substantialis alterius, duo requiruntur. Quorum unum est, ut forma sit principium essendi substantialiter ei, cujus est forma, principium autem dico non effectivum, sed formale quo aliquid est et denominatur ens. Unde sequitur aliud, scilicet quod forma et materia conveniant in uno esse, quod non contingit principio effectivo cum eo, cui dat esse; et hoc esse est in quo subsistit substantia composita, quæ est una secundum esse ex materia et forma constans."

that, together with the material element to which it is united, it partakes of the same being, inasmuch as it constitutes with matter one entire nature and complete substance, which is identical with and predicable of both combined, but of neither of them separately. The form, inasmuch as it thus concurs to the production of things, is a cause, but one quite different from the efficient. The efficient cause is always extrinsic, the formal cause always intrinsic to the thing constituted; the former is completely distinct from the effect it produces, and outside the same; the latter is within the thing it makes up, as part of it, and partakes of its being. So the architect is distinct from the house which he builds, but the materials and their arrangement are intrinsic to it, nay, both taken together are identical with the building that is made of them. Now the rational soul gives to the body substantial entity, since it determines the same to a specific substance. For the body is, as such, indeterminate and common to all material beings, the soul ranges it in a certain species and makes it human; the body is, of itself, devoid of life, the soul completes it to one living whole, that stands completely by itself, and is an entire principle of intellectual as well as sensitive and vegetative activity. And so the soul does, not in that it acts or imprints new modifications on the body, but in that it joins its own entity to it and enters into composition with it, so as to constitute together with it, as a component part, a new being of superior perfection. Such being the union between soul and body, it is likewise evident that they have the same being in common, for they are constituent parts of the one complete substance or nature of man, who is neither the body alone, nor the soul, but both together united, and is the subject of both bodily and spiritual operation. In every regard, then, does the rational soul possess all the essential attributes of the substantial form, and in all respects does it show itself, not as an agent that moves, modifies, or governs the body, but as a principle which as a formal element concurs to the constitution of the human whole.

Philosophically speaking, therefore, we must maintain information as the only means to explain the composition of our being, the union of soul and body. It stands on a firm ground, and is supported by convincing reasons, taken from experience as well as metaphysical speculation; it excludes the dualism upheld by all other systems, and defends man's essential unity. Nor is it a philosophical tenet alone; it is also a theological doctrine, and an article of our holy faith. The union of the body with the soul, as its substantial form, is implied in several mysteries and dogmas of revealed religion, and has, therefore, repeatedly been taught and defined by the authority of the Church: by Clement V., in the

Council of Vienne, in 1311, against certain Averroists;¹ by Leo X., in the fifth Lateran Council, in 1513, against Pomponatius; by Pius IX., in his condemnation of Günther's and Balzer's systems, in 1857 and 1860. In these ecclesiastical acts it is defined to be of Christian faith that the rational soul is the form of the body, of itself, truly, immediately, and essentially. The soul is the form of the body, truly, if not in a metaphorical or improper sense, that is, not only acting on it; of itself and immediately, if by communicating its own entity, and not by the interposition of some reality, whether substantial or accidental; essentially, if by the exigence and in consequence of its own essence, and hence, for the perfection of this, and for the end of forming a new and complete nature. Moreover, according to the definition quoted, the soul gives to the human body life, which, as all agree, belongs to our being quite essentially and substantially. Is, then, the union between soul and body not substantial, and is, in that union, the soul not the formal constituent of the substance newly composed, and, consequently, the substantial form? Though, therefore, in the documents cited, the term *substantial* does not occur, still, all that is peculiar and essential to a substantial form is predicated of the rational soul.

Although the theory of information is thus philosophically and theologically demonstrated, several explanations may still be desired for a fuller understanding. It might still seem to be hardly conceivable how the rational soul is the ultimate source not only of intellectual but also of sensitive and vegetative activity, and how, from a spiritual substance, another than a spiritual operation can proceed. The difficulty has been foreseen by St. Thomas, and solved in more than one place.² The several substantial forms, he says, differ from one another by their greater or lesser perfection, as there is also a gradation in the things made up of them in nature; for the animate bodies are more perfect than the inanimate, and the animals are above the plants. Wherefore, he continues, Aristotle likens the several species of natural beings to numbers, which differ from one another by the subtraction or addition of the unit, and compares the souls to the several species of geometrical figures. But the superior degree of perfection includes the inferior, the greater the smaller number, the pentagon the tetragon, and so we must conclude that also the higher substantial form implies the virtue and the excellence of the lower. For this reason the ra-

¹ The definition of the Council of Vienne is couched in the following terms: "Quisquis deinceps asserere, defendere, seu tenere pertinaciter præsumperit, quod anima rationalis seu intellectiva non sit forma corporis humani per se et essentialiter, tanquam hæreticus sit censendus." Clement. De Summa Trinitate et Fide Catholica. Tit. 4, cap. unico.

² S. Theol., p. i., qu. 76, art. 3; Quæst. Disp. De Anima, Art. 9.

tional soul, which is among all the substantial forms of this universe the most perfect, virtually contains the perfection of the sensitive and vegetative principle of the brutes and plants, and, consequently, united to matter, it imparts to the bodily composite all powers that are found in any grade of life. Thus it is by the rational soul that man is intelligent, sensitive, and vegetative. From the axiom appealed to St. Thomas draws a further conclusion.¹ The rational soul being supreme, it virtually also contains the body-form, and hence completes in us primordial matter to a body endowed with physical and chemical forces, with quantity and qualities. To one and the selfsame soul, therefore, man owes it that he is an actual, a bodily, a living, a sentient, and a human being. By the rational soul man is an actual being, because he is constituted by it in a complete essence; a bodily being, because he is endued by it with all the properties and powers of a perfect body; a living being, because he is quickened by it and enabled to vegetate; a sentient being, because he is furnished by it with sensitiveness; a human being, because he is gifted by it with reason, his characteristic. This view of the Angelic Doctor's is in full accordance with the above-mentioned tenet of his, that in the same being there can be only one substantial form.

From this it may be understood to what extent the soul informs matter in us. The body owes to the soul, besides the physical forces, its vegetative and sensitive faculties. So far there is between them a natural union, a mutual completion to one active principle. But the rational faculties are not and cannot be communicated to the body; these, with their corresponding acts, the soul reserves for itself. The body, therefore, does not, as it were, imbibe the entire virtue and excellence of the soul, and, conversely, the latter, though it communicates to the body its undivided simple substance, is not in the body completely and in every regard, but rather remains elevated above it, exercising its supreme activity without it by its own power.² And so, it stands to reason; for the soul is of a superior degree of perfection, and the higher cannot be entirely absorbed by the lower.³

Yet, if that be so, another serious difficulty seems to arise. In every substantial union, according to Scholastic principles, each component is of itself incomplete—the one in need of further determination, the other in need of a subject in which it is to be received. Whenever elements, not being of that description, are con-

¹ S. Theol., p. i., qu. 76, art. 4; art. 6, ad. 1.

² Quæst. Disp., De Anima, Art. 1, ad. 18: "Quamvis esse animæ sit quod ammodo corporis, non tamen corpus attingit ad esse animæ participandum secundum totam suam nobilitatem et virtutem, et ideo est aliqua operatio animæ, in quâ non communicat corpus."

³ Sum. c. gent., lib. ii., c. 68, sub finem.

sidered as complete in themselves, they enter, not into an essential, but into an accidental composition. So we ourselves have reasoned above, in order to prove information. How, then, is it that the soul, which is a subsistent or spiritual substance, having operations of its own, requires a body? How is it perfected and completed by a material element, and not rather impeded in its spiritual activity, as Plato thought? Again, how is the unity of human operation better accounted for in our theory than in the systems of mutual influence or pre-established harmony? St. Thomas has not failed to answer these objections. In his opinion, the human soul, though spiritual, is of itself, without the senses, no perfect principle of intellection, and has, on this account, a natural aptness to a substantial union with the body. Having, in the *Summa contra Gentiles*, evinced its preëminence over the body, he proceeds to say: "Yet, since our intellection itself requires faculties which operate through certain bodily organs, to wit, the fancy and the senses, the human soul is understood to be naturally united to the body; in order to complete the human species." In like manner he says, in the *Summa Theologica*,² that the soul is adapted to the union with the body on account of its imperfection and potentiality in the intellectual order itself. This might seem to be in contradiction with its spirituality, and with the nature of intellection, which was proved to be an inorganic operation. Yet that this is so, we learn from what he says of the degree of human intelligence.³

The intelligent creatures, as he says, are partakers of God's intellectual nature, the more so the nearer they approach Him on their grade of perfection. Now God, being infinitely perfect, clearly and distinctly knows all truth by His own essence as by one single idea, which, as it comprises all things, may justly be termed most universal. Intellectual natures must, consequently, be capable of universal ideas; yet, as their cognitive power or light diminishes, the more they recede from God, their ideas must, in proportion to the lower degree of their intellect, be less universal or comprehensive; not because they cannot represent many or even all things at once, for this is essential to the intellect, but because they exhibit the particular and individual ever more faintly and indistinctly.⁴ Hence every created intelligence attains a clear and distinct knowledge of particular objects by several

¹ Sum. c. gent., lib. 2, c. 68: "Quia tamen ipsum intelligere animæ humanæ indiget potentiis, quæ per quædam organa corporalia operantur, scilicet imaginatione et sensu, ex hoc ipso declaratur, quod naturaliter unitur corpori ad complendam speciem humanam."

² Sum. Theol., p. i., q. 51, art. 1.

³ Sum. Theol., p. i., qu. 89, art. 1; Quæst. Disp. De Anima, art. 15.

⁴ Sum. Theol., p. i., qu. 55, art. 3.

ideas, by few or many according as its nature is more or less perfect. The human soul is the lowest among all intellectual principles, and hence, in behalf of the clearness of its cognition, its ideas are most multiplied; nay, it is no more fitted to know things in their individuality by universal species, there remaining in it only that universality which comprises many things indistinctly; a deficiency which is, indeed, patent to experience and most striking in those of inferior mental endowments. If, therefore, only universal species were communicated to us, our cognition would be very imperfect, for it would be extremely confused and indistinct. To render it clear and perfect, it is necessary that we have as many ideas as there are knowable objects, or for each particular thing a particular idea. But whence should the soul gather particular species? Of course, not from the spiritual substances; for these are universal, inasmuch as the spiritual, though individual in its existence, includes many perfections on account of its pre-eminent nature. The human intellect must, therefore, get its species from the material world below the spiritual. From there not only the higher grades of being are excluded, but, in consequence of their imperfection and impenetrability, one bodily substance excludes and repels also the other; yet the bodily agents cannot act on the spiritual. Therefore the soul, that it may enter into communication with them, must be united with a body furnished with senses, which, on the one hand, partly inhering in the rational vital principle, and, on the other hand, determined and acted upon by the exterior world, hold up to the mind by their cognition the material objects and bring them near to it. From the sensuous perception, then, the intellect abstracts species after a spiritual manner, which are universal, inasmuch as they represent things from a general point of view, and particular, inasmuch as they afford us knowledge of the bodies in their individual and particular nature. Hence we understand the senses to be necessary to the soul, not as a part of its intellectual faculty, but as a means by which the proportioned object is presented to the mind; and thus it is plain how the soul is of itself an incomplete principle even of intellectual activity and is made an entire and perfect nature by its union with the body.

This solution of the difficulty spoken of throws light on several other important points. Now we see why the intellect, though inorganic, depends nevertheless on the evolution and the regular activity of the organic faculties, extrinsically, however, and not intrinsically. Now the objections of the materialists, taken from the physical and chemical processes that take place in our brain during mental operations, may easily be refuted. Now the influence which the senses, and through them the material things, exercise

on the soul, and which conversely the soul has on the body, is no longer a riddle. If the intellect must receive its proper object from the senses, proximately from those which have their seat in the brain, it is evident that the soul cannot act if the body is not properly disposed, and that, notwithstanding their diversity in nature, there is a proportion between sensuous and mental operations. Again, as the organic and inorganic faculties, the intellect and the senses, the rational and lower appetite all spring ultimately from the same simple substance of the soul, the intense operation of the one necessarily mars that of the other, since it exhausts the strength of the common source, which is but too finite and imperfect; and the energetic tendency of the one carries away the others, since they are intimately connected in the same root. We may also explain how it comes that the intellect, as we daily experience, cannot at all think, during this life, without being assisted by the fancy, however great an abundance of intelligible species be stored up in the memory by former operations. It is the substantial union of the soul with the body that effects such complete harmony between our lower and higher faculties. Every being acts as it is. The soul, and with it the intellect, is linked to the body so as jointly to form one essence; hence it does not act at all but together with the bodily senses.¹ Though elevated above the body, the soul is nevertheless weighed down and closely attached to it by oneness in nature; therefore, it cannot take its flight alone even with its rational faculties, but rises only together with its partner in the same human essence, having become like a bird destined to soar in the air, but which, when fastened to the earth, is able but to walk on the ground. So far it is true that the body fetters and confines the mind; but this loss is amply compensated by other advantages. However, though the soul cannot during this earthly life exercise its activity independently of the body, it does not follow from this that disembodied it becomes unfit to act. For, being on the lowest grade of intelligent substances, it is of itself not incapable of cognition, but only of clear and distinct intellection by universal ideas. Separated from matter, it regains its power of merely spiritual operation, not imperfect as it was at the moment of creation, but enriched with species, which it acquired dependently on the senses, and prepared to receive a higher intellectual light, which it deserved by virtuous actions. Not improperly it is said that the soul is united to the body for the sake of the first evolution, but is disunited from it again, when once developed, in order to exist and act more perfectly, as a tender plant is first brought up in a hot-house, but, when grown up, is placed in the earth.

¹ Sum. Theol., p. i., qu. 84, art. 7.

To recapitulate our prolonged discussion, how has the human soul been presented to our view by all our proofs and positions? With what attributes have we seen it endowed? What nature did we discover in its depth? We may in accordance with our conclusions define it an intellective principiant which is the substantial form of the body. The soul is the principle of life, a substance free from all composition of both integral and essential parts, independent of matter in its existence, and consequently subsistent in itself, a source of the broadest activity, a subject endowed with an intellect capable of knowing all truth, and a will tending to all goodness, the one satisfied only with the knowledge, and the other with the perfect love, of the infinite. To the human soul, therefore, a wonderful excellence is imparted, which raises it not only immensely above the inanimate, but also above all the principles of animal life. For the bodies as such are inert, restricted in their being, and repellant; but man's soul is self-moving, comprehensive, expansive, fit to receive all forms and inclined to all perfection. The bodily world is ever changing even as to its substantial composition, and hence exists limited in time and space; yet our soul, simple in its substance, is absolutely incapable of any essential change, adapted to endless existence, and comprising with its thoughts eternity. All other vital principles of this universe are united to bodies, on which they are essentially dependent, wherefore they cannot exist by themselves, but become extinct together with the destruction of their material substratum; the human soul, on the contrary, is independent of matter and able to exist apart from the body by itself. Again, all cognition and appetite of the sensitive life is restricted to the material, but our vital power lifts itself up by the intellect and will to the objects most pure and spiritual, nay, to the Divinity itself, of which it is a likeness.

But though the human soul is of so noble an origin and nature, it is in its order on the lowest degree of essential perfection, the most imperfect intelligence; on this account it is as a substantial form planted in the body and is made with it one complete substance, to gather by means of the senses less universal, yet clearer, cognition from the world beneath. United to matter, it gives the same completeness in every regard, making it an actual, a living, a sentient being; and, not yet exhausted, it keeps man's characteristic gift, reason and free will, for itself, thus rising above the body, but acting always conjointly with it in consequence of substantial conjunction. This relation to the body distinguishes our soul from the pure spirits, and shows it, particularly during this life, much inferior to them, since they have a direct insight into the immaterial by few, but most comprehensive, ideas, without any

change or interruption. But by this imperfection and destination to union with the body, the soul realizes a grand plan of Divine Providence and plays a wonderful part in the universe. The immense gap between the material and the spiritual is thus shut; two worlds so different, the one so high, the other so low, are amicably joined in one essence, and all creation is harmoniously united. Man himself, in whom this union is effected, becomes a microcosm, a little world resembling the great in all its parts, an epitome, as it were, of all finite being. In him is the material and the immaterial, the latter imperfectly, but the former in its highest perfection, since the bodily forces, vegetation and sensation, are in him more perfect than in anything else.¹

Much and valuable knowledge have we thus gained by the inquiry into the nature of the human soul. We have seen a substance which is a mirror of the whole universe, the summary of all its excellence, the medium of the most astonishing harmony and unity, the source of action more wondrous than all the beauty and the energy of visible nature. We have beheld in it the sublimest kind of cognition, a spark of divine life, a reflection of God's simplicity and infinity, a likeness of the Deity itself. Nowhere are the highest truths, the greatness of God, His wisdom and bounty, revealed to us so clearly as in our own soul.

Into our own selves we have acquired a deeper insight. We have become acquainted with our own weakness and imperfection, but we have also been taught our preëminence over the material, and our exalted dignity; and from thence we may conclude further excellences of the rational part of our being, its incorruptibility and immortality, its destination to contemplate in eternal bliss the beauty, and to embrace with everlasting love the goodness, of the Infinite Being. Our desires, too, are directed to a sublime goal; we feel ourselves carried above these earthly things, low and perishable, to the eternal. Our esteem and love of the moral order is heightened, for the latter now begins to attract us with unwonted power, since it appears to be a light from a superior world, a way to true and everlasting happiness, a harmony between our elevated rank and our conduct, between our actions and our last end in eternity.

Lastly, our courage and confidence is strengthened and mightily supported, because we know ourselves to be the object of God's tenderest affection, since we are His likeness, and rulers of this world set up by Him to dispose of it for His glory. We are assured that, notwithstanding our feebleness, He will not despise us, but with careful providence lead us back to Himself, whence we proceeded. Nor shall we find it inconsistent, but rather highly

¹ Sum. Theol., p. i., qu. 91, art. 1.

credible, that out of His supereminent bounty He has gratuitously lifted us up to the supernatural order revealed in Christian religion. By this new creation He has but extended the profusion of the goodness which He manifested in our first making, and accomplished that conformity and that tendency to Him which He implanted in the nature of our soul.

THE DUTY OF CATHOLICS IN THE FACE OF MODERN UNBELIEF.

IT has been remarked by ecclesiastical historians, that no heresy has ever flourished for more than three hundred years. If one and another among the various forms of error has continued to exist beyond this period, its life has been but a living death. The principle of corruption inherent in it from the first became so manifest to all except those whose eyes were blinded by their personal interest in it, that men passed it by as having outlived its time. It was out of harmony with the spirit of its age. It was not only certainly doomed to die, but the process of decay was visibly proceeding. It was like the man who still lingers on, although mortification has long ago eaten away the diseased limb, and is advancing surely and slowly towards some vital part. After its tercentenary of vigor (if falsehood can ever deserve the name of vigorous), every heresy is doomed to linger on rather than to live, to drag on an inglorious existence without influence, without strength, without any hold on men of cultivated intelligence and ability, save in so far as it panders to pride and passion, and affords a convenient excuse for a life of self-indulgent pleasure-seeking, or sordid money-getting, or selfish ambition. If its term of life has been extended, it is because of the respectable shelter it affords to those who shrink from obedience to a church which enforces upon her children, in practice as well as in theory, the necessity of self-denial and submission to authority. If it still numbers among its members some pious souls, who, in all good faith, accept its teaching, it is because prejudice and education have blinded their eyes, or because they have no opportunity of knowing a better creed. But they are a class existing rather in the past than in the present, or at least they are to be found only in dark nooks and crannies, where the light of God's truth shines but dimly.

To this law of the decay of heresy, Protestantism appeared some thirty or forty years ago to afford a signal exception. It had existed 300 years and more; it had flourished nigh 300 years, if we may date the period of prosperity from the day when the Spanish Armada was wrecked on England's shores, and Elizabeth felt herself secure on a throne which had refused submission to the Holy See. The early storms, half political and half religious, which sent the Pilgrim Fathers to New England's shores, instead of shattering the bark of Protestantism, appeared to establish on either side of the Atlantic a form of religion congenial to the temper of the northern nations, and therefore possessed of a vigorous vitality. The early promise for a long time seemed to be fulfilled. Protestant religion, whether Episcopalian or Presbyterian, was either the established or the dominant religion in England, Scotland and Wales. America, as she grew up to be a powerful and independent nation, followed in the track of the old country. If Ireland clings to her hereditary faith, those who had usurped her soil, and driven her inhabitants from the homes of their ancestors, regarded the crushing out of the Catholic religion as merely a matter of time. If the Irish presumed to be obstinate in their Popery, they could be swept from the country altogether, and could be replaced by Protestant settlers, who would renew the face of the earth, and fill it with an enlightened Protestantism. Everywhere among the English-speaking nations this new form of Christianity rooted and fixed itself, and boldly proclaimed itself the religion of the future, uniting the advantages of Christianity and independence of thought, of piety and freedom, of a willing acceptance of Divine revelation without a submission to any living authority, which could impose inconvenient dogmas.

Even as late as a quarter of a century ago, Protestantism seemed to have fulfilled her early promise. True, there had been internal divisions and defalcations from the religion of the government or of the majority. Episcopalianism has been sorely wounded by children whom she had herself nursed and reared, but if they ceased to be Episcopalians they still remained dogmatic Protestants. Among Episcopalians themselves, a wide separation had arisen between the Evangelical school on the one hand and the Puseyite or Ritualistic on the other hand, but the latter like the former were still essentially dogmatic Protestants, even though they played with the name of Catholic. Firm and strong to all appearance, the Protestant temple still stood; the Protestant Churches were crowded with worshipers; the Protestant religion was regarded as the champion of orthodoxy against the Rationalist, and one Protestant minister's anathema was still regarded with apprehen-

sion, as excluding, if not from the pale of salvation, yet at least from the pale of social and religious respectability.

But how great the change! So great that we who have drifted into it do not appreciate its full significance. The disintegration of Protestantism has been going on with an almost inconceivable rapidity during the last few years, and is proceeding at an ever accelerated ratio. In England it is rapid enough, but the proverbial conservatism of the English character has retarded the process. The political importance of Anglicanism has given to the Episcopalianism of England a factitious strength. The Anglican bishops, members of the House of Peers and Lords spiritual, highly educated and wealthy noblemen, whose well-bred dignity entitled them to a place in the best society, communicated a sort of magnificence to the religious body to which they belonged. The Anglican clergy, drawn from the upper middle class, many of them from the ranks of the landed gentry, were social potentates on a small scale in town and village, and gathered round them all the respectability of its inhabitants. Even now there are many small towns and country districts where absence from the English parish church is considered as almost a slur on any man above the class of laborer or artisan, and the absentee is denounced in the family circle as little better than an infidel. But even in conservative England, these old-fashioned notions are rapidly giving way and are being relegated, like the *paganism* of the early middle ages, to remote districts and hamlets far removed from the busy hum of the crowded city.

In America, however, these influences are scarcely felt. The whole condition of society is completely different. The absence of an hereditary aristocracy, or a state religion, the fact that the influential class consists for the most part of men who have made their own position by their own personal energy and talent, robs Episcopalianism of that exclusive prestige which still clings to it in the educated classes of English society. Every religion in America has to fight its way on its own merits, and if it have weak points, they are sure to be detected and exposed. The quick instinct of public opinion discovers whether any given form of belief has a solid foundation to rest upon, and approves or condemns it accordingly. It is illogical and self-contradictory; the eager and acute intelligence of young America, without any formal process of reasoning, rejects it as an insoluble article. There are none of the time-honored associations clinging around it which in England blind men to its inherent weakness. It has not the traditional hold on the American that it has on the Englishman. The difference between the two countries is of course one of degree, not of kind; but no one who studies the state of feeling on either side of the

Atlantic can deny its existence in a very marked degree. Even in New England, the influence of "blue-blood" and of the form of religion with which the blue-blood for the most part identifies itself, is small as compared with its influence in the old country. In the Western States it scarcely exists at all. In New York and the surrounding cities it is declining day by day, and in a few years will be an element scarcely worth consideration among the forces which will determine the future religion of the country. In England, a Methodist or Wesleyan shopkeeper who makes money and is ambitious to be counted among the "gentry," still finds it desirable to adopt Episcopalianism as one of the factors which constitute respectability and aid the parvenu to a place in good society. But few Americans would think of turning Episcopalians merely for the sake of the social advantages accruing from it.

The result of all this is that dogmatic Protestantism, of which Episcopalianism is the representative creed, has a far worse chance in America than in England. The change which has taken place within the last thirty years is far more obvious in the former than in the latter country. The Episcopal and other Protestant churches find their adherents falling away from them more rapidly. Their congregations become beautifully less, their services are less frequented. The number of worshipers depends far more on the personal ability and attractiveness of the minister. It is far more necessary for him to consult the popular taste, and to serve up meats flavored and seasoned to suit the wishes of his listeners.

The existence and the popularity of men like these is a remarkable indication of the decay of Protestantism in the United States. It is one of many indications that dogmatic Protestantism is moribund, if not practically dead, as a religion. It has been weighed in the balance and found wanting. The hunger after some sort of religion may still attach the "pious female sex" to the formal belief which has been handed down to them; their husbands or brothers may still accompany them to the Episcopal Church of their parish.

In country districts and in fashionable watering-places, the churches may still be frequented for respectability's sake, but Protestantism as a living, energizing power, ready to do battle against all opponents, has lost its former vitality, and thoughtful men are drifting away from it into some form or other of unbelief or agnosticism. They gather in crowds to listen to the open opponent of Christianity, and applaud with insane delight his flippant sarcasms or unveiled attacks on all those doctrines which, to their parents and ancestors, were dear as their very life-blood. Respect for the religious opinions of the majority, which shuts the mouth or veils the unbelief of many an English skeptic, is not recognized in

America as a motive for silence, simply because the majority of Protestants have no religious opinions calling for respect. They no longer cherish the fundamental doctrines of Christianity with a personal and deeply rooted affection. If they still call themselves Christians, their Christianity hangs, for the most part, somewhat loosely about them. They do not feel hurt if it is assailed, or resent the covert sneers of the disciple of Strauss or Renan.

From time to time they wake up to a dim consciousness of the moral and social "ghouls" that are being let loose upon the world by the disciples of "free thought," but the danger is not sufficiently imminent to force them to enter seriously into the consequences of their religious position. They lament the frequency of divorce and the precocious independence of youth, the vices which ravage society and recall the corruptions of the pagan world; but they view the evil from a certain distance and console themselves with a hope that the spread of education or the growth of a healthy civilization will gradually crush out the evils, the existence of which it cannot fail to recognize.

It is not, therefore, to be wondered at, that the encroaching and advancing tide of unbelief makes short work of the barriers by which dogmatic Protestantism seeks to hold it back. As the inrolling sea sweeps away the rampart and citadel of sand which the busy hands of little workmen erect on the sea-shore, so the inrolling sea of skepticism is rapidly washing away the bulwarks and forts of sand which all the various forms of Christianity, save one, oppose to its advance.

All save one—for one there is which the waves and waters of modern thought are powerless to injure. Feebly and fruitlessly they beat upon the solid masonry on which the Church of God is built, and idly they lash themselves into fury and expend their feeble force on the rock upon which she is built. Vainly do they sweep round her if perchance they may find one weak point in her defences, one little cranny in which they may force an entrance and rush in to their work of destruction. But as the ages roll along, instead of loosening her hold or undermining her foundations, they do but add fresh strength to her position and bind together her solid bulwarks into a more perfect unity and exhibit her more clearly to the whole world in the majesty of her eternal might. The Catholic Church rises up proudly among the seething waters, and amid the general ruin stands out in striking contrast to the feeble creeds which are being swallowed up in the abyss. The rain falls and the winds blow and the floods come and beat upon that house, and it falls not, for it is founded on a rock.

Even those who have for centuries attacked and reviled her are beginning, as their own frail tenements are beaten down by the

storm, to turn from time to time their wistful eyes to the indefectible glory of her unshaken faith. She, and she alone, is regarded by the enemies of Christendom as an adversary to be feared, and while they hate her, revile her, misrepresent her, yet all the while in their secret hearts they respect her and recognize her power. The innate faculty which grasps instinctively after Truth can never wholly be eradicated, and even the dogmatic Atheist amid his most audacious blasphemies still cherishes, deep down in the depths of his soul, a consciousness, or half consciousness, that after all the Catholic Church is right and he is wrong. The lurking suspicion may be buried under a heap of vice and pride and intellectual dishonesty; it may be overlaid with a mass of sophisms by which he has long sought to deceive others and has at last succeeded in deceiving only himself. But you may expel nature with the pitchfork of fallacy and plausible argumentation, yet back she will come in spite of all; and the skeptic, while he denounces all religions as mere empty and illogical superstitions worthy of the contempt of intellectual men, has from time to time a misgiving lest in his sweeping denunciation he should be condemning, amid a mass of criminals justly doomed to die, one that is the very Truth itself, and whose only crime is that she demands unqualified and unconditional submission from rebels who will not obey.

But while the Church has nothing to fear from her puny assailants, and looks down calmly from her vantage ground on the battle which rages around, her children, as individuals, do not share in her indefectibility. The waves which beat harmlessly on the rock of the Church may engulf, and do engulf, many of her sons and daughters. The advance of skepticism brings no danger to the Catholic Church, but it is pregnant with danger to Catholics. As the Evil One can avail nothing against God, but can work and does work sad havoc among the children of God, so unbelief, the Devil's first lieutenant, carries captive and entices to their destruction not a few who are the children of Catholic parents and perhaps have themselves been nursed in the Church's bosom. As the Devil consoles himself for the hopelessness of his warfare against God by venting his spite on those who bear the stamp of the Divine likeness, so he consoles himself for the hopelessness of his warfare against the Church by many a successful raid on those who are signed with the sign of the Catholic Church and enrolled in her army. Soldier in deed and in truth the Catholic must be in the present day, and many an assault he must encounter, many a battle he must fight against the countless foes who are arrayed in the livery of modern unbelief. In his daily paper, in his weekly or monthly magazine, among his associates in the school of medicine or of law, in office and counting house, in club and restaurant, on

the railroad, at the hotel, at the private dinner-table, in every social or friendly meeting, he is liable to encounter plausible, ingenious, well-stated objections to Christianity and even to Theism. There is no shirking the contest; the enemy must be met. If we would avoid coming into contact with modern infidelity, we must needs go out of the world. It is in the very air we breathe; it encircles us on every side; we may protect our children from it during childhood and early youth, but the day must come when they will be exposed to its attack. Every day it stalks abroad more fearlessly, emboldened by the overthrow of the dogmatic Protestant. How, then, are we to deal with it? What is the attitude of the Catholic, and especially of the educated Catholic, towards modern Infidelity?

The question is the more important because of the weight which the world outside attaches to the dictum of the Catholic on religious questions. Men seem to expect not only every priest, but every educated layman to be a trained theologian and controversialist. They appear to imagine that the gift of inerrancy attaches to every expression of opinion on the part of each individual Catholic. They expect us, one and all, to be armed *cap-a-pie*, to be ready to meet every objection and to solve every difficulty; or if not this, at least to be able to tell them what the Church teaches on this or that point of doctrine or practice. They are often quite unreasonable in their demands on our information, and on our power of ready argument. All this makes our responsibility the greater. Few Catholics are aware how great a treasure is committed to their charge; how the Protestant and the waverer between belief and unbelief expects of them an acquaintance with all the moot points of controversy, and accepts their statements on the most intricate questions as if they were the voice of the Church herself.

It must be acknowledged that the position of Catholics is a difficult one. As a general rule, our adversaries are better equipped than we are as regards general cultivation, the higher education, and in scientific knowledge. They have the advantage in point of mere secular learning and intellectual development, on both sides of the Atlantic. From a variety of different causes it must be confessed that in respect of dialectic skill, and literary research, and scholar-like training, and breadth of information, Protestants are the superiors of their Catholic neighbors. It would not be difficult, if our space allowed of it, to trace out the causes of this superiority. It will be enough at present to remind our readers that any nation, or section of a nation, which has for long years been driven out of the political and social arena by direct or indirect persecution, sinks thereby in the social and intellectual order, and only recovers, after the lapse of centuries, the advantages of which it has been un-

justly deprived. Add to this that the discouragement by the Catholic Church of mixed education deprives her loyal children of many opportunities of secular learning which they would otherwise have enjoyed. The former of these causes has been at work, ever since the Reformation, both in England and in Ireland. In the latter country it was carried on with a persistent brutality which, until but a short time since, made the higher education impossible, unless at the price of apostasy; and though in England the persecuting laws fell into abeyance at an earlier period, yet the Catholics, long accustomed to the tradition of injustice, and excluded from the English universities, and from all the public educational endowments, held themselves aloof from the intellectual as well as from the political activity of the nation, and lived for the most part in the quiet retirement of a country life.

The savage cruelty with which Ireland was treated in matters of education did not affect the Catholic population of Ireland alone. Its effects are keenly felt in America at the present day. The forced illiteracy of generations has left the class to which most emigrants belong so unaccustomed to intellectual cultivation that they have almost ceased to feel the want of it. In spite of a bright, quick intelligence, in spite of an eagerness for knowledge, in spite of a natural docility and readiness to learn, they have been so long starved of their mental food by the hateful oppression of misrule, that they do not recover, even in the freedom of American liberty, the appetite for intellectual training which once made Ireland one of the most learned of European nations. Even in America, too, Catholics as such are at a disadvantage. The public schools, with their purely secular education, are no fit place for the training of Catholic children. The normal schools and universities share the same defect; and though we cannot expect non-Catholics to understand the injustice thus entailed on Catholic consciences, yet as a matter of fact the Catholic population is at a very serious disadvantage as compared with their Protestant neighbors, and is heavily handicapped in the intellectual race.

All this renders the problem to be solved a more difficult one. Fought the battle must be. How are we to train our young soldiers to fight it? What reply are we to advise the Catholic to make when he is brought face to face with the Protestant, the opponent of Christianity, perhaps the open scoffer against the existence of God? Is he to be silent, or to attempt a reply, conscious as he often is of being at a disadvantage in a knowledge of facts, in skill of argument, in the use of the weapons with which he has to shield himself and to strike down his adversary? Is he to endanger his cause by his feeble method of fighting for it? Is he to expose his holy religion to a suspicion of weakness which is really his, not

Hers? If he attempt a reply, ought he simply to stand on the defensive, or is he to carry the war boldly into the enemy's country and attack the position of his adversaries? Is it best for him merely to state the Catholic doctrine without attempting to defend it, or ought he to be able to give a reason for each article of his faith?

The practical solution of questions like these depends not so much on the generation of Catholics now growing up into manhood and womanhood, as on those who have the charge of their intellectual training. It is the parish priest, the presidents of Catholic schools and colleges, the superiors of the training institutions, the Catholic schoolmaster and schoolmistress, be they religious or secular, whose attention we desire to direct to this all-important question. It is they who have to form the rising generation of Catholics. It is to them that we look for the arming of the champions of Faith against the insidious attacks of error. It is they who have the best opportunity of suggesting the weapons to be used, the method of fighting to be adopted; it is they who must put in the hands of the combatant the shield which is to defend him against the piercing darts of skepticism, and the sword and the spear with which he is to attack and put to flight the enemies of the Catholic Church.

The first point to which we would call attention is a point so obvious that it would be absurd to allude to it if it were not so generally overlooked. It is that all dangers to faith from whatever external source they come derive their power to harm from some moral weakness in him who is exposed to them. Mere external attack will never harm the faith of a Catholic, if he have been living up to his religion. The reason of his peril is that there is a traitor in the citadel. In small or great things there has been some unfaithfulness to the grace of God, some wilful, deliberate unfaithfulness, generally some open rebellion and violation of the moral law. The young man whose life is stainless, who has not allowed the siren pleasure to seduce him by her wiles, or the lust for gold to absorb his energies and shut out God, or the longing for fame and honor and a high reputation among men to turn him aside from his desire to please God, will be impervious to every attack on his faith. The objections raised by the skeptic may cause him pain as being an insult to the religion that he loves and cherishes. He may be quite unable to answer the difficulties raised, but they make no impression upon his intellect, and he instinctively rejects them, as a good son rejects any sort of imputation, however apparently plausible, upon the honor of his mother. It is only when there has been some practical disloyalty to God that faith is prone to be weakened and shaken by the attacks of non-Catholics and

infidels. The moral sense must be perverted before the intellect can admit a practical error subversive of its complete and perfect adherence to Truth.

If all Catholics would live good lives, Ingersoll's blasphemies would fall as harmless on their ears as the rattling shower of bullets on the casemate battery. *Beati mundo corde, quoniam ipsi Deum videbunt.* The pure in heart shall see God, and seeing Him they shall see His truth with a clear vision, and seeing it there is no fear lest they desert their virgin mistress Truth for the foul harlot Error, however cunningly Error be painted to deceive the unwary, and however closely she may seek to imitate in garb and gesture her Godlike rival. Hence the man who trains up the young in the love of virtue does more for the defence of truth than he who hurls syllogisms against Error, and plies her with the most trenchant and convincing argument. He is a more efficacious champion of the truth even than one who furnishes youth with a thorough knowledge of their religion, and teaches them solid arguments in defence of every dogma.

It was only the other day that a young man, trained most carefully in a Catholic college, said mournfully to one who was remonstrating with him on his skepticism: "I know well all the arguments for my religion. I know the answers to all the ordinary objections brought against it. I find no difficulty in refuting the objections, *but yet somehow I myself do not believe.*" The gift of faith had been forfeited by habitual sin, and the armory well stocked with weapons was useless to him, who had lost the power to use them. There is no such thing as a purely intellectual difficulty against the Catholic faith. It is when the intellect is blinded by the corrupt will that conjures up the spectre of doubt that it attributes to the phantom a solid reality. It is the intellect debauched by concupiscence which loses that instinctive perception of truth which is an infallible preservative against error and doubt.

But while all this is of primary importance, while nothing without a high morality can ever be a safeguard against the loss of faith, we must not neglect the other side of the question. We must not be satisfied to see our youth grow up pious noodles so long as we are sure that they are pious. Even if it were safe policy as regards Catholics themselves (which it is not), it would bring Catholicity into contempt, and would be a fatal bar to the conversion of those who, though outside the Church, instinctively look to Catholics as the proper champions of truth. Even on matters of natural religion, unconnected with positive dogma, Catholics, and especially Catholic priests, are expected to come to the front, and so be ready with a philosophical defence of first principles. Hence arises the practical point at issue, how far should ordinary

Catholics be trained up to religious argument with the enemies of our religion, or with inquirers who raise conscientious difficulties against this or that dogma, or Catholic practice?

I think that the general experience goes to prove that religious controversy is rarely productive of much good. It may be sometimes necessary, but it is an unfortunate necessity. It rarely convinces; it still more rarely converts. It very commonly strengthens prejudice and embitters opposition to the Church. It has a constant tendency to desert the true question at issue, and to run off into some issue which is not really to the point. It assigns the victory for the most part not to the champion of truth, but to the possessor of the quickest wit and sharpest tongue. It is of more importance to the professional controversialist that his arguments should be plausible than that they should be true. In controversy clever clap-trap often carries the day. An appeal to the sympathies or feelings will enlist the hearer on the side of error in spite of the underlying fallacy. For these and other reasons like them it is, as a general rule, unwise for the ordinary Catholic to enter upon a religious controversy. It is far better for him to fall back upon the weight of authority; and any man of intelligence will understand that this is the most rational and sensible course for him to pursue. If a skeptic asks me (I speak in the character of an average educated Catholic layman) whether I really believe that my God is present in a wafer, when the evidence of every sense testifies to its being an ordinary piece of bread, and challenges me to prove the fact, my most rational answer is to ask him, by way of retort, whether he really believes that the earth moves and the sun stands still, when the evidence of his senses testifies to the contrary, and so challenge him to prove by arguments the scientific fact. He will, probably, reply that it has been proved again and again; and that, though he cannot bring forward the actual proof, yet he knows that they are sufficient to satisfy men of learning who are competent judges of the question. I answer that this is exactly my case with regard to the doctrine of the Blessed Eucharist. I cannot prove it, but I am satisfied to receive it on authority, just as he receives on authority the doctrine of the earth's revolution. The only difference is that he relies on human authority, and therefore makes an act of human faith. I rely only on Divine authority as well as human, and therefore make an act of Divine faith.

But, as a general rule, what is asked and expected of Catholics is not so much the arguments by which they try to prove this or that dogma, as a statement of what the Church actually teaches on this or that point. One of the greatest hindrances to the conversion of non-Catholics is a false idea of Catholic teaching; they

attribute to her some manifest absurdity, and then on the strength of its incredibility reject the Church's teaching as a whole. Granted their premiss, their conclusion is a perfectly logical one. If the Church inculcated upon her children a single dogma which wavered by a single hair's breadth from the rule of truth, the whole system of her teaching would be justly rejected by mankind. It is true that Tertullian says, *Credo quia absurdum*, but we must remember that Tertullian was a Montanist, and, even if he had not fallen away when he wrote those words, yet the tendency to exaggeration was a part of his nature. Besides, the words admit of a perfectly true meaning. *Credo quia absurdum* does not mean, I believe this on the score of its absurdity, but I am obliged to exercise faith on this point because it is at variance with ordinary experience. In this sense the dictum is perfectly true of the mystery of the Blessed Eucharist, of all miracles, of all the strange paradoxes which make the Gospel of Christ a scandal to the Jews, and to the Greeks a folly. But Catholics at the same time cling to that shield which is their safeguard against the skeptic and the world. They must never forget that there is only one religious system in the world which teaches no absurdity in the strict sense of the word, which involves no inherent contradiction, which asks the acceptance of nothing against which an enlightened reason revolts, and that is the Church which is founded on the See of Peter.

To return to our immediate subject, we are asking ourselves, what is the safest attitude for the average educated Catholic, when brought face to face with the infidel objector; and consequently what should be the general drift of the teaching given to our young Catholics, who are likely to have to encounter cultivated skepticism, and what should be the advice of those who educate them as to the position they should take up if called upon to defend their faith? As I have said, they cannot be armed, *cap-a-pie*, against all possible objections, and, even if they could, it certainly is a dangerous thing to enter upon a dispute with an opponent who is well-instructed, quick-witted, and perhaps rather unscrupulous. But men of the world do expect, and have a right to expect, that the Catholics should be able to state, clearly and simply, what it is that the Church teaches on those points where she is most often misrepresented, and where she is most obvious to plausible objection. The mind of man has an instinctive perception of truth, an innate appreciation of the fitness of things. This instinct, though it may be dulled by deliberate sin, and overlaid with ignorance and prejudice, never disappears altogether. Even in those who have learnt to call evil good, and good evil, it never can be wholly extinct; some faint vestiges of it remain even in the degraded intelligence of the dogmatic and proselytizing atheist. In the man

of good-will, who is ready to obey the law of God so far as he can see that it binds him, and to submit to the yoke of the Church as soon as he is convinced of her claims to be the divine teacher, this instinctive power enables him to recognize at once that which has a ring of truth, to discern without an effort the true from the false. Such a man, when he hears the Catholic doctrine stated on any controverted point, is impelled by his natural love of truth to assent to it. To the voice of nature the supernatural voice, speaking within him, as by divine authority, adds its confirming verdict of approval; the process in his mind is one of immediate intuition, rather than of argument; he is drawn towards the truth almost in spite of himself; he takes to it naturally without exactly knowing why, just as the healthy appetite takes to the food suitable to its needs. He falls in love with its divine loveliness without being able to account even to himself for his yearning after it.

We often hear non-Catholics candidly avow, when thus the truth is set before them, that there is something in it irresistibly attractive. They profess their admiration for its dogmas, generally speaking, and only except a few, which some personal consideration or a misunderstanding of them causes them to look askance at and reject. Very often it is sheer ignorance of what those dogmas really are which gives rise to their dislike of them. What they object to is not any doctrine as taught by the Church, but the caricature which passes current for the reality in the world at large. It is true that the difficulty may partly arise from themselves, that the cloud of ignorance may be mingled with the mist of sin, that those prejudices would somehow melt away if they had not in their actions been false to the guidance of the Light which lightens every man who is born into the world. But the moral barrier could often be overleaped were it not for the gulf of ignorance behind it. It is the double chain which cannot be broken, and which hinders the soul from attaining the truth after which it longs.

I do not hesitate to call it a *gulf* of ignorance; and it is a gulf, the depth and breadth of which it is not easy for one who has always been a Catholic to understand and appreciate, unless he has been brought into contact with it professionally as a priest must needs be in a large city, still Catholics cannot be wholly ignorant of its existence. Now and then some well-educated man lets fall a remark which betrays an entire misconception of the most fundamental doctrines and practices of the Church. Sometimes a popular writer lets us into the secret of his aversion to Catholicity by some portentous misstatement as to what Rome teaches. We ourselves remember a Protestant Episcopal clergyman who, after a visit to France, gravely informed his congregation that in that priest-ridden country he had actually seen a list of the various

prices for which different sins could be forgiven. When the good man was questioned it turned out that, in his ignorance of the language, he had thought that the "Prix des Chaises," often hung up at the door of French cathedrals, was a price-list of the sums received for absolution from sins more or less heinous. Some of our readers will recollect, in Hawthorne's *Scarlet Letter*, his extraordinary calculation of the amount of indulgences which could be gained at Rome in a few hours. Under the false impression that an indulgence of one year meant the curtailment by one year of the time to be spent in purgatory, he comes to the conclusion that, by reciting certain prayers and visiting certain holy places, any ordinary individual might in a very short time shorten their time in purgatory by hundreds or thousands of years, and he points out very naturally the demoralizing effect of such a belief. Such a mistake as this creates a very excusable prejudice, but at the same time is a fatal barrier to the conversion of those who entertain it. It is mistakes like this that every educated Catholic should be able to contradict. It is of the greatest importance to Catholics, not for their own sakes alone, but for the sake of others also, that they should be instructed in the Church's doctrine on points where a little perversion will turn what is reasonable and true into what is quite unreasonable and false. If a Catholic has never been taught the difference between absolute and relative worship, how can he meet successfully the Protestant objection to the "adoration of the Cross?" If he has never been instructed in the doctrine of concomitance, how can he reasonably explain the Church's practice of Communion under one species only? If he has never learned what indulgence really means, and the true significance of an indulgence of three hundred days, or seven years, how can he answer, even in his own mind, the countless difficulties that may be raised against them?

The conclusions which follow from what we have been saying may be stated in a few words. 1. For the maintenance and for the advancement of the Catholic religion nothing is so important as the faithful practice of it by individual Catholics. Nothing but this can secure them from defection; nothing has such a power to win over others as this. The point of primary importance, therefore, is to train the young to purity of morals and to the obedience of faith.

2. This is not enough, or rather it is impossible without a further step. Moral and religious training must include the intellect as well as the will. Instruction is necessary, else ignorance is sure to bring with it its twin companion sin. Our young Catholics must be taught not only to state with accuracy the leading tenets of their faith, but to be able to give a reasonable ex-

planation of them, such as would satisfy the educated inquirer upon those points where Protestants most frequently attack us.

3. It is not desirable to encourage in the average lay Catholic an eagerness for the fray in matters of religion. He will often do better to meet the objector by some ready rejoinder, personal or even irrelevant, than by a serious attempt to argue out the difficulty. If a man begin to talk about the "monstrous conception of eternal fire," it may be a better answer to ask him to withhold his judgment until he has been there for a hundred years or so, than to rouse him to fresh blasphemies by discussing the possibility of hell. We must be on our guard against exposing that which is holy to be trampled upon by the sensualist, or torn by the unbeliever. There is a *disciplina arcani* suitable to these days of modern paganism, as well as that which the Christians practised among the pagans of old.

QUID EST HOMO? A QUERY ON THE PLURALITY OF WORLDS.

IN a learned and interesting article, which the April issue of the QUARTERLY contained, there was expounded a theory on the plurality of worlds, by one highly qualified to handle the subject. The theory is one which is patronized by not a few in the learned world; and, in the article to which we refer, it is brought back to solid principles, and is made to rest on a basis so trustworthy as the doctrine of St. Thomas. The readiness and familiarity with which the reverend and learned writer applies the principles of the Angelic Doctor to the theory before him, is one instance of that philosophical revival which is a bright feature of the day; and which shines on the face of the Church, refreshes our Catholic instincts, and follows up the initiative taken by His Holiness, in the cause of true science and learning. Hoping to see a fuller development given to this question, which is felt to bear somehow in a significant manner upon all our revealed doctrine, we have thought to offer a few remarks upon the arguments presented by the learned essayist; and, if the tenor of our observations seem but critical and so far negative, we would beg to supplement them with a more positive view, to which the reverend essayist barely alluded.

To make clear the full weight and significance of his speculation,

as far as it affects infidelity, it seems very evident that what he undertook to prove against free thought is abundantly established. He desired to show that no relevant objection could be made to Revelation, and no slight could be put upon it, by the scientific hypothesis of a plurality of races inhabiting the stellar orbs. Should the present unverified hypothesis be, in any possible event, raised to the dignity of a doctrine, Revelation will remain equally a doctrine, in all its symmetry of form and proportion.

Further, in the reverend author's judgment, the outcome of such a scientific development would be an extension of view, an increased grandeur of conception. We cannot but agree with him; for whatever God has done must result so with us. But he proceeds farther, and is prone to anticipate; and with the good-will which goes half-way towards making a hearty scientist, he forestalls that conclusion, he believes it actual, and thinks God has dealt so with those stellar depths, and has peopled them with rational beings, of our genus, though not of our species.

For this he offers three arguments. More than three we cannot distinguish. Taking them in the order in which we now mean to review them, we may call them the utilitarian argument, the argument for number of species, and the argument for reconciliation.

Utilitarianism in general is the system of thought or action by which things are referred as means to an end. Systematically, things are viewed as measured by the end, and their worth is determined by that. They are compared, assorted, accepted, rejected, on the merits of this one relationship,—how they comport with the end in view. Thus far we are all utilitarians, in theory as well as in practice.

There are two greater orders of utilitarianism, one broad, the other narrow; one viewing things at large, the other regarding them in a special field; the one being that of the commander, the other that of his subaltern. The broad system of utilitarianism excludes the view of no particular end, but by preference keeps its eye on the one more remote, towards which all others converge. Facts and relations which lie outside of the subaltern's field of vision appear, from this commanding point, conspicuous and ordered in keeping with the rest. Facts even which might seem in conflict with other facts become coördinate therewith, by subordination to a higher fact; and notes which sounded in conflicting keys resolve into the intelligent elements of a more comprehensive harmony. In this view of the world, what seems to be neglect in one direction is part of a higher providence in another. "Has God a care for the oxen?" asks the apostle. But if He has not, or has less care for the oxen, it is only because He has more for men, and for

their progress in mercy and charity and hope. In this broad view of the world, even such a thing as evil in the universe is possible; and the universe withal rolls on in its own perfect movement, perfect whether the rhythm of that movement be, absolutely speaking, good, or better, or best.

Thus, then, what within our limited span of life, and to our narrow stretch of vision, seem irreconcilable facts which will never meet in one, like meridians, which at the equator appear perfectly parallel; the same facts pursued beyond the visible horizon, and discerned by a higher intelligence, are found to meet at the pole. And again, as on the smooth surface of the sea it might appear that so level a table, or rather so concave a bosom which the ocean presents, could never, by any freak of fortune, happen to be round and convex, and nod complacently towards itself, till reëntering into itself it came around to whence it started; so, standing as we do, on the infinitesimal arc of some six thousand historical years, we are liable, in our littleness, to settle down in a valley of difficulties, and to feel great thoughts like a great weight upon our little premises; and so it must be until, standing outside of our native narrowness, we come to ply a leverage of thought which is not restricted by the conditions of our birth, and we behold all meridians meeting in a pole, and every surface of the sphere, no matter how varied, blending amicably with every other. This is the broader utilitarian view of things. It is metaphysical and theological.

There is another utilitarianism, that of the subaltern; who, placed to command some nearer attainable end, bends every nerve towards the attainment thereof. In the departments of knowledge, theoretical and practical alike, so various are the adaptations actual and possible, so numerous the combinations, and so diverse the abilities of men for discovering, devising or applying the one or the other, that, in every laboratory of nature and in every hall of speculation, a peerage of wit comes into existence, an aristocracy of genius. The nineteenth century in particular has revised all the merits and titles of nobility, by re-arranging everything upon its own peculiar ground of material culture, or the development of material resources. Men are excellent according as they excel in material specialties. All specialties are partial, limited, but these in particular are limited to matters of sight, touch, hearing; and their highest theory seldom wanders far beyond the demands of practical comfort. Thus hampered, if this utilitarianism applies its principles to wider questions, to metaphysics or theology, it is narrow and warped in the effort. If it essays to control the nobler world of thought, of doctrine, of ethics, of politics, it measures religion by mathematics, piety by poetry, monasticism by the fiscal

returns, eternal justice by material expediency. It has given birth to a liberal brood of scientific knight-errantry, of freebooters and free lances; of steady political legislation, intrenching in parallel lines of approach upon every stronghold of truth and virtue. It never fails to make a point one way or another; and the least it does is to mask effectively the object of all man's highest cravings, and the final object of true utilitarianism, the knowledge and service of God. For, who ever missed eternal bliss, except on some principle of narrow utility? He had bought a yoke; or he had purchased a house; or he had married a wife; so he left heaven alone. This is materialistic utilitarianism.

Having settled these preliminaries, we may now approach the argument which the reverend essayist bases upon utility. He first lays down the general principle: "God, having determined upon the amount of perfection to be created, was bound to draw from it the greatest possible amount of glory; no force of the universe should be allowed to go to waste; all the forces combined should be so drawn out as to realize in the best possible manner the general end of the universe." Then he proceeds to make the particular application of this general principle: "Now, without the plurality of worlds teeming with myriads of intellectual substances informing an organism, this law of wisdom would utterly fail. Pray, what is the physical use of such masses? Can any one tell? No use whatever can be mentioned; we can see no necessity for such a vast number of colossal systems," etc. Therefore, there exists a plurality of worlds. We beg leave to determine the exact value of these propositions, especially of the second, or minor.

Indeed, as to the general proposition, no philosopher, whose mind is imbued with the essentially broad views of St. Thomas, will ever start with narrow principles, or give in to the short-sighted materialism of the day. But it is quite possible that, with such a broad principle as God's greater glory over-ruling everything, one should connect some other assertion rather too restricted in its nature; as, that the said glory of God cannot be attained except in such and such ways as I designate; particularly if I designate them merely in default of my seeing other ways.

In all matters of God's free choice and determination, and such are the creation and arrangement of things in the universe, God chose freely what number, weight and measure He pleased. He did so on earth; He has done so in the sky. No necessity is imposed on Him as to whether He should make things or not, no necessity arising either from the immutable essences of things, or the immutable attitude of all things towards Himself. And when He chose this world, to make it in time, He made it as its essences demanded that they should be, and He made it essentially depen-

dent on Himself, so that it should ever give glory to Him, as a whole and in all its parts. But how much of it there should be, and how its parts should stand related to one another, in the mingling and blending of their physical proportions, this was entirely the subject matter of His free design, and He designed it all freely. Therefore is it that we know miracles are possible: therefore, likewise, optimism is false.

Is it needful that one physical element more, or one less, should temper the world to make it the very best? Is it needful that two suns, or no sun, should revolve here or there? Is it needful that more grass or less rock should fill up this prospect to satisfy the eye? What is there to make anything necessary, when the whole thing is unnecessary, and every one of its parts arbitrary? If it can be shown by an exclusive minor proposition that such and such a method is the *only* way for effecting the glory of God, then the argument will be quite conclusive that such a method exists. But if the economy of the glory of God is to be demonstrated by fair-seeming hypotheses, which are not exclusive, then there is no inference metaphysically conclusive. At most one can affirm: "I do not know what else can be said." One can ask questions: "Pray, what is the physical use of such an arrangement otherwise?" One can plead that he "sees no necessity for such a vast number of colossal suns and planets, unless this hypothesis be accepted." But all this fails of coming to a certain conclusion, because the conclusion will have started from an uncertain hypothesis.

Sometimes, indeed, it seems possible to argue in these matters absolutely; as when St. Thomas lays it down broadly that no created effect can exhaust the power of God, yet goes on to say that no dignity can be higher than that of the Mother of God; which surely seems to be only a created effect. But when we lay this down, given the present world such as it is, in the number, weight and measure poised as it is by God's free choice, calculated by His wisdom to return just so much glory, not more, not less,—it will be difficult from the general premises, that God's glory must be elicited, and that the world's forces must not be wasted, to conclude that, therefore, such and such exclusively must be the arrangement, and that, as with the moon of Laplace, if God did not arrange it so, there must have been an error in the process. And if Laplace's speculation had been justified, what would it prove? Only this, that in the parts of the world there is no optimism, just as in the whole world we know there is none. For the parts need not be better than the whole, in that wherein they offer themselves indifferent and free to the choice of God's free will. And who will show that the poisoning of a moon, or the locating of a rational

species here or there, is not indifferent and free; that such elements belong either to the intrinsic essence of matter, or to the essential attitude of matter towards God? This can be proved of *one* rational species; but given one such species, or even one individual, there the conclusion stops. Now here we are speaking of *more* than one rational species; we are discussing the question of a plurality of worlds. Therefore, in the argument before us, granting the general principle, we have to decline accepting the minor, which is not and cannot be proved.

We might desist here from weighing the utilitarian argument more fully, but that we observe the argument itself insists and pushes onward. It borrows the aid of another argument to confirm it. And this confirmation is derived from the size, number, weight and other material conditions of the heavenly orbs. Emphasis is laid upon the fact that for over fifty centuries they have rolled unknown through immeasurable space, that myriads upon myriads of millions of solar systems so vast, so colossal, so swift in their movements, have all the while been moving in rhythmical revolutions. Now this would have been a prodigality of outlay, unless the hypothesis before us be accepted. Therefore, we must accept the plurality of worlds.

But it seems to us that these material conditions assume in the argument a degree of importance which sounds unfamiliar to our ears, either in connection with St. Thomas, or with any "theological and metaphysical arguments" of our acquaintance. For it is on this basis that the reasoning is said to be conducted. Now are not these elements purely physical and materialistic? Do they not appeal to mere imagination, which they tend to oppress with vastness, number and weight? And does the oppression of the imagination tend to simplify, and not rather to mystify, the operations of a logical reason? We would beg to suggest that metaphysical and theological reason will find a single grain of sand, or one drop of water, quite as effective in the premises as the burden of the myriad myriads. Nay, taking up the argument in the very sense which now we are criticising, we will state independently, that if a single grain of sand on the far-off shore in a stellar space, if a single drop of rain falling in the midst of the sea on some starry orb, if a single "gem of purest ray serene" in the deep bosom of some solar ocean, can be shown to be thrown away, to be useless in creation, to be *frustra*, then all the epithets lavished upon these vast systems in the same hypothesis, must on all accounts be expended on that grain of sand, that drop of rain, that gem of purest ray serene. Then there would be a reckless "waste of forces,"—a "failure to put the amount of forces cre-

ated to the best possible advantage"—a "manner of acting absolutely and utterly unworthy of God's wisdom,"—and so forth.

And now, having struck a blow in behalf of the theory, we beg leave to turn round and address it thus: Pray, what reason can you assign why the drop of rain in *our* mid-ocean is not utterly wasted? why the grain of sand on *our* shore is not recklessly thrown away? why the protophyte is not prodigally abused in the bottom of *our* sea? What reason can you assign, which will not exactly apply to the uninhabited state of the stellar orbs? Is it that you see the actual use of the odd protophyte, which I now designate with the finger of my fancy amid the million millions? Is it that you weigh the utility of that drop of rain in the middle of the sea? Can you estimate the exact value in creation of that unknown vein of metal in the bowels of this earth? Unknown, I say. If you cannot, why take offence at the unknown stellar orbs? If you can, apply the same reason to them. It will fit exactly.

Allow me to urge the point. "Hast thou entered into the depths of the sea, and walked in the lowest parts of the deep? Hast thou considered the breadth of the earth? Tell me if thou knowest all things?" Can you understand evil in the world? Yet, evil is here, and God's glory is gathered from it, and greater glory than if He had not permitted it. And, if uninhabited stellar orbs are not evil, either morally or physically, what antecedent reasoning, either metaphysical or theological, can put them down as a failure, unless, perforce, they admit of such and such an hypothesis to save them from condemnation?

And, if man did know the reasons for this orb and not for the others, that would give him no premise to work on, except his ignorance. But man's ignorance and man's knowledge alike, in the positive order of physical creation, are no criterion whatever of its why or its wherefore. Rather the very development of man, that he might have something to know, and might come in time to learn it, is reason enough why God should have given the world an amplitude sufficient to supply us with subjects of thought throughout all time, without fear of our resources being ever exhausted. He has handed the universe over to our disputations, and He has given an occupation to the children of men. We are but embryonic, and, if we live, it is but for a day. And, as we might imagine a puzzled embryo philosophizing on its hapless condition,—Why this forming system? Why this developing vertebra? Why this locomotive apparatus for one who has never known motion? and we answer, commiserating: Wait awhile, yet a little while, and the evolution of God's providence will justify itself and you; so is it with this embryonic universe, philoso-

phizing in its centre, man. Or, if you will have it rather that he is no embryo, but developed and living for a few days, short and evil, and that querulously he puts forth a cry from the narrowness of his view and the shortness of his ken; for he cannot understand the things that are about him, and much less the things that are above him; lo! a sweet spirit of the sky may be heard to whisper in the simplicity of his soul: "O man! who art thou that judgest? Behold yon sky; as far as the heavens transcend the earth, so far are God's thoughts above your thoughts, and God's ways above your ways. He is patient, because eternal; *patiens quia æternus*. He has plenty of time, for He lives from everlasting to everlasting. You are impatient; you live but a day, and you live fast; and thirty generations are come and gone before a sea-level is raised. It is meet you should have a resurrection!"

The next argument which we review proceeds to this effect, that the higher we mount in the scale of being, the more manifold must we find the number of species in each higher order, and since, within the compass of this material universe, the rational creature is highest, the number of rational species should be indefinitely multiplied. Now, it is evident that mankind is only one such species. Therefore, there must be others in the stars.

This argument, which is drawn from general principles of St. Thomas, is confirmed by another saying of the Angelic Doctor. He observes that there is a wider distance between the lowest angel and the most intelligent man than between the latter and the lowest savage. But there are countless degrees between these two latter. Therefore there must be countless species between the two former, between man and the angel.

We shall first take up the argument, then its confirmation, and afterwards set matters in that light wherein we conceive them from St. Thomas.

Does not the argument go beyond its object, and overleap itself? and, instead of answering a difficulty, raise it in an aggravated form? With the elevation of species, it is said, there should be an increase in the multiplication thereof; therefore, since on this planet there are many species of the lower orders, and only one rational species, there must be other rational beings in the stars. Granted, for the moment; we continue: and will there not be more species of the lower orders, too, in the same stars? If there are ten myriads of these lower orders to overbalance poor single-handed man on this unprovided orb, will there not be ten myriads of them to overbalance the poor rational being there? The difficulty is raised to an aggravated form. For the same argument, which will establish a rational being there, different in species from the rational being here, will differentiate the lower orders there from their

compeers here. Is there, in fact, a reason drawn from the nature of things, from the power of God, from the conditions of climate, which will vary one kind, and not the other? It cannot be urged that the difficulty requires it so, for that would be to beg the question. We are denying the while that the difficulty does require it so, or rather that there is any difficulty at all to be settled. But of that subsequently.

A confirmation is added, which we do not quite understand, for it seems to create a new difficulty, and that in logic. What meaning there is in it seems to be only this, that a specific difference exists between the angel and man, while no such specific difference exists between the most intelligent man and the lowest savage. A specific difference, as we know, is vastly greater than all the possible grades of intelligence between a learned gentleman and a poor Hottentot. The saying, then, of St. Thomas *might* be utilized in some such way as this: "The intellect of an angel," he says, "surpasses the human intellect more than that of the best philosopher surpasses the lowest clown, for these two latter are within the one species, and the two former are not;" and similarly, the lowest clown surpasses the highest brute more than he is surpassed by the best philosopher. But this establishes our one rational species just half way, and symmetrically, between brute and angel. Therefore, there is no need of imagining any other rational species in the stars.

As to the other principles quoted from St. Thomas, they would prove something as to our rational species, if only they could be applied to it; as every general principle demands a particular minor to make it descend upon a special subject. But the principles are quoted in their generality, and are simply applied to our subject-matter without misgiving. And as to a certain analogy supplied by St. Augustine, when he speaks of the stars as possibly sensitive or intelligent, and St. Thomas subjoins the query, whether perhaps they may not be informed by incorporeal substances, the whole state of the question is very obscure, and the subject-matter is very different from the present, where we speak not of stars being rational, but of rational beings in the stars. St. Thomas, then, may well say, "It makes no difference to divine faith whether it be one way or the other," while our learned author lays stress on the fact that the present question does make much difference, some way or other, as regards the contents of our faith.

Before we proceed to that, we may be allowed to state the misgivings we feel, arising from the whole doctrine of St. Thomas and tending to show that no general principles of the multiplication of species can be made to bear upon species of the rational kind. We shall thus be giving a reply to the appeal of the learned essayist,

when he asks: "Why should the principle fail in its best and noblest application, whereas it is maintained and applied in the lower being?"

In the whole structure of scholastic philosophy, the prospect, which is consistently presented to our view as comprehending the whole of creation, is that there are two extremes therein, and but one mean, the extremes being, on the one hand, the purely spiritual, and, on the other, the purely material; the mean being the juncture between the two.

Now, it is impossible that a juncture be more than one. It is impossible to conceive of a useful rivet, which, before it holds two surfaces together, must be riveted by another rivet, and that by a third, and so on indefinitely. Because, if this were necessary, the first were no rivet at all, but called so by a misnomer. Now, St. Thomas is not misnaming; he is constantly proving the thing, that man is the rivet, the juncture, betwixt intellectual substances above and material substances below. Man adequately joins these two orders together in the indefeasible right of his being a mean between them; for he alone is double, compounded of both, having a spiritual soul and a material body. He cannot then need another juncture to unite himself, already the juncture, with either extreme, and then a third, and then a fourth. Such multiplication of species, which shall be edged in between man and the angel, comes under a head of argument constantly rebutted by scholastic philosophy, as when it proves that we cannot go on indefinitely in reaching a first cause, or that accidents do not need other accidents, whereby they may be joined to their immediate subject; that the modality, for instance, called curvature, does not need another mode to hang upon its subject, as a hook in the wall does not demand another hook whereby itself shall hang, and this latter a third, and then a fourth. Thus, again, no relationship between two terms postulates anything except the two. Given the two extremes, the relationship between at once blossoms forth. And just so, in the infinite wisdom of God, given the two extremes of the purely intellectual angel and the purely material brute, the intermediary between both at once blossoms forth, and that is man. And rising to a higher analogy in the infinite mercy of the Lord, given a fallen race and a commiserating God, the flower of David blossoms forth between them, and the Word made Flesh joins the two in one.

The mention which we have just made of Christ, the Incarnate Word, offers to introduce us into our own positive view, regarding the question before us; but the learned essayist opens up this subject of the Incarnation as a distinct issue with infidelity. We should have thought there was no need for this; all that he had

said before sufficiently guards our flank on this side. We think, too, that nothing is gained in the new issue.

For, first, he states impressively the importance of this new debate. "These questions," he observes, "must be answered, for on them depends the whole controversy between infidelity and Christianity." He states the question, and clears the ground. "In what relation would these new personalities, so to speak, stand with regard to the whole system of our holy religion? What place would they hold in it?" etc. Then he lays down his proposition: That Christ is the centre of all; that all these creations were made through Christ, glorify God dependently on Christ, and do so morally. In short, he sums up thus: As we all received of Christ's fulness; so must they receive of His fulness to reach their destiny.

Now we come to the proof. But the author observes: "Of course, this is not the place to prove the above statements, or vindicate their truth. We must necessarily take them for granted."

But here we are somewhat at a loss. Is the argument undertaken for the sake of Catholics? They could dispense with it; they accept the conclusions beforehand. Is it for the sake of infidels? Then they deny all the premises. The infidel accepts the plurality of worlds, and denies Christianity. A Catholic accepts Christianity, and possibly denies the plurality of worlds. The reconciliation begins with what each admits, and proves no point which either denies. As far, therefore, as this argument goes, the sneer of Tom Paine still curls upon his lip, and he repeats with perfect assurance: "The two beliefs cannot be held together in the same mind, and he who thinks he believes in both, has thought but little of either."

But however little the argument may serve to conciliate the infidel, or to propitiate the believer, it will serve us excellently for a transition, and by this door we may enter into our positive and constructive view of things. If this prove suggestive and consistent, that will be only because there is absolutely nothing new in it; for it is as old as Christianity. If it be found wanting, that will be only because justice is not done to it in our treatment of it, and we beg the philosophical and theological minds to fill up the deficiencies as they will know how.

Let us observe, then, where the speculation has left us. It has left us pondering, at its own invitation, on the only sound explanation of our Lord's attitude towards those imaginary races in the stars. And what is that attitude? Let us take in its full meaning, and note the involuntary admissions which the theory before us makes, when it invites us to ponder on our Lord's Providence in the world.

What is the attitude? It is that of One, who, though Highest by nature, has deliberately chosen a rational species, and assumed a lowly compound nature. And which of the rational species, propounded in the theory, has He selected? Is it the highest? No, but in the theory the lowest. He has not seized upon the higher races. He has not taken his stand upon the largest orbs. He has not selected a central sun; nor even, in this system of ours, which He has honored with His Incarnation, has He chosen a sun at all. Among this little knot of planets His glance has lighted favorably, not upon the largest, almost upon the smallest. Further, on this little earth did He honor the highest point, or a central spot, or the most fertile land, or anything, in short, that was either mathematically or physically symmetrical? Oh, philosophically and theologically, He is the very centre of the universe. He is the Light of all creation, and the Mirror without spot of the eternal majesty. But what have the physics of matter to do with that? or even the politics of human kind? May be, politically viewed, He chose the centre of the human world? Is that so? Was Judea a centre? And in despised Judea did He at least make choice of Jerusalem, and of the Temple therein, and, at a fitting moment, in the splendor of solemnities, amid the august throng of sacred priests and noble princes, walk forth upon this earth in His pride of beauty, and seize in willing captivity the gazing eyes and ravished hearts of senates lost in admiration and multitudes prostrate in adoration? What a sarcasm on such a pretty phantasy is Bethlehem, and Nazareth, and Galilee, and Egypt! What a shock to the æsthetics of science is the company He kept! What a scandal to all mathematics, pure as well as mixed, to all the equipoising of the worlds, political, solar and nebular, is everything He did! We may recall St. Augustine's festive vein: *Accedet homo ad cor altum et exaltabitur Deus*; "Man shall reach to a deep heart, and God shall be deeper still." *Homo, scrutando scrutationes defecisti!* "O man, thou hast missed it in thy searchings so profound!"

This analogy quite illuminates our present topic, for in its light there is much less to wonder at, if we find man, whose head Christ is, made a little less than the angels; and if, in the natural, as well as moral conditions of his being, we behold him situated in exact accord with his prototype; for that prototype was made man *propter homines*, for men's sake; and He is the model and *sampler* of all their existence. If man, then, is not located in a central sun, nor on the largest planet; if he was not set in mathematical proportion either with the heavens above, or with the earth beneath, or with the waters under the earth; if he is not moulded to match the myriads of lower creatures afar off among the zoophytes, nor

even to hold his own against his nearest neighbors, the elephant, the lion, and the horse, in their strength, size, and agility; if these things are so, who is it that can take offence? Is it the world or its physics? Tell me, was man made for the world and its physics, or were they made for man? *Propter hominem*. And is it by quantity, by *moles*, that he is better than they? Perhaps it is St. Augustine that answers somewhere: "*Non mole magna sunt, quæ vere magna sunt.*"

"It is not growing like a tree,
In bulk, doth make man better be,"

observes Ben Jonson; and it may be that what the dramatist goes on to say will add significance to other parts of our discussion. He continues:

"Or standing long an oak, three hundred year,
To fall a log at last, dry, bald, and sear.
A lily of a day
Is fairer far in May.
Although it fall and die that night,
It was the plant and flower of Light!
In small proportions we just beauties see;
And in short measure life may perfect be."

Something more remarkable is this, that, as we mount higher in the dispensations of God, we tend more towards unity. In the supernatural order there is only One Man, the Mediator, Christ Jesus; there is only one such couple as Mary and Joseph. And, as we begin to descend, the comprehension of perfections becoming less, the extension of quantity becomes more. There are twelve Apostles and seventy-two Disciples; and so on down to the base of the pyramid, the apex being at the top. And in the natural order, in the world of matter and of man, the same law holds. Man is the apex of the orders; and, as we descend in the scale of beings, they lose, compared with him, in the comprehensiveness of their perfection; and so they gain in extension, to make up by quantity what they lack in quality; for man in the material world has been appointed to represent God in the universe. And as in the universe no created word can express God sufficiently, or can articulate half this idea, the Divine Wisdom multiplies His words like an eloquent pleader; He distributes His phrases like a rhythmic poet, He speaks gently to win us sweetly, He showers His speech to impress us mightily; and that, without being oppressed, we may receive largely of His resources, He has economized them for our weakness in an unfolding reserve that shall open as we demand, and shall yield its deposit as we desire; and He has put the key thereof in the keeping of men. *Tradidit mundum disputationi eorum*: "He

has handed the world over to their disputations." Now, in the same station of dignity has He made man to stand with respect to the material world. All the creatures thereof are "groaning and travailing" to express man's perfections, who is the little world, the microcosm, and the big world is trying to take him off; and the efforts thereof, well meant, but ineffectual, are made to multiply in unceasing energy and geometrical procession down to the broad base of the material pyramid, where perfection fades away to the monad and the star of clay, and number stretches out to the myriad and the dust of the milky way. If we are less conscious of all this, it is because we are in a fallen state. Adam, before he fell, could call everything by its name.

With these analogies to strike the proper note of our subject, we venture to approach what may sound a little reactionary, and in the face of an enlightened science we presume to call it Catholic Instinct. The word may sound like a waif of the Middle Ages, straying by some ill-omened presage into the bright centuries of a scientific orient. We would deprecate, however, the use of any term which might lessen its outspoken confidence, or make its countenance fall. If its name, "instinct," is a prejudice to it in the light of science, any other name will do. But, if its name is a prejudice, and must be discarded, then the "moral sense" of ethics must likewise be rejected. Yet many excellent philosophers employ the term "moral sense" when they speak of a ready exercise of reason upon the applications of the moral law; and so we may be excused for thinking that a ready exercise of enlightened faith upon the requirements of Divine truth might well be called Catholic instinct. Neither the "sense" nor the "instinct" is blind; quite the contrary; but what they have characteristic about them is, that they are particularly ready; and, even where unable to explain themselves, can readily be taken up and explained by the scientific faculty; and, inarticulate in their unerring feelings, are speedily formulated into articulate laws. Thus, in the most solemn disputations of theology the doctors appeal to "the sense of the faithful;" and, availing themselves of the prayers in use as the most ready expression of such sense, they take it as an axiom that the law of prayer reveals the law of faith: *Lex credendi ipsa supplicandi lege statuitur*.

We eschew any enthusiasm or glow of feeling in the path of science, unless it first pay due attention to the demands of faith; and that not the mere dogma of faith, for we are not minimizers, but the form, contour, complexion, color of faith; those intangible qualities which a refined instinct catches intuitively, as a mother identifies her child unerringly, without being able precisely to lay her finger on any mark which would convince another. The in-

stinct which we speak of lights upon the things of God by a certain sympathy with their essence, or rather with Him of whom they all are full, and whom in their silence they eloquently reveal to such as are of the same kith and kin; or, as St. Thomas expresses it, *propter connaturalitatem quamdam objecti*. So that sound science alone does not cover it. Or how otherwise could it be that, where all the doctors of the Church have so abounded in the highest theological science, one alone is noticed, St. Gregory Nazianzen, as containing not even an incidental error in the writings which he has bequeathed to the Church? An eminent spiritual author lays it to the account of his wisdom, the first gift of the Holy Ghost, and one which in its eminence characterizes the Doctor, but in its generality is the apanage of all the faithful. In that illustrious Greek Doctor, who so peculiarly carries off the palm for his individual eminence therein, it is interesting to notice the other fact with which this one is connected, that during twelve years he studied nothing but the Holy Scriptures. Howsoever it originates, and on what sustenance soever it feeds and thrives, we beg to give a hearing to this sacred wisdom, which often abounds more where natural science is found wanting, and which, therefore, we have thought right to call Catholic instinct. It says:

“Observe this universe,—high as heaven, deep beyond conception, all but wide enough to escape from under the wings of Omnipotence. Yet I feel not too small to be its centre; conscious though I be that I fail of being as high as my own roof-tree, or as deep as the well from which I draw, or as wide as the farm which so kindly supports me. After all, is it by length or height that greatness is measured? Is it by extension of bulk, and not by intensity of worth? I fondly imagine that, as I cast my thought, a single fugitive thought, such as I can afford to throw away, like a passing sheen of my mind's activity upon this darksome current of unreflecting creatures, as I glance from below upwards and then down to the depths where microscope never searched nor telescope reached, I fondly fancy that my passing thought, this glancing ray flashing from an intelligent mind on the rolling tide of creation, is worth more in its native value, as it makes the depths pellucid with its fugitive being, than ever a poet's eye has caught in all the clay and metal, and light, and rhythm of solar systems and starry depths. Behold! so many blades of grass on the sward, so many drops of water in the rills, so many suns in the welkin of creation, all teeming, if so you will have it, with sense, with vegetation, with their resources unexhausted and unopened. Yet I know that my one playful thought is worth more than all; and if all of them were laboriously brought into being that they might be tipped for one instant with the spiritual glory of being just thought of by my

mind, and of thus being the occasion of one intellectual word which I speak to myself, all creation would have been well devised, would have served a noble purpose, and might be suffered to slip out of existence again perfectly content. So great a being is this single passing glance of intellectual light, and so great a function is the objective glory of stimulating one movement in the intelligent subject!

"Now things pass not out of existence; and we speak the intelligent word of knowledge not once, but often and constantly, and on their account. This is all their history, that they have been elaborated slowly, deliberately, so as to befit the residence intended for their liege lord, one like to themselves in the right of his body, above them in the right of his soul. To use the analogy of revelation, as I see the world of human society evolving for many a thousand years, to receive the mystery of piety in the coming of Christianity, a mystery which appeared in the midst of the ages, and not at the beginning of time; and yet there was no waste, no neglect there, though tremendous results had been cast for time and eternity, all in its absence; so I cannot but ask, is the late discovery of some beds of clay in the sky, and is the tardiness of our personal arrival upon the scene to enjoy the discovery thereof, a matter of such vast consequence that we must remodel all which was ever known before, and must apologize for Christianity, and defend God? Things seem to me just what they ought to be. There is an early rain of God's mercies, and of nature's revelation, and there is a later rain too; and both make one progressive season in the creations and manifestations of His natural providence. I would not have the revelation earlier, nor would I have the formation later. In either case, the precise measure of glory freely determined by God's will, would not be what it is. In no case would there be waste, neglect,—terms which sound strange in our ears when God's action is called in question, and when no metaphysical or theological reason is adduced to establish some intrinsic impossibility.

"Here, far from an impossibility or even an incongruity, I behold everything most congruous and proper; an earth for man's body, a universe for his soul; an earth scarcely yet opened to satisfy corporal needs, a universe just unfolding to develop his spiritual being. Will God, who metes out so much to man in the right of his bodily sustenance, show Himself chary in distributing food for the mind and the heart; lend man no assistance for his heart to be humble, no aid for his mind to be great? But forsooth, as begrudging him a prospect, God must be conceived as turning the landscape to some more practical account, by planting a bigger brother of ours there, who shall tread the prospect down

with his feet, lest the prospect should go to waste! He, whose blessing hath overflowed like a river, is brought down to household economy; and utilitarianism forbids him to allow us the sole use of the stars!

"But, you assert, man does not use them at all. You protest, 'no use whatever can be mentioned, if we suppose them deserted and sterile, and devoid of living inhabitants.' You proclaim against 'such a vast number of colossal systems of suns and planets lasting for so many centuries without any known advantage, and for no probable reason that can be imagined.' Is all that I have now alleged no reason? And is contemplation no use? What do you mean by use? Consumption, burning up, eating up? That is materialistic enough; but even on earth that is not the only use to which things are put. If it were, it would entail this advantage, that half the socialism of the day would never have come into being. But half the socialism and nihilism of the day have come into being from quite another use, to which even the things of this earth are turned,—from the use of contemplation, or, rather, the abuse of contemplation. This is that use of things on earth which does not consume what it enjoys, but enjoys what it does not consume; and when it appropriates these things exorbitantly, and enjoys them exclusively, it is a use so true, and it is so stinging an abuse, that mankind grows rebellious and socialistic and nihilistic:

'The man of wealth and pride
Takes up a space that many poor supplied—
Space for his lake, his park's extended bounds,
Space for his horses, equipage, and hounds.'

There is more use here than materialistic use. There is the use of contemplation in the enjoyment of a prospect. Now in contemplation, to speak of it in general, the soul feeds on truth and beauty, as spirits feed; it witnesses as angels witness; it lives the life which God Himself lives, in the sole adequate witnessing of His own infinite perfections, and, by contemplating the world, man, according to Seneca, gives an adequate testimony to the world, and 'saves works so great from being without a witness.'

"I behold, then, the rays like messengers trooping to me from the far-off stars. I see much. I hear of more. They tell me, as they arrive, that I cannot exhaust the prospect. God is not so poor in wisdom or in power as to stint the measure of the landscape, that I should ever be able to take it in with a single glance, no, nor in a single life, nor, may be, in the lives of all the generations. He who made the gardeners of the earth knows how to lay out a garden for the intellect in the skies. I gather them in,

then, as the rays come to me and tell me of their long journeys, and I

‘Dilate
My spirit to the size of that I contemplate.’

The undulations of light bear in upon my eyes, and the waves of grandeur come rolling over my spirit, and God comes with them, as Job says: ‘As waves swelling over me I feared God, and the weight of Him I could not bear.’ As the deluge of God’s eloquence would overwhelm me, He distributes His words and dispenses the phrases. Hence, He has moderated His messages to the capacity of our fathers, and their sons and our posterity, saluting us ever with a new strain, and by the voices of new messengers. I know them by number that they cannot be numbered by me, and this, the conscious weight of the unknown, feeds my faculty with the magnificent. I know them by name, that they are each a little effort, energizing to express the message which they convey. They are telling—each a little syllable. They are voices, each a tiny sound. And in the sound is the element of a word; in the syllable, the fragment of an idea. I put them together and decipher them, not in the light of torch, nor of sun, nor of firmament, but in a higher light than all this, the light of my spiritual intelligence. Thus illuminated, they yield up their contents clear and striking, what none of the stars and none of the suns, nor all of them together, with the nebulae of the milky way, have ever conceived; for neither any one, nor all of these possess the light of my single thought, which placidly, without effort, reads: The heavens are telling the glory of God!

“All creation travaileth until now, endeavoring to bear this sealed packet unto us. It is laboring to unfold all its treasures unto us. It will show us all, multitude, length, depth, motion, if we will but know; it will develop all its resources, to whet our appetite for learning, and make us develop ours; and, if we do but know, all nature is honored and rests in peace. Eternal life itself has no higher term than this, that we know.

“Is contemplation, then, no use?

“From this service to man, if you discard the skies, you must also dismiss the earth. If the skies are not marshalled to their end by man’s *Benedicite, omnia opera Domini, Domino*, ‘Bless the Lord, all ye works of the Lord,’ then neither is this globe, for all the use he makes of it. Introduce here another and a higher race, or twenty of them, if you find reason to fancy a single one necessary in the sky. First people the unexplored depth of our earth with rational species, to know it and consume it; the unknown

deserts of the sea, to plant them and till them ; the altitudes of the mountains, to mine them and work them ; the dreary wastes of the clouds—I will make bold to say, ‘the frightful waste’—of atmosphere, water, clay, rock, before you condemn the skies to the political economy of statistics.”

The theory which we have been considering presents us, not with a grand conception of the world, but with a mean conception of man. Let it make man less, or make the world more, before we can find room here for other species than our own. And yet how much less shall it make the one, and how much more shall it make the other ? Let God himself give us the measure. He does so. He leads us out, of a starry night, and bids us look up and count the stars if we can. Why so ? Is it to beat down our pride, and show us our place on this little orb of clay ? Yes, and no ! Yes, indeed, for the turgid spirit of man needs humiliation ; and therefore He has made us little and set us in a little place, with a thousand little mean things about us, to keep us walking in truth. Yet no ! As if all that firmament were but a tent of the night, under which man rests his weary head during this mortal slumber, and which God will roll up like a tent when the shadows disappear in the morning, He does not promise this home as worthy of us, nor even a new heaven and a new earth, though they will be added unto us ; but as being above all these, as being dilated in the vastness of our nature, He promises a home which befits us, and which, if we are scarcely worthy of it, at least is fully worthy of us. And this is nothing less than the infinite bosom of God himself: “I will be thy reward, exceeding great.”

THE PROGRESS OF THE CHURCH IN THE UNITED STATES,

FROM THE FIRST PROVINCIAL COUNCIL TO THE THIRD PLENARY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE.

JUST as the third decade of the century was closing there were signs in many lands of political and social convulsions, such as in the material order sometimes visit distant points of the globe in simultaneous action by volcano and earthquake, by tornado and deluge.

England had conjured the coming storm by stilling the Catholic agitation and granting the Emancipation, so long denied to those who had remained faithful to the religion of earlier and better days. The Catholic was comparatively free; the descendants of the barons of Runnymede, the bearers of the oldest titles in the English aristocracy, were once more allowed to occupy their seats in the House of Lords; the bar, the army, the navy, were again thrown open to men who believed in the whole Bible, and took the words of Christ literally.

England yielded also to popular demand on another point, admitting the inadequacy of her parliamentary representation, and conceding a measure of legislative reform, by which the Commons were cleansed of some rotten boroughs, and the members made by the election of larger and freer constituencies.

France, though she had just planted her lilies in Algiers, was on the eve of a revolution, which almost without a blow unseated a dynasty and changed the constitution of the monarchy. The Belgian provinces, chafing under a tyrannic rule, and mindful of old liberties, were about to sever their connection with the Netherlands and form an independent kingdom. Greece, aided at the last moment by the great powers of Europe, was about to see her final deliverance from Mohammedan sway, and take her place among the kingdoms. Poland was in revolt against the Muscovite; Italy was seething with Carbonari plots; Spain and Portugal were on the brink of revolution.

But while all Europe was thus agitated, and the friends of civil and religious order and liberty were filled with forebodings, the United States had enjoyed peace and prosperity. A presidential canvass, conducted with unusual violence of language, had ended without the least breach of the public peace, and the chief magistracy had devolved on a man of iron will.

The civil freedom won by the Revolutionary war had entailed the principle of the equality of all religious denominations before the law. Prejudice, deep-seated, fostered for generations by malevolent rulers in state and church, still swayed many minds, and this, whenever it could with impunity, thwarted in regard to Catholics the great and wholesome spirit pervading the institutions founded in this country, where liberty was not identified with irreligion and excess.

Catholics had been free, as it was rare for them to be free; every prerogative of citizenship exercised by their fellow-citizens was, in theory at least, theirs; the offices, the professions, the paths of commerce, art, and science were open to them. They could build churches as noble as their means could afford; if a dozen pious ladies wished to live in the same house, and devote their lives to prayer or charity, the government beheld in this no danger to the public weal. The agitation in the British isles, which achieved Catholic emancipation, had provoked and revived the old spirit of bigotry, and publications abounded denouncing the faith and lives of Catholics. These had not been without their influence in this country, where they reached the more ignorant, less cultivated portion of the people, and where designing men re-echoed their charges with a view of strengthening their own hold on deluded followers kept in the shadow of death.

The diocese of Baltimore at its erection, when confided to the care of the illustrious patriot, the Right Rev. John Carroll, comprised the whole United States, as recognized by the treaty of Paris in 1783, reaching from the Atlantic to the Mississippi, and from the great lakes to Florida; but the republic had, by the cession of Louisiana and Florida, as to which France and Spain yielded their rights, acquired the territory reaching to the Gulf of Mexico and west of the Mississippi to the Pacific. This vast territory, after being for a quarter of a century governed by a resident bishop, auxiliary to the sees of Santiago de Cuba and St. Christopher, was, in 1793, formed into the diocese of Louisiana and the Floridas.

The original diocese of Baltimore constituted in 1829 the actual province of that name, embracing the dioceses of Baltimore, Boston, Philadelphia, Bardstown, Cincinnati, and Charleston; while that of Louisiana and the Floridas had been subdivided into the dioceses of New Orleans, St. Louis, and the Vicariate Apostolic of Alabama and the Floridas, just then created into the diocese of Mobile. The bishops of these three sees were not subject to any metropolitan; and the incumbents of St. Louis and Mobile, that of New Orleans being vacant, were invited to attend the council.

The time of the first council forms a dividing point in our

Church history. Fifty-three years had elapsed since the Declaration of Independence, and fifty-five have passed since it closed its sessions.

From the feeble beginnings at the commencement of our national existence the Church had grown and extended. The Catholic population of the United States at the time of the first Council was estimated at 500,000; that of the whole country being 12,000,000. The diocese of Boston, which included all New England, had a bishop, eight priests, sixteen churches, and about 15,000 Catholics. The baptisms in Boston for 1829 were 536. The diocese had an Ursuline convent, with its academy, and eight or ten Catholic schools. The diocese of New York covered the whole State of that name and half of New Jersey. It could boast of a bishop, twenty priests, about ten churches, and 180,000 souls,—25,000 in New York City. There was an orphan asylum in that city under eight Sisters of Charity, but schools were few and elementary. The diocese of Philadelphia included the States of Pennsylvania and Delaware and half of New Jersey. The bishop no longer exercised authority, an administrator apostolic endeavoring to repair the effects of a terrible schism which, excited by a priest who finally apostatized, had engendered feelings of great bitterness, and sent numbers of families into heresy. This diocese had eighteen priests, about fourteen churches, and 35,000 Catholics. It was almost destitute of institutions and schools, but had Sisters of Charity at Philadelphia and Harrisburg. A spirit of schismatic turbulence in Philadelphia had been a severe trial to Bishop Carroll, and had filled with bitterness the lives of Bishops Egan and Conwell. The diocese of Baltimore embraced the State of Maryland and the District of Columbia, and the Archbishop was administrator of the diocese of Richmond, which was coextensive with the State of Virginia. The diocese of Baltimore had an archbishop, fifty-two priests, about forty churches, five of them in the metropolitan city. In regard to institutions it was far in advance of the dioceses we have already named. It had St. Mary's College and Seminary at Baltimore, under the priests of St. Sulpice; a college and seminary, Mount St. Mary's, at Emmittsburg; a college in Georgetown; it possessed a convent of Carmelite nuns, established by religious who were driven from their cloistered home on the continent of Europe by the storm of revolution; a monastery of Visitation nuns, established in 1808 by Mother Alice Lawlor, under the direction of Archbishop Neale; a community of Sisters of Charity, founded at Emmittsburg by Mother Elizabeth Seton, under the guidance of Rev. Messrs. Dubois and Bruté. This sisterhood already numbered 106 members; sixty-two at the mother house, the rest in Baltimore, Washington, Frederick, New

York, Philadelphia, Harrisburg. It had also a community of Sisters of Providence, colored women, laboring among their own people. The city of Baltimore had an infirmary and an orphan asylum under the Sisters of Charity; a free-school for boys and a boarding-school under the Sisters of Providence. Virginia, where the first altar in our land had been reared by Fathers of the Order of St. Dominic more than three centuries before, was in a far different condition. It had three or four priests, residing at Norfolk and Richmond; but Catholics were few and scattered, and no other church had a resident pastor.

The diocese of Charleston, which included the states of North and South Carolina and Georgia, had about 10,000 Catholics who were known or attended to. The bishop had but ten priests for his extensive diocese; four of these were in Georgia, and he had sent one to St. Augustine at the appeal of the Vicar Apostolic. The trustee system had here shown its unfitness for Catholics; Bishop England had just been compelled to raise money in order to repurchase the Church at Columbia, S. C., which the trustees had so involved that it was sold at auction.

The diocese of Bardstown, still under the venerable Bishop Benedict Joseph Flaget, the only survivor of the suffragans of Archbishop Carroll, had been divided. Kentucky and Tennessee were still under his care, as well as Indiana and Illinois. The more recently erected diocese of Cincinnati had taken from Bardstown Ohio and Michigan, with the Northwest Territory, now known, in part, as Wisconsin. The diocese of Bardstown had a Catholic population mainly sprung from sturdy pioneers from Maryland, who had, disputing the land with hostile Indians, reared their rough homes on the fertile soil. They had been retained in the faith and trained by cultivated and polished priests from France, England and Belgium, and elements, thus apparently inharmonious, had, in the spirit of faith, blended to form the thriving, united, edifying church of Kentucky.

The diocese of Bardstown had its venerable bishop, with his coadjutor, Bishop David, some thirty priests, and, as was estimated, thirty thousand Catholics; Kentucky had twenty-six churches, many of them, indeed, only of logs, and it contained two-thirds of the souls in the diocese. There were about twenty-six priests, a convent of Dominican Friars, a college and seminary at Bardstown, two preparatory seminaries, three primary schools. Besides a convent of Dominican Nuns, there were two communities instituted in the diocese, the Sisters of Loretto, founded by the great missionary, Rev. Charles Nerinckx, which had extended to ten establishments; and Sisters of Charity, founded by Bishop David, which had three houses.

In Tennessee, as in its parent State, North Carolina, the faith

had made little progress; a few score Catholic families were scattered through the State, depending on occasional visitations of priests from Kentucky. When, seven years after the first Council of Baltimore, a bishop was consecrated for the State, there was not a church or a priest within its limits.

In Indiana there were Catholics and a church at the ancient French town of Vincennes. Other Catholics, some of the old French stock, and others of recent emigration, were scattered through the State, and there were Indians who still retained the Catholicity of their ancestors, converts of the early missionaries.

The position of the Church in Illinois was somewhat similar. The Church of the Immaculate Conception at Kaskaskia, owing its name and origin to Father James Marquette, the explorer of the Mississippi; the Church of the Holy Family at Cahokia, where the unfortunate Varlet once officiated; the church at Prairie du Rocher, were all vacant, and the Catholic congregations there were attended only at intervals. Rev. John Bouiller was building a brick church at Mine à Breton, where there were Catholics enough to justify the step. This State, too, had its Indians who had not lost all trace of their Catholic teaching. In these parts of the diocese of Kentucky the labors of the priests were extremely severe. A priest would often ride a hundred miles in his parish, and one declared that he would have to ride a thousand to visit it thoroughly. There were scattered Catholics, some of whom had not seen a priest in twenty years. If this was the case in a diocese where there were so many and so zealous priests, what must have been the case in many of the eastern States?

The diocese of Cincinnati had a bishop, eighteen priests, and 30,000 Catholics. The State of Ohio contained eleven churches and about eleven priests; the State of Michigan, four priests. The Indian missions had been revived, and Arbre Croche became a centre of light.

This comprised all the original diocese of Baltimore, except the State of Mississippi, which had been placed under the care of the Bishop of New Orleans, the few Catholics at Natchez and Biloxi having from French and Spanish days been attended by priests from that city.

There was a general progress in all parts of the country. From notices in the papers of the time we learn that new churches were undertaken or had just been opened in Portland, Eastport and Orono, Maine; Dover, New Hampshire; Charlestown, Mass.; Hartford, Conn.; Newport and Pawtucket, Rhode Island; Buffalo, New York; Fayetteville and Washington, N. Carolina; St. Joseph's, Ohio; Mine à Breton, Illinois.

The emigration from Europe, which began after the fall and

deportation of Napoleon, was daily adding to the Catholic population, and the Catholics coming from the British Isles, roused by the recent agitation for emancipation, were zealous and ready to make sacrifices for their religion. Wherever they planted themselves or secured employment, they sought a priest and were ready to aid him in erecting a church as soon as their numbers made it possible. Accustomed, too, for centuries, to support their own churches and clergy, they gave liberally, and did not expect everything to be provided for them. The priest enjoyed their entire confidence, and they gave readily to him, thus neutralizing the trustee spirit which had grown up in some parts. In older settled parts, notably in Maryland, which received little emigration, and where from the first the clergy had been self-supporting, deriving less aid from the people, there was less apparent progress, there were fewer new churches.

In the old district and diocese of Louisiana and the Floridas the evidences of Catholic progress were very apparent, although the schismatic opposition at New Orleans had hampered the zeal of Bishop Dubourg, and at last filled him with discouragement. The dioceses of New Orleans and St. Louis had at least eighty priests and 100,000 Catholics. Besides the ancient Ursuline Convent and Academy at New Orleans, then a century old, the Ladies of the Sacred Heart, introduced within a few years, had already, in these two dioceses, six convents and academies. Religion had been revived, and the bishop, on his visitation through Louisiana, went from parish to parish, finding in each a church and resident pastor, and in some churches newly erected and ready to dedicate. The Catholic population in Missouri was less compact, and more was to be done; but two religious orders were already there, the Jesuits, the nucleus being a body of young Belgians brought over by the Rev. Mr. Nerinckx, and the Lazarists, of whom the bishop himself was a member, and who were already in their seminary forming new priests for the wants of the diocese. Here wealthy Catholics gave liberally to found and endow institutions. In this way a hospital arose in St. Louis, which was confided to Sisters of Charity from Emmitsburg. The Rev. Messrs. La Croix and Lutz had begun Indian missions, and the Jesuit fathers had established schools for Indian boys.

The progress in the half century had been great, and the growth healthy. At the period of the Revolution the Catholics, perhaps in all forty thousand, had, like those in England, been so long crushed by penal laws that they were despondent, and by no means sanguine for the future. In the thirteen colonies there was not a church, except in Pennsylvania, the chapels in Maryland being required to be under the roofs of the priests' residences, so as not to

offend the Protestant eye by any evidence of the existence of a church. No bishop had ever been seen; confirmation had never been administered; no priest had ever been ordained. The old French settlements in the territory northwest of the Ohio were still there, but the little body of priests had dwindled away to one, and in consequence of the Revolution no pastors could be expected in the future from Quebec. The Catholic population was one to seventy-five of the entire population. It had grown in half a century to be one in twenty-four.

In Louisiana, down to the commencement of the century, the government was Catholic, and clergy were maintained; and for the last quarter of the eighteenth century there had been a resident bishop. Florida, where religion had been planted and a church founded in 1565, just after the close of the Council of Trent, had undergone greater vicissitudes. Its Catholic life had lasted for two centuries, its Indian missions had given a noble series of zealous martyrs; but while in the hands of England, from 1763 to 1783, many of its Catholic inhabitants retired to Cuba; and but for the advent of a colony of Minorcans, religion would almost have disappeared. Spain, on recovering her ancient colony, restored religion; but when it passed into the hands of the United States, our government gave the site of the oldest Catholic church, without the slightest examination, to the Episcopalians, which put forward an absurd claim to it, because the ruins of the house once occupied by the resident bishop were called Casa Episcopal. The site of another church was given to one who had been allowed to occupy it; and to complete the iniquity, the government occupies to this day, as barracks, the old Franciscan convent, the home from which Fathers Corpa, Rodriguez, Auñon, Badajoz and Velascola went forth to martyrdom. At the time of the council, Florida had, as we have seen, but one priest, whom Bishop England had sent from Charleston at the request of Bishop Portier.

In reviewing the whole field we see that there had been great progress from the days when Catholicity, east of the Mississippi, had no home beyond the limits of Maryland and Pennsylvania, except in the old French hamlets in the west. The growth of the Church was not uniform; in Maryland, Kentucky, Louisiana and Missouri, there were the greatest signs of vitality; colleges, academies, houses of religious of both sexes, schools; in other States the struggle was mainly to give Catholics opportunity to hear mass and approach the sacraments. In New York and Pennsylvania the bishops, almost from the outset, had found themselves hampered and thwarted in such a way that it was impossible for them to make even remote plans for any diocesan institutions.

To meet the wants of Catholic readers there was at this time

only one publishing house, that of Eugene Cummiskey, of Philadelphia; but he had not the activity or success of his predecessor, Bernard Dornin. The Catholic papers of the country were confined to the *United States Catholic Miscellany* of Charleston, directed by Bishop England himself, and to *The Jesuit*, published in Boston. *The Truth Teller*, issued in New York, was devoted more especially to Irish news, but gave a great deal of Catholic matter, though it was not under Episcopal supervision, and at times showed little respect for the Episcopal character.

There was no edifice of architectural prominence in the country belonging to the Church, except the Cathedrals in Baltimore and New York.

Such was the position of the Church in the United States when the first Provincial Council was summoned. It was the fifth time in the annals of North America that bishops had been convened by the Metropolitan of a Province.

The first, that held in Mexico by Archbishop Alonso de Montufar, in 1555, was attended by three suffragans, and representatives of three others; the second, held in 1565, by the same Metropolitan, was attended by five suffragan bishops; the third, held in 1585, by the Most Reverend Pedro Moya y Contreras, Archbishop of Mexico, consisted of the Metropolitan and six suffragan bishops; another council of six bishops was held in 1771, but its acts were not approved at Rome nor published. It was a strange and sad fact to record, but unfortunately only too true, that in that Catholic country there was not, when the Council of Baltimore met, a single bishop, the last representative of the Mexican hierarchy, Antonio Joaquin Perez, Bishop of Puebla, having died of grief on the 26th of March, 1829, the seizure of a church which was given to the Freemasons, to be profaned by their irreligious rites, having broken his heart. Indeed, at this very time priests came to the United States to obtain the holy oils, and candidates for the priesthood who had studied in Mexico came to this country to receive holy orders; and two were actually ordained at Baltimore at the time of the Council.

The first Council of Baltimore consisted of the Metropolitan, the Most Reverend James Whitfield, Archbishop of Baltimore; of the venerable Benedict Joseph Flaget, Bishop of Bardstown; the Right Reverend John England, Bishop of Charleston; the Right Reverend Edward Fenwick, of the order of Preachers, Bishop of Cincinnati; Right Reverend Joseph Rosati, of the Congregation of the Mission, Bishop of St. Louis and Administrator of New Orleans; Right Reverend Benedict J. Fenwick, Bishop of Boston; and the Very Reverend William Matthews, Vicar Apostolic and Administrator of the diocese of Philadelphia. In the number of prelates it

did not, therefore, compare unfavorably with those held in the olden time in the neighboring country, when the Church was upheld by all the power of Spain. The bishops of Mobile and New York were in Europe, and Bishop David, Coadjutor of Bardstown, whom Bishop Dubois, of New York, had named as his procurator to represent him at the Council, was too ill to undertake the journey to Baltimore in those days of slow and tedious travel. But the Fathers of the Council represented the secular clergy, and the Dominican, Jesuit and Lazarist orders, as well as the Congregation of St. Sulpice; and England, Ireland, France, Italy and America had given birth to the bishops here convened.

Diverse as had been the training, diverse the origin of these venerable prelates, the utmost harmony prevailed. The decrees of the Council do not show all the good effected in the meeting of bishops, separated from each other by such vast distances as to make frequent consultation impossible. Convened at Baltimore together, the difficulties, wants, struggles, trials and hopes of each diocese were made known; the concerted action to be adopted for the great future of the Church was planned.

The influence of the Council was soon apparent. A periodical, the *Metropolitan*, soon appeared in Baltimore, the *Catholic Diary* in New York, *Telegraph* in Cincinnati, *Herald* in Philadelphia, helped to diffuse Catholic intelligence among the faithful, animate their courage and instruct them in points which were daily misrepresented. The papers then teemed with controversy. There soon came an annual, giving the condition of each diocese, with the names of churches, institutions and clergy, facilitating intercourse between Catholics in all parts of the country.

The first Council of Baltimore had proposed an accurate edition of the Catholic Bible. Unfortunately, the subject was not then acted upon; as only one house had issued any that were in print, a standard might have been adopted and an accurate revised text would have saved the country from the flood of incorrect Bibles and Testaments since poured out. The Douay Bible was in general terms adopted, under a belief which Cardinal Cappellari corrected, that it had been approved at Rome; but in fact the Douay has not been printed since 1635. A revision of it, and by no means a happy one, made by Bishop Challoner in 1749-50, very incorrectly and carelessly printed, is really the basis of our present Bibles, which have been modified by unknown hands in England, and under the direction of Archbishops Troy and Murray in Ireland, as well as by several hands in this country. There is no uniform text, scarcely two editions read alike, and yet all are put forward as Douay Bibles, when really not one of them is entitled to the name. An edition of Challoner's New Testament, issued without his sanction in 1752,

and thoroughly Protestantized, has been twice reprinted in this country, and is still sold as Catholic. There seems to be no cure for the evil but to return to the text of the Douay as translated by Dr. Gregory Martin, a careful, accurate version, in the grand old English of the sixteenth century, embodying all the traditional religious language of Catholic England and Ireland.

The increase of Catholic books was as notable as that of periodicals and papers. Lucas, of Baltimore, a convert, soon had a long list of works which he issued, and Catholic bookstores sprang up in many parts.

The progress of the Church in the erection of houses for the worship of Almighty God, and in the maintenance of priests for struggling communities, was due in no slight degree to the aid generously afforded for many years by the Association for the Propagation of the Faith, a society of the faithful which took its origin in France, mainly in the labors of a few devoted women to raise by trifling contributions means to aid Bishop Dubourg, of Louisiana, who had appealed to the charity of France.

The little circle of a few pious women grew into a society of immense size, and Catholic missions in all parts of the world felt its influence as they received its liberal allowances. Protestants generally confound this association, which merely raises money by weekly cent contributions and allots its receipts among missions, with the Congregation of the Propaganda at Rome, which is a department of the Pontifical Government having jurisdiction over the missions and mission countries.

The Catholic Bishops of the United States received great aid from the association, and we owe it a deep debt of gratitude, which we have not repaid with any of the promptness and generosity that our altered circumstances have made a duty, now that its resources have been crippled by the misfortunes of France. It can, without exaggeration, be said that in many dioceses the money allotted by this pious association first enabled bishops to act independently of the trustees of their Cathedral churches, whose course was calculated to paralyze the whole action of the bishop whom it should have been their pride, as it was their duty, to aid, within the limits of their powers, to discharge the duties of his exalted position. Small as the allowance may seem to many of us who scan the volumes of the Annals, it was of great moment at that time, when it enabled a bishop to make a visitation of his diocese, to seek neglected Catholics, to pay for the education of a few seminarians, or for the hire of a hall for the celebration of mass, till the little congregation could gather money to build a modest church.¹

¹ The Church in the United States must have received some three millions of dollars from the association. We ought at least to return it the annual interest, to enable

The government of the Church in this country under the Sovereign Pontiffs, from the colonial days, had been all managed through the Sacred Congregation de Propaganda Fide. To the constant supervision and aid of that department, and the great cardinals who had successively been its Prefects, under Popes Pius VI. and VII., Leo XII. and Pius VIII., the Church owed its progress from the foundation of the See of Baltimore to the condition it had attained at the time of the first Council of Baltimore; and the elevation to the Papal throne of Cardinal Cappellari, who was, as Prefect, so familiar with the wants and development of the American Church, as well as with the Archbishop and his suffragans personally, gave Catholics here an assurance of even greater fostering care under his Pontificate.

This hope was not disappointed. If the progress from 1776 to 1829 had been remarkable, from a small and obscure body just released from the most oppressive penal laws, and barely known in two or three colonies, to a church existing in every state of the Republic, with its hierarchy established, and by its acts taking an honored place in the legislation of that ecclesiastical body that had triumphed over the heathen emperors of Rome, the feudal tyrants of mediæval times, the so-called Reformers, the Gallican and the modern infidel, its progress in the next half century under the Propaganda, guided by the Sovereign Pontiffs Gregory XVI., Pius IX. and Leo XIII., was to present a still more remarkable spectacle.

O unconquerable Church of Rome! Church of all lands and all races, of all centuries and all seasons, with the same unvarying faith, the same priesthood, the same sacrifice, the same sacraments for the king and the peasant, the most learned philosopher and the most unlettered of men, for the Cræsus and the Lazarus, what Church but thou couldst have a mission for this land of ours, where Providence has gathered men of every race and tongue, and shown the very helplessness of schism and error by their utter incapacity to mould men into one homogeneous Christian body, instinct with faith and hope and life that is in charity? This dost thou accomplish, O Catholic Church of America, and it is wonderful in our eyes!

Schism and error may have opinions. Their typical word is: "I think." The Catholic Church speaks like the prophets of old: "Thus saith the Lord." She goes forth with a divine commission, and that gives her messenger or apostle an innate strength or power. A bishop may be sent to a new diocese, like Bishop Miles to Tennessee, and find himself alone in a great state without a church, without a priest, without shelter, and be stricken down

it to aid missions now in need; we are ashamed to say that we do not contribute one per cent. of the amount to that excellent work.

with sickness amid strangers ; or, like Bishop Bruté, set out with only one priest as his whole body of clergy, to scour two states in search of the flock confided to his care. In like manner Bishop Loras set up his mitre and crosier amid the few log huts of the first pioneers of a state, the rude backwoodsmen, before any of them in all Iowa had begun to erect a church of any kind. He does not falter, he has all to create, a clergy, churches, schools, institutions, and yet without any definite knowledge whence he is to obtain the pittance needed for his own maintenance, he sets to work. The struggle is great, the pioneer bishop may sink soon under his labors, but the work goes on ; it may be slow, there may be little for years to encourage, but the triumph must come.

This strikes thinking Americans who stop to study the world around them. Here, they say, is a church that believes in itself, has full faith in itself, in its own mission, its own power, its ultimate triumph. Its people all believe alike, and all join devoutly and earnestly in a worship which, though strange to us, is grand in its conception, grand in its outward form ; and what we cannot understand is that this Church, as we see it, seems a living contradiction of many popular ideas. It has always been accused of hostility to the Bible ; but with a belief in the authenticity, inspiration and accuracy of the Bible dying out among Protestants, this Church upholds all steadily and sturdily, and uses the Scriptures more freely in its worship, and its rites and ceremonies, than any of the sects ; here is a church charged with fostering ignorance, that establishes colleges, academies, and schools in all parts of the country, and if present tendencies continue, is likely in a few years to have the only institutions of learning in which the ancient classics are read and appreciated ; here is a church represented to us as debasing, but presenting to its humblest followers the noblest works of architecture, sculpture, painting and music.

A church which in fifty years has so developed that from half a million of believers it numbers eight millions, is a fact that cannot be overlooked. Increasing more rapidly than other portions of the population by its birth rate, as well as by immigration, its influence is steadily advancing, while polemical attacks, mob violence, hostile legislation, and the trickery of shrewd politicians, seem by successive failures to give it new strength, as it triumphantly points to their exposure.

Let us examine in detail the elements of this semi-century of progress.

In the very year of the first Baltimore Council, a German priest from the United States, the Rev. Frederic Rézé, appealed to the princes and prelates of Catholic Austria for an organized aid to maintain and keep alive the Catholic faith and its practice among

the German immigrants to the United States, whose numbers were steadily increasing. Led by the Cardinal Archduke Rudolph, the sons of Austria formed the Leopoldine Association, which at once began to contribute annually to the support of priests and churches for the German Catholics in the United States. It also aroused a zeal for mission work in this country which brought in priests and led to the establishment of several religious communities.

The next year New Orleans received a bishop, and Philadelphia a coadjutor to its aged prelate in the person of the learned Francis Patrick Kenrick. Both dioceses had long needed a bishop's presence and action, and both soon showed the effects of energetic zeal.

In 1832 the Asiatic cholera swept over the country, and the Catholic priests and the Sisters of various communities devoted themselves heroically to the care of those who were seized with the terrible disease, Bishop Edward Fenwick with several clergymen and religious dying martyrs of charity. The second visitation of this scourge in 1834 elicited similar devotedness.

Meanwhile a new see had been established at Detroit in 1833, and the Rev. Dr. Rézé, the first bishop, induced the Redemptorists in Austria to send some Fathers to revive Catholicity in the hearts of the Indians in his diocese and convert the heathen. They were soon called from this field to meet the more urgent want of the German Catholics, and with few exceptions this has been for many years the special field of their labors in the dioceses of Baltimore, Philadelphia, Erie, New York, Buffalo, Rochester and New Orleans. Besides the care of German congregations, the Sons of St. Alphonsus Liguori have, by missions in English-speaking churches, rendered incalculable service, and Fathers Konings and Müller have contributed to the Catholic literature of the country. This order has already given bishops to the Church in the persons of Bishops Neumann and Gross.

After holding a second provincial Council, and crowning his work by erecting a church in Baltimore at his own expense, Archbishop Whitfield died in 1834. About this time a church was erected at Burlington, the first in Vermont, and New Hampshire had a second one at Dover; while a priest exploring the new town of Milwaukee found twenty Catholics as the nucleus of a congregation. The Fathers of the Society of Jesus, by the general wish of the Bishop, undertook the work of Indian missions begun by their predecessors in the seventeenth century.

But while the Church was thus expanding, and new churches were rising in many parts of the country, the old hostile spirit stimulated by unprincipled men was creating a feeling that needed only a spark to produce a popular outburst. Those who had at

first entered the lists to assail Catholic doctrine and practice by arguments skilfully using Scripture, the fathers, and church history, and observing, to some extent, at least, the decorum of theological discussion, had given way to men who wielded only the arms of misrepresentation, calumny and abuse, who wantonly put forward the grossest frauds and forgeries. The convents and houses of sisters were the especial objects of attack, and all that minds sunk in sensual vice could gather or invent was accumulated in accusations against the pious and devoted Catholic ladies. A wretched woman from Montreal was made the heroine of a book giving pretended accounts of a convent in which she had never been, and in its pages obscenity was hypocritically gilded with pretended zeal for morality.

A Protestant editor of New York went to Montreal with the book in his hand, and visited the convent, examining every portion of it. His published statement proved the vile book a fraud, but his testimony was unheeded. Emulating similar notoriety, a girl who had been taken into the Ursuline Convent at Charlestown, Massachusetts, as a charity pupil, gave notes from which a similar work, under the title of *Six Months in a Convent*, was concocted. It was at once answered, but the public mind had been excited, intemperate ministers harangued the people, and before long a mob unchecked by the public authorities assailed the convent, drove the nuns and pupils from it at night, pillaged and profaned the chapel, tore open the graves of the dead, and gave the building to the flames.

It is a disgrace to American literature that such books were then published; a disgrace not to be removed. Works on our literature now never allude to them, although their circulation was enormous, and their influence beyond precedent. Their vileness is such that historians of American literature shrink from mentioning them.

Still stranger is it that men who could coin and circulate such moral filth should assume to be champions of virtue; or that a mob from the vilest dens and slums should be regarded as of such exalted morality as to find aught to censure in the pure and cultivated ladies of the Ursuline Convent.

A mockery of a trial followed the Charlestown arson and murder; but in the prejudiced state of the public mind, there were no convictions.

The half century has brought a vindication of the Catholic morality. The original New England stock is dying out; divorce and the prevalence of sins against the purity of the marriage state, and the object for which it was instituted, are sapping the strength of the race. Moralists are at last denouncing these sins; and when they come to show by statistics the terrible state of affairs, one and all call attention to the fact that it exists among the Protestant part of the community alone; and they admit that among the Catholics there is a superior morality, and greater faithfulness among the

married to each other and to God's holy designs. The New England of 1884 recognizes the very Catholic morality which half a century ago it assailed and denied.

Yet the Church was spreading. The diocese of Boston could already number 25,000 souls; Chicago had a resident priest; Catholicity had reached western Massachusetts, and a pastor had a flock in Worcester. The third Council of Baltimore, in 1836, solicited the erection of sees at Dubuque, Nashville, and Natchez, and the next year two priests, sent from the St. Lawrence at the request of Bishop Provancher, for the first time said mass in Oregon.

In the short term between 1833 and 1838, the number of suffragan bishops had increased from ten to fifteen, but the number of priests had doubled, rising from 202 to 406; the next nine years showed still greater increase, the number of priests in 1847 being 834, more than double, the number of churches rising from 324 in 1836 to 812 in 1847, while the Catholic population, estimated at 500,000 in 1829, exceeded a million in 1846.

The Catholics had endeavored to keep pace with the wants of their increasing numbers, but where all was to be created the drain for the erection and maintenance of schools was a heavy one. There were in many parts free schools, but the whole system of teaching and the schoolbooks were hostile to the Catholic Religion. About 1840 an effort was made in New York to obtain for schools supported by religious denominations a share in the school-moneys. It was no innovation, as this had been done for many years with good results, and had been abandoned only in consequence of frauds practiced by the Bethel Baptist Church, in order to obtain a greater amount than its school was legitimately entitled to claim. The petition of the Catholics to the Common Council was met by opposing petitions from some religious denominations who employed learned lawyers to advocate their views. The Catholic claim was sustained with admirable ability by Rt. Rev. John Hughes, coadjutor Bishop of New York, who had already established a high reputation in a controversy with Rev. Mr. Breckenridge. The debate attracted attention in all parts of the country, but the Common Council durst not grant the Catholic relief. An application to the legislature found the candidates of both political parties pledged to oppose the Catholic interest, so that the Catholics nominated a ticket of their own. The question of religious services and instruction in schools was thus fairly presented to the public. There were two courses open: one, to allow religious services and instruction to be given in the schools, Catholic for Catholics, Protestant for Protestants, or to exclude entirely from the training of the young all religious services and

instruction of any kind. The former system has been adopted by England and her Colonies; the latter was the basis of a new school system, adopted by the State of New York, and since widely copied in other States. It assumes, really, that religion is injurious to the young, a thing to be proscribed, and that the secular authority has the right and duty to proscribe it. Logically, it must be injurious to adults, and there must exist the same right and duty to close all churches. An increase of crime and dishonesty has been the result. Where the Ten Commandments are no longer taught, where children do not learn the divine precept, "Thou shalt not steal," the result must be theft, dishonesty, speculation and embezzlement. Where they do not learn the precept, "Thou shalt not commit adultery," the standard of moral purity must be low, marital infidelity must prevail, and divorces must be sought and desired. Such a school system, while it checked, to some extent, the anti-Catholic teachings and books in schools, could not satisfy Catholics. It is a recent system, and its fruits, as tested in the United States and Australia, have been "like Dead Sea fruits that tempt the eye, and turn to ashes on the lips." It is un-American, for all the early schools in this country recognized the importance of religion in the training of the young. And when Protestant denominations, in order to thwart Catholics, took ground against religious instruction, they dug their own graves.

When Catholics found that they must choose between a godless education, furnished by the State, and a Christian education at their own cost, they did not hesitate. The discussions had brought the question home to every Catholic fireside, and the faithful were ready for the necessary sacrifices. An impulse was given to the cause of Catholic education, which soon showed grand results. St. Xavier's College, Cincinnati, was opened in 1840, under the Jesuit Fathers, and St. John's, at Fordham, New York. The next year the Augustinians opened Villanova College, near Philadelphia, and, soon after the Jesuit Fathers established the College of the Holy Cross at Worcester, Massachusetts. Academies for young ladies were also multiplied, the Ladies of the Sacred Heart coming to the East to found establishments such as they had already in Missouri and Louisiana. Parochial schools, free schools, sprang up in all parts where the congregations could by any sacrifice establish them. The Brothers of the Christian Schools, Xaverian Brothers, Brothers of Mary and of St. Francis gave teachers for the schools for boys, and those for girls found instructors in the Sisters of Charity, and of Loretto, in Ursuline and Dominican and Benedictine nuns, in Ladies of the Sacred Heart, and subsequently in orders like the School Sisters of Notre-Dame, Sisters of Notre-Dame, of the Holy Cross, of St. Joseph, of St. Dominic, and other similar organizations. So earnestly have Catholics devoted them-

selves to this great task of Christian education, for which all America will, one day, when common-sense returns, bless them most devoutly, that, in 1884, the pupils in the Catholic parochial schools number fully half a million, a number equal to that of the whole Catholic body at the date of the first Provincial Council of Baltimore. With more than 2500 parochial schools in the country, they do not feel that they have done enough, and Catholic journals deem the work in many parts far too inadequate, and show how much yet remains to be done. Yet, our parochial school system is an affair of only about forty years' active life, and has labored under many disadvantages, arising from a want of uniform courses of teaching, study and books. The diocese of Fort Wayne stands as the pioneer in giving the parochial schools a thorough organization with a view to their greatest efficiency. For higher education, we have now 87 colleges, 599 academies. There are, besides, 22 ecclesiastical seminaries, and a number of similar institutions for sacerdotal training in various religious orders, really seminaries, though known under other names. There is a movement which will ultimately succeed, though the time is not certain, for the establishment of a great Catholic University. The influence of the sound Catholic educational system is all the more important, because, though the earlier colleges in the country were under religious control, and sustained mainly by some denomination, the later colleges and universities are not only secularized, but, besides ignoring religion, affect to follow the modern infidel schools of science, and in the study of history, ancient and modern, obey the same guidance. The federal government seeks to control the school systems of the country, now in the hands of the States, and its influence will be of the same character. The Catholic educational system is, and will be, the great, clear, distinctive exponent of Christian truth against its assailants.

The Fifth Council of Baltimore, convened in May, 1843, under his Grace Archbishop Eccleston, was attended by sixteen bishops, including Bishop Odin, who had been appointed Vicar-Apostolic of Texas, originally a Mexican State, but which had, by the action of emigrants from the United States, recently made itself an independent republic. At its request, the Holy See erected several new sees: Little Rock in the State of Arkansas, Chicago in Illinois, Hartford for Connecticut and Rhode Island, Milwaukee for Wisconsin, Pittsburgh for western Pennsylvania. Before the close of the year, Oregon, a growing territory on the Pacific, was made a Vicariate Apostolic. At the opening of the year 1844, the Church in this country, not including Texas, had one archbishop, twenty-five bishops, and 610 priests, nearly double the number reported for 1834. The churches numbered 611, having more than trebled in eleven years.

But a bitter feeling against Catholics prevailed, inflamed not only by unscrupulous men in pulpits, but also by demagogues, who pictured to the workingmen that the influx of foreigners, then mainly Catholic, must inevitably result in reducing them to beggary. A political party, combining these two elements of hatred to Catholics and to foreigners, assumed the name of Native American. By processions, insulting banners, and violent denunciations, the demagogues sought to provoke Catholics to some act of violence. This they desired as a pretext for attacking and destroying Catholic Churches. In May, 1844, this policy led to fearful riots in Philadelphia, which the authorities made no effort to suppress, although two Catholic churches and many residences were burned to the ground, and unoffending citizens slaughtered in cold blood for their religion. The same feeling showed itself in Indiana, where, on the accusation of a shameless woman, a priest was sent to the State prison, although his innocence then, and subsequently, was made so clear that the governor felt that he must save the State from eternal disgrace by opening the prison-doors.

Many business men fled from Philadelphia, and throughout the Catholic body in the United States a feeling of insecurity prevailed. New York narrowly escaped similar scenes. The success of the "Native Americans," many of whom were Irish Protestants, seemed to forebode periodical violence to the disciples of the Church of God. But, if there was a feeling of despondency, it soon passed away. Catholics always remember that they are heirs of the promise: "Blessed are you, when men shall persecute you, and speak evil against you, lying, *and you suffer for my sake.*"

Before the close of the year a native-born American, whose vigorous philosophical mind had been recognized as almost unequalled in the land, after a series of reasonings, which he had, step by step, laid before the public, announced that there was no logical course for a man to pursue except to enter the Catholic Church; and true to his conviction and to God's grace, Orestes A. Brownson became a Catholic, and from the year 1845 gave the cause of truth a vigorous American champion, fully versed in all questions of the day, knowing all the intrigues and schemes of politicians, and advancing Catholic truth with his tremendous logic.

When the year for the next Council came, Bishop Fenwick, who had refused to sell the ruins of the Ursuline Convent, but kept them as a monument of bigotry and injustice, died without obtaining redress. At this time too, a Benedictine monk, Dom Boniface Wimmer, came with a few students and lay-brothers to establish his ancient monastic order in the United States. He began his work in the diocese of Pittsburgh, and Providence so blessed this work that, at this day, he is an Abbot, having more priests under him than any other in the long history of his order, although two other Abbeys

have been formed by members of the congregation he founded. He chose for his especial field the German Catholics of this country, and only in rare cases have the Benedictines assumed charge of other congregations. The order has spread through the dioceses of Pittsburgh, Erie, Newark, Richmond, Savannah, Mobile, Covington, Kansas, Oregon, and has with some success undertaken in Georgia to win the negro race from vice and ignorance to a moral, Christian life. A few years later, in 1850, a colony of Swiss Benedictine Fathers founded a house in Indiana, which has extended its missions as far west as Dakota Territory, where Dom Martin Marty, resigning his abbacy of St. Meinrad's, in Indiana, labored so successfully among the Sioux Indians that he has been made Vicar Apostolic. The Benedictines conduct seminaries and colleges, and do parochial work, as well as maintain missions among the Indians and Negroes.

The sixth council, composed of the Archbishop of Baltimore and twenty-two suffragans, with heads of several religious orders, sought to give the Church a shield against the assaults of the Evil One by placing it in an especial manner under the protection of the "Blessed Virgin Mary, conceived without sin," who was formally chosen Patroness of the United States, and the increased devotion among the faithful after the especial favor of her exemption from original sin had been defined as an article of faith led to the observance of the 8th of December as a holy day of obligation.

After this council new sees were erected at Albany and Buffalo, in the State of New York, and at Cleveland, in Ohio. Oregon was made a metropolitan see, with suffragan bishops, whose sees were finally fixed at Nesqually, in Washington Territory, and in Vancouver's Island. A provincial council was held in Oregon in February, 1848.

The annexation of the Republic of Texas to the United States involved us in a war with Mexico, which resulted in adding to the territory of the United States not only Texas, but the Catholic provinces of New Mexico, Arizona, and California. Texas and California soon lost their Spanish characteristics, but to this day New Mexico has retained her Spanish population with very slight additions from any other races. The United States government has, however, persistently placed over this Catholic people as governors, secretaries, and judges Protestants, some of whom have been selected apparently from their coarse and brutal hostility to every thing Catholic. It has, too, placed the Catholic Indians under Protestant control, and, degrading itself to the work of petty proselytizing, has used every means of coercion and bribery to alienate from the Catholic faith, in which they had been brought up for three hundred years, the simple-minded Pueblo Indians.

There had been a diocese established in California before its acquisition by the United States; and in 1847 a see was established at Monterey, with Upper California as the diocese, the bishop being subject directly to the Holy See. New Mexico was made a vicariate apostolic; in Texas a see had been established at Galveston in 1847.

After the holding of the seventh council of Baltimore, in 1849, which was attended by twenty-five bishops, the Holy See, at the instance of the Propaganda, having already raised St. Louis to the rank of an archbishopric, did the same for New York, Cincinnati, and New Orleans. New sees were erected at Wheeling, Savannah, and St. Paul.

The ancient province of Baltimore, after an existence of forty years, was thus divided: New York and Cincinnati each had a province; Louisiana, as anciently understood, was also divided into three provinces: St. Louis, New Orleans, and Oregon; and the Spanish territory on the Pacific gave the province of San Francisco.

The whole United States in 1850 was estimated to contain 1,523,350 Catholics, governed by three archbishops, twenty-four bishops, 1081 priests, with 1073 churches, and twenty-nine theological seminaries. The work of the Congregation de Propaganda Fide had kept pace with the growth and the wants of the Church in this country.

Up to this time the legislation of the Provincial Council of Baltimore extended to all parts of the republic, each diocese having its own statutes and regulations adopted in the synods held by the Right Rev. Bishops after brief intervals. Henceforward each province would have its own series of decrees, and those of Baltimore would have force only within its greatly restricted province.

A series of councils has been held in the newly created provinces; but their decrees, though approved by the Holy See, and fully as binding as any previously passed, seemed to lack the moral force of those adopted for the whole extent of the United States, and there arose an instinctive tendency for councils that would, as before, pass decrees of national jurisdiction. This led to the first Plenary Council of Baltimore, which opened on the 9th of May, 1852, the Most Rev. Francis Patrick Kenrick, Archbishop of Baltimore, presiding as Apostolic Delegate. Around him gathered five other archbishops, and twenty-three of their suffragan bishops, and titular bishops, acting as administrators or vicars apostolic. The Bishop of Monterey was also present, completing the whole episcopate of the United States. The Abbot of La Trappe, Superiors of the Augustinians, Dominicans, Benedictines, Franciscans, Jesuits,

Redemptorists, Lazarists, and Sulpitians, attested the spread of religious orders and the work their members were accomplishing.

After this council the Propaganda obtained the erection of the metropolitan see of San Francisco, and of the episcopal sees of Portland, Burlington, Brooklyn, Newark, Erie, Covington, Quincy, Santa Fé, and Natchez, and of a vicariate apostolic, embracing the upper peninsula of Michigan.

The increase of the Catholic body in the United States, from the time of the Revolution, was due to the natural increase of those then in the country and the natives of the Catholic provinces subsequently acquired, but in a still greater degree to the Catholic portion of the immense immigration into this country from European countries, and to its increase by births. The Catholic element in the early immigration was mainly in the Irish portion, and at first the emigrants from Ireland were rather Protestant than Catholic. In 1850 the whole number of foreign-born persons in the United States was 2,244,602. Of these about 1,000,000 may be regarded as Catholics, and their children three-quarters of a million more; the more ancient stock constituting another three-quarters of a million; the whole Catholic population of the country being at the time estimated by the soundest thinkers at two and a half millions.

In 1846, for the first time in the history of our immigration, the Germans arriving on our shores exceeded the natives of Ireland, but the more conservative and Catholic part of the Teutonic people were less numerous represented than that which belonged to the more radical and revolutionary classes.¹

This increased immigration had revived the anti-Catholic feeling. St. Louis was the scene of bloody riots in 1854; a mob attacked the Catholic Church in Manchester, N. H.; and Father Bapst was tarred and feathered at Ellsworth, Maine, by a formal act of the town; on the 6th of August in the following year, a day of shame for Louisville and Kentucky, twenty Catholics were murdered, their homes given to the flames, and an attempt made to destroy the Cathedral. Churches suffered almost total destruction in Newark, N. J., and Williamsburg, N. Y.

The storm spent its force, and Catholics, who enjoy the pre-eminence of being the only sufferers for the faith in this republic during the present century, resumed their labors to build up the house of God. Manchester saw its church completed, and this very year has become the Sec of a Bishop. Provincial councils and diocesan synods were held in Cincinnati, St. Louis, New Or-

¹ In 1854 the Germans arriving were 220,000, while the Irish fell to 101,000; the total for the years 1845 to 1854 being, Irish, 1,512,100; German, 1,226,392.

leans, Baltimore, in the years 1855 to 1858. By 1859, the 1081 priests and 1073 churches of 1850 had more than doubled, having risen to 2108 clergymen ministering in 2334 temples of the living God.

By this time the Benedictines had extended their labors as far west as Kansas; another Trappist monastery had been founded in Iowa; the followers of St. Norbert were establishing a house in Wisconsin; the Franciscans were founding a large institution and community at Allegheny, in the diocese of Buffalo; and other communities had been formed for the German population in the dioceses of Philadelphia, Cincinnati, Alton, and Louisville; the Conventuals in a similar manner had begun their labors at Syracuse; an American province of Capuchins had sprung up in Wisconsin; the Dominicans, Augustinians, Jesuits, Lazarists, and Redemptorists had multiplied their houses and missions; the Passionists, disciples of St. Paul of the Cross, were introduced into the diocese of Pittsburgh in 1852, soon to gain in numbers, and by their austere life and zealous mission work to multiply their houses and their redeeming labors. The Oblates of Mary Immaculate from Canada were establishing churches in Washington Territory at the West, and New York on the East. The great community of the Fathers of the Congregation of the Holy Cross, founded at Notre Dame, Indiana, by V. Rev. Mr. Sorin, in 1842, was building up a future university, and directing churches in several dioceses. The community of Priests of the Most Precious Blood, founded in Ohio in 1844, was extending its churches in the districts of Ohio where the German immigration had taken root; the Priests of Mercy had charge of a French church in New York, and were laboring in the painful missions of Florida. At New York the V. Rev. I. T. Hecker had established a community of missionary priests of St. Paul, mainly for giving missions.

Laboring with these and the secular clergy, especially in the direction of academies and schools, were the Brothers of the Christian Schools, who, introduced into New York in 1846, had already extended to various parts of that State, Missouri, Michigan, and Louisiana; the Brothers of the Society of Mary, another body of excellent teachers, beginning their labors in Ohio, were already spreading to other States; Xaverian Brothers, Brothers of Christian Instruction, and especially Brothers of the Third Order of St. Francis, were directing parochial schools in many dioceses; the Ursuline and Visitation nuns had increased the number of their convents and academies; the Ladies of the Sacred Heart, extending to the East, had institutions also in the dioceses of New York, Albany, Buffalo, Philadelphia, Detroit, Chicago, and Kansas; the Kentucky sisterhoods, the Sisters of Loretto and Nazareth, had multiplied their communities and their schools; the Dominican

nuns had similarly increased. The Sisters of St. Joseph from a feeble beginning were spreading to many parts of the country. The Sisters of Providence had begun their excellent work in Indiana. The School Sisters of Notre Dame had begun their work in Wisconsin in 1847, and, by their thorough system of training their members as teachers, had already made so favorable an impression by their success that they had extended to Baltimore, Philadelphia, New York, Pittsburgh, Buffalo, and Detroit, the first example of a community founded for the German Catholics which spread rapidly among English-speaking congregations. The Sisters of the Holy Cross, from their house near Notre Dame, Indiana, had also filiations in many dioceses.

The great community founded by Mother Seton was pursuing its labors, as planned by her, in New York, New Jersey, and Ohio; while the Mother House at Emmitsburg, with the members there, had been transferred to the French sisterhood, and was adopting a new field of labor to conform to the spirit of their new rule. Besides these and some other teaching orders, like the Sisters of the Immaculate Heart of Mary in Michigan, congregations of sisters had been introduced whose field was not education, but the corporal and spiritual works of mercy. Such were the Sisters of Mercy introduced from Ireland into the diocese of Pittsburgh in 1843, and soon laboring in those of Little Rock, Portland, Hartford, New York, Brooklyn, Cincinnati, Baltimore, Chicago, and San Francisco; the Sisters of our Lady of Mercy founded by Bishop England in Charleston; the Sisters of our Lady of Charity of the Good Shepherd, whose mission it is to attempt the reform of fallen women, were pursuing their devoted labors in Louisville, New York, Philadelphia, Cincinnati, St. Louis, and New Orleans, and a similar order in Buffalo; the Franciscan Sisters of the Poor had opened a hospital in Cincinnati.

Thus had colleges, academies, and schools been increased in number, as well as asylums, hospitals, refuges; and the religious orders, with increasing vocations, were enabled to undertake new labors at the appeal of the bishops.

Such was the condition of the Church in the United States on the eve of the great civil war, which cost the lives of so many thousands of our citizens, and brought desolation on so many States. The bishops and clergy of the Catholic Church had done nothing to fan the embers of sectional hatred; no Catholic pulpit rang with appeals to the passions; the influence of the Church was for peace. But when the war began, Catholics in all parts did their duty as subjects of the government which they recognized; and in the camp and on the battlefield, in the hospital and the prison, the Catholic priest and the Catholic sister ministered fearlessly and constantly. They did their holy work in the light

of day, and many who, for the first time, could watch the calm and fearless zeal, were filled with deepest reverence for the ministers of a faith which had ever been presented to them in odious colors.

The war left the South in a state of utter prostration; cities and towns in ruins; her rich lands untilled for want of capital and labor. In the general distress a great part of the Catholic churches and institutions had disappeared, and others sank in the struggle for existence under the harsh rule which ensued. The enfranchised negroes, almost destitute of religious ideas or knowledge, were a field opened to the zeal of the Church, but the bishops of the South were without resources and without priests, and had to rebuild ruined churches and academies. The Church had always labored to mitigate the evils of slavery and to console the bondman. The first priest known to have officiated on our territory, the Dominican Father Antonio de Montesinos, is famous in history as the first to denounce the enslavement of the Indians; and, though the number of saints who have flourished in America is still small, it includes one born in slavery, and one who devoted his whole life to the consolation and relief of the negro slaves.

The priests of St. Joseph, a community founded in England for mission work, and the Benedictine Fathers of St. Vincent's Abbey in Pennsylvania, in time gave their services to the Southern bishops, and the slow and laborious task has been begun of raising the negroes to a moral sense of purity, honesty, and truth, and imbuing their minds with solid principles of religion. This is all the more difficult, as all the religion presented to many was a wild sentimentalism, manifested in excitement, leading to no moral reform, no repentance for sin, no hope of amendment.

Among the recent marks of progress is the increase of reformatories, the house of the Angel Guardian at Boston having been one of the earliest. Near most of the great cities there are now such institutions under the care of religious, where the neglected children of careless and dissolute parents, or those whose waywardness defies control, are kept in discipline tempered by religion and prepared at last to earn their livelihood, and become, as men and women, a blessing and not a curse to society.

Just after the close of the war the second Plenary Council was held at Baltimore, opening on the 7th of October, 1866. Archbishop Spalding presided as Apostolic Delegate, and six archbishops, thirty-seven bishops, three mitred abbots, and thirteen representatives of orders of the regular clergy, attended. For this council the subjects to be discussed had been prepared with wonderful ability by the farseeing Delegate, and they were carefully studied. The decrees that were passed formed a body of doctrine and discipline of the highest order, and as such were regarded in all parts of the Catholic world.

During the war, and for some years subsequently, exact reports of the state of the Church in all parts of the United States were not to be obtained. Yet immigration continued to swell the numbers of Catholics at the North, and in parts acquired by the armies of the Federal government.

When the centennial year 1876 arrived, the Catholic body, so insignificant a hundred years before, without a bishop, with few priests, fewer churches, and no institutions, either of learning or mercy, had become one of six millions of faithful, under eleven archbishops, fifty-six bishops, and five thousand and seventy-four priests. In more than five thousand churches was the holy sacrifice offered in thanksgiving for the blessings which had been vouchsafed them in that period; sixty-three colleges were training young men in sound and solid learning for all the higher walks of life, and hundreds of thousands of children received in the parochial schools knowledge based on morality. To prelude this memorable year, the Sovereign Pontiff had raised Boston, Philadelphia, Milwaukee, and Santa Fé to the rank of metropolitans in 1875, and Chicago was also, in 1880, created an archbishopric.

In this, the year of the third Plenary Council, there are summoned to it a cardinal, the Archbishop of New York; eleven other archbishops besides the Apostolic Delegate, fifty-eight bishops, six mitred abbots, and heads of more religious orders than can now be found in many countries. They will convene as the ecclesiastical superiors of at least seven thousand secular and regular priests charged with the care of more than eight millions of souls.

The progress has been great not only in numbers but in other respects. The episcopate of the United States, which dates back less than a century, has already made an impression on the great gatherings of the bishops of the world, as in that which assembled in Rome at the definition of the Immaculate Conception, in that on the Centenary of St. Peter, and still more in the Œcumenical Council of the Vatican. The ecclesiastical seminaries are better provided, many of them are large institutions with learned faculties, who are enabled to impart a more thorough training than was possible in former years, and aiming to give the country priests as well educated as those nurtured at the American College in Rome, or that at Louvain. The colleges, too, have gained strength, and this is all the more needed as they will soon stand alone in recognizing Christianity, revelation, the scriptures, as well as in the cultivation of the ancient classics, in the study of the literature of Greece and Rome, and in a sound school of philosophy and ethics. The religious orders continue their work, and in those which gather for works of mercy the pious women of Catholicity there

have been new accessions in the Little Sisters of the Poor and the Sisters of Bon Secours, while to the contemplatives have been added the Dominican Nuns of the Perpetual Adoration.

There are still wants to be met. Besides the English-speaking Catholics, whose churches are now keeping pace to some extent with the increase, and the German Catholic body now represented by so large a proportion of archbishops, bishops, abbots, religious and secular clergy, there are other nationalities whose faith in the future is a problem. Thousands of Italians are reaching our shores, thousands of Poles, great numbers from Portugal and its islands, as well as from Spanish America. All are considered Catholics, but it cannot be said that all are seen as component parts of the body of Catholic worshipers or recipients of the sacraments of the Church. The Poles have generally made efforts to establish churches for themselves, but they seem to lack harmony, and by old local jealousies transferred to this soil not infrequently bring their congregations and churches to ruin, or exile their priests. The Portuguese are concentrated in a few localities, and seem to preserve faith and zeal; but the Italians show very little love of the faith, and very little knowledge of it. Far different from the humble Irish who years ago, laboring on the great public works, always welcomed a priest, and helped to erect churches as they moved along, the Italians neither frequent the churches now accessible to them, nor exert themselves to erect others where they can hear the words of truth in their own tongue. The Italian churches are few compared to the Italian body, and they are not maintained exclusively by them. In many cities there are quarters occupied by Italians who seem to have lost all religion, so that when zealous priests speaking their language give missions in order to revive their faith, they find but a score of listeners, the very women having apparently lost all attachment to religion.

Those coming to us from Spanish America are very numerous, but Spanish churches, except in the old Mexican provinces now annexed to this country, are almost unknown; and yet few comparatively of this body are seen in the Catholic churches where the sermons are in English.

These people are all nominally Catholics, and are by some counted as members of the Catholic Church in this country, but it is a grave question what steps can be taken to save them and their children. The Italians, from their poverty, are a favorite field for Protestant proselytizers, who, by presents and other means, endeavor to win their attendance at their schools and mission chapels. Had they the robust faith which characterized the mass of Irish immigrants of three-score years ago, the case would be different; but the task is to instruct them in their faith and enkindle a zeal and love for it.

With this exception the Church in this country stands in a wonderful degree of prosperity, fitted for its work with churches, some of them, like the great cathedrals of New York, Philadelphia, Cincinnati, the churches of the Jesuits in New York and Buffalo, architectural monuments of remarkable beauty, and institutions that impress all by their magnitude and fitness for their work.

The Church in the United States has, by its organization and the high character of its episcopate, made its impression on the whole Catholic world. Since the first Provincial Council of 1829 the bishops of this country have been repeatedly summoned as a body to Rome, under Pope Pius IX. of blessed memory, to take part in the definition of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin, as to which they had all responded that it was the unwavering faith of their flocks; then at the centenary of St. Peter and the solemn canonization which then took place; and finally, to the General Council of the Church, held in the Vatican, which distinctly defined the infallibility of the Vicar of Christ, and condemned so many false theories of this century.

Since then the elevation by the Sovereign Pontiff of His Grace, John McCloskey, Archbishop of New York, to the Cardinalate in 1875, has given the Church in the United States a constant representative voice in the august senate of the Church, the immediate counsellors of the Pope, the College of Cardinals.

The fathers of the coming council will thus meet to seek, under divine inspiration and the guidance of the successor of St. Peter, the best and wisest means to continue the work of the Lord in this country; to save the millions here already in the fold, to present the truth so distinctly that others must yield to grace, and seek salvation by the path which the Son of Man has traced.

THE LIFE AND TIMES OF FREDERICK THE SECOND.

(Continued from p. 322.)

THE KINGDOM OF ITALY.

AFTER Germany, Burgundy, and Lotharingia, the next part of Charlemagne's vast empire which claims our attention is the kingdom of Italy. Its consideration will, however, occupy but little of our space, as so many facts concerning it have been already incidentally mentioned. Nevertheless, certain portions of its history, especially the earlier portion, should be noticed, since they have their bearing on the later age of our hero, Frederick II.

After the division of the Roman Empire into the empires of the East and of the West, it was again for a time reunited under Zeno, emperor of the East. Then Italy was governed by his nominal lieutenant, but really independent king, Odoacer the Goth, from A.D. 476 to 493. It was afterwards (from 493 to 526) governed by Theodoric, king of the East Goths. The seat of his government was Ravenna, which had also been the seat of government during the later Western Empire. This kingdom included much more than Italy, its coast-line extending a little westward of the mouth of the Rhone. The emperor Justinian (527-565), through his general, Belisarius, brought Italy (including Sicily, Sardinia, and Corsica) back under his rule, and at the end of his Gothic war (which lasted from 537 to 543) it was ruled by his officers, termed *exarchs*, from Ravenna. The special region which was known by the name of "the Exarchate" corresponded with what is now the province of the "Romagna," its modern name indicating the long continuance of the rule of Eastern Rome, or Constantinople, in that region. The seaboard of what is now Provence, from a little west of the Rhone to the river Var, was, however, ceded to the extensive Teutonic people called the Franks, who then occupied France and a large part of Germany.

In 568 there appeared on the scene the true founders of the "Kingdom of Italy." These were another Teutonic people called the Lombards, who, under Alboin, then advanced into Italy from that region which is now Styria and western Hungary. Northern Italy, already weakened by previous incursions of Franks and Alemans, soon succumbed, and Pavia became the Lombard capital. Alboin's successor, Antharis, much extended the Lombard king-

dom, became a Christian (though he was converted but to Arianism) and founded the duchy of Beneventum—the first duke of which, Zoton, destroyed the abbey of Monte Casino, which remained desolate for one hundred and fifty years. A large part of Italy, however, remained faithful to the Emperor, the Imperial and Lombard domains intersecting one another. Thus Venice¹ remained imperial, as did Liguria, sheltered beneath the Apennines. So also did the islands of Sardinia, Corsica, and Sicily, as well as the territory to the east of the Apennines between the Po and Ancona, in the Exarchate. Besides these the Emperor also retained the allegiance of Rome, of the country between Civita-Vecchia and Terracina, of the duchy of Naples, with the toe and the heel of the Italian boot. Thus the Lombard kingdom consisted of northern Italy, which is still called Lombardy, of the duchy of Spoleto (which is now Umbria, with the territory eastward of it), of Beneventum and the greater part of the kingdom of Naples.

In 590 St. Gregory the Great was elected Pope, and achieved the independence of Rome by allying himself with the duke of Spoleto against the aggressive Lombard king (against whose aggression the impotent exarch did nothing to defend the Eternal City), and by converting the Lombards from their Arianism. The attack on the worship of images by the emperor Leo (the Isaurian) completed the alienation of Italy from the Eastern Roman Empire. The aggression of the Lombards continuing, Pope Gregory II. (A.D. 716) called upon Charles Martel (the valiant leader of the West Franks) for aid against the Lombard king Luitprand, but Charles could not afford him the help he desired. In 753 the Lombards attacked and took Ravenna and the Exarchate—the exarch flying from Italy. Then Pepin (Charles Martel's son), having been acknowledged by Pope Zachary as king of the Franks, crossed the Alps, at the call of Pope Stephen, and compelled the then Lombard king, Astolf, to yield up the Exarchate and the Pentapolis. The Pentapolis was what afterwards became the duchy of Urbino, or the northern half of the modern march of Ancona, *i.e.*, from the Exarchate down to Ancona.

These regions Pepin presented to the Pope, who declared him "Patrician of the Romans." The Lombards again threatening, Pope Hadrian I., in 774, applied to Charlemagne (son of Pepin) for aid against their king Desiderius, who was advancing against

¹ The Venetian islands were first peopled by inhabitants of Aquilea, who fled to them from the Huns in the middle of the fifth century. Aquilea had been founded 183 B.C., and became a Patriarchate in the sixth century. The prelate of the adjacent town of Grado was also styled a patriarch, but in the fifteenth century that title was taken thence to Venice. The Patriarchate of Aquilea took in the region between Como and the Istrian Pola. Its patriarchs grew to be powerful princes at the north-eastern corner of the Adriatic.

Rome. Charlemagne crossed the Alps, defeated and took prisoner Desiderius at Pavia, and himself assumed the crown of Lombardy. He confirmed his father's grant to the Pope, and he, in his time, was declared "Patrician of Rome," and on a visit to Rome, in 800, he was crowned Roman Emperor, as before related.

The emperor's Italian kingdom reached from the Alps to Terracina, and thence across to the east coast. The Principality of Beneventum, however, remained Lombard, as he could only make it tributary to him. The islands, Naples, and the toe and heel of the boot, remained Greek. Other principalities south of Charlemagne's kingdom were Capua and Salerno. Capua included the territory west of Beneventum and north of Naples; Salerno was formed by the lands south of Naples and north of the Grecian territory at the toe of the boot. The emperor gave the county and marquisate of Tuscany to one Bonifacio. After Charlemagne's death the kingdom of Italy went with the Empire under his immediate successors; the local magnates, however, gradually gaining more and more power and independence as emperor succeeded to emperor. At the end of the ninth century the count of Tuscany, the archbishop of Milan, and the duke of Friuli,¹ were almost independent potentates.

Charlemagne was succeeded by his grandson Bernard² (813), after whom came Charlemagne's own son, Louis I., who was crowned emperor in 816. After him came his son Lothair I. (emperor in 823), then his (Lothair's) son, Louis II. (king of Italy, 844; emperor, 850). To him again succeeded Carloman, son of Louis the Germanic, who was both king of the East Franks and grandson of Charlemagne.³ Carloman was king of Italy from 876 to 880, and was the father of Arnulf, the Roman emperor.⁴ After Carloman came his brother, the emperor Charles the Fat.

On the deposition of Charles the Fat (887), an opportunity was very naturally taken to choose an Italian king less thoroughly German than the chosen emperor Arnulf. Accordingly the duke of Friuli, Berengar I., was chosen, who only claimed Carolingian descent through Gisele (the daughter of Louis, son of Charlemagne), who had married Count Eberhard.

Berengar's kingship was, however, contested by Guido of Spoleto, supported by Adalbert, count of Tuscany.⁵ Guido succeeded for a time, and was crowned both king and emperor, and after his death the same was the case with his son Lambert. Nevertheless,

¹ Friuli took in what is now the region of Trent and Northeastern Venetia.

² Son of the emperor's son Charles.

³ Being the son of Charlemagne's son Louis I.

⁴ See No. 33 (January, 1884) of *Amer. Cath. Quarterly Review*, p. 24.

⁵ A descendant of Bonifacio who was made count (or marquis) by Charlemagne.

the Germans returned under Arnulf, and the latter was crowned emperor of Rome, as has been before mentioned. After his death and that of Lambert, Berengar succeeded, and was in turn crowned emperor. He had, however, to contend for some time, first, with Louis of Provence, son of Boso, king of Burgundy,¹ and afterwards with Rudolf of Burgundy, who for a brief space got possession of the crown, being supported by Ermengarde, daughter of Adalbert of Tuscany.

The next king, Hugh, a vile and infamous tyrant, was a close connection both of Ermengarde and of Guido, the then marquis of Tuscany. Hugh (926-945) was count of Arles and grandson of Lothair I. He came from Provence to Pisa, and was welcomed king by Pope John X. He married the infamous Roman woman Marozia, whose son afterwards drove him from Rome, though he continued for a time to reign over the rest of Italy till he was forced to return to Provence, when he left behind him his son Lothair II., who reigned from 946 to 950.

Berengar II., a grandson of Berengar I., and Marquis of Ivrea,² was the next king, who associated his son Adalbert with him in his kingdom. He sought to obtain the hand of the young and fair Adelhei, Lothair's widow, who refused his suit. Thereupon he cruelly ill-used her, thereby bringing Otho I. down upon him and upon Italy, to her rescue. He then, as before related,³ made Berengar become his man, and was himself crowned king and emperor at Milan and Rome in 962. Thenceforth the kingdom of Italy remained inseparably united with the German Empire up to the date of Frederick the Second's birth, December 26, 1194.

Certain other Italian events, however, both before and after the crowning of Otho, yet need to be here referred to.

The coming of the Northmen and of the Saracens will be treated of under the heading, "The Eastern Empire," but we may now be permitted to remark that the latter had harassed Sicily and the islands from the year 827. Local disputants were so ill-advised as to invoke their aid in Beneventum in 840, and thus at the end of another ten years they had established themselves on Monte Garigano (a revered sanctuary of St. Michael), and on the banks of the Garigliano, whence they ravaged the country and destroyed the monastery of Monte Casino a second time. Having pushed as far inland as Narni, they were, in 916, exterminated by the Greeks and Lombards united, King Berengar and Pope John X. taking the field in person. In the north, Italy was ravaged by the pagan Hungarians, who poured into the country in the time of Berengar

¹ See *l. c.*, ante, p. 26, note 2.

² Ivrea was in the northwest of Italy, in the Alpine region north of Turin.

³ See *l. c.*, ante, p. 25.

I.; they were only finally restrained and settled in their own kingdom by Otho I.

Meanwhile the Greeks had regained much of their power in the south, owing to the discords and intestine disputes of their neighbors. Their so-called "Theme¹ of Lombardy" reached up to Salerno, and they had Naples and Amalfi, with Bari on the Hadriatic, for their chief cities. Indeed, the Lombard lords of Beneventum and Capua became unstable subjects to the eastern emperor.

Under the Saxon emperors the self-government of the Romans was forcibly pulled down by both the first and the third Othos, and after Otho III. the Pope and the counts of Tusculum ruled the Roman territory. Under the Franconian emperors he went with "the great Countess" Matilda, daughter and heiress of Boniface, Count of Tuscany and the representative of the first Bonifacio who had been installed by Charlemagne.

KAROLINGIA.

We have next briefly to survey that portion of the empires of Charlemagne and Charles the Fat which was situated to the west² of Lotharingia and Burgundy. This was called Karolingia, because it fell to Karl, or Charles (the Bald), youngest son of the second Frankish emperor Louis (who was himself the son of Charlemagne); just as Lotharingia was so-called as belonging to the two Lothairs. These Lothairs were, first, the emperor Louis' son Lothair, and secondly, Lothair's son, the second Lothair.

In Charles the Bald's time Karolingia took in modern France west of the Rhone³ and the Saone, and including, westwards, Rheims and Laon, with part of Belgium (Flanders), and of Spain (the Spanish March down to Barcelona), and the Channel Islands. His supremacy, however, was more nominal than real over the great duchy of Aquitaine (*i.e.*, the country between the Loire and the Garonne), over the duchy of Gascony (between the Garonne and the Pyrenees), over the county of Toulouse (the country east of Gascony), over the Spanish March and over Septimania—*i.e.*, the land bordering the coast between the Spanish March, the county of Toulouse and the kingdom of Burgundy. Brittany was also all but independent. Other domains to be distinctly noted are the county of Flanders and the duchy of Burgundy. But the greatest duchy of all was the duchy of France, the capital of which was Paris. This duchy included the Isle of France, with Maine, Anjou, Normandy, Champagne and Orleans. Its ruler had the title of "Dux Francorum," and its gradually in-

¹ "Theme" was the term used by the Greeks to denote the large provinces of their empire.

² See *l. c.*, *ante*, p. 22.

³ Except a strip west of the Rhone.

creasing territory was "France," which thus gradually grew out of Karolingia.

Charles reigned from 840 to 876, and was succeeded by his son and grandson (Louis II. and Louis III.), after whose short reigns the kingdom fell for a brief space into the great empire of Charles the Fat,¹ who was chosen to the detriment of Louis III.'s brother, Charles the Simple.²

Upon the deposition, in 885, of Charles the Fat, Odo, Count of Paris, was elected first duke and afterwards king of France (887), as the result of his courageous defence of Paris against the inroads of those Scandinavian invaders known as the "Northmen" or "Normans." Nevertheless, in 893 certain nobles, discontented with Odo, elected Charles the Simple king of France also. Thus was initiated a double series of kings, each claiming to be "king of France;" Charles the Simple and his descendants (the Carolingian series), reigning at Laon; while Odo and his successors ruled at Paris. But neither of these sovereigns held much of what is *now* France. Thus all modern France south of the Loire was practically independent (under the dukes of Aquitaine and Gascony, and the counts of Barcelona³ and Toulouse). While Brittany was under its Breton count, the French territory of Normandy, even, was destined soon to be ceded to those very Scandinavian "Northmen" who had been so courageously repulsed by Odo.

The duchy of Burgundy was ruled by an almost independent duke, Richard le Justicier (877-920). This duchy formed no part of the *kingdom* of Burgundy,⁴ but answered roughly to the modern province of Burgundy west of the Saone, with some part of Nivernois and a southern fragment of Champagne. The county of Flanders—which answered to modern Artois, French Flanders, and Belgium to the Scald (Escaut), was under its independent counts, Baldwin I. or "Iron Arm" (862-879), Baldwin II. or "the Bald" (879-917), and Baldwin III. (919-958).

King Odo of Paris then succeeded his brother Robert I. (922-923), and after his death, his sister Emma having married Rudolph, duke of Burgundy,⁵ the latter became king (923-934), struggling with Louis IV. (called "The Stranger"),⁶ who was king from 936 to 953. Rudolph was aided by Hugh, duke of France, and son of Robert, duke and king of France. After the death of Rudolph, Louis IV. remained king till 953, when he was succeeded

¹ Son of Louis the Germanic, son of Louis I., son of Charlemagne.

² Charles the Fat was the grandson of Louis I., who was the great-grandfather of Charles the Simple.

³ The count of Barcelona held, of course, part of what is now Spain.

⁴ See *l. c.*, ante, pp. 22 and 26, note 2.

⁵ The successor of Duke Richard le Justicier.

⁶ Son of Charles the Simple and husband of a sister of the emperor Otho I.

by his son Lothair,¹ who reigned till 985, and was again succeeded by his son Louis V., who, dying after a year's reign, left a widow, Adelaide, who married Hugh Capet, duke of France, son of duke Hugh, last before-mentioned, and grandson of King Robert. This Hugh Capet of Paris succeeded (in 987) Louis V. of Laon, who was the last Carolingian king—his uncle Karl being excluded on account of his having accepted the duchy of Lotharingen (Lorraine) as a fief from Otho I.²

Meanwhile Maine, Anjou and Champagne had become practically independent. The great province of Normandy, with the Channel Islands, had also become a Norman duchy under the Northman Rolf, or Rollo, to whom it was granted³ in 911 by the weak king Charles the Simple, who also gave him the hand of his daughter Gisele. Rolf, before marriage, accepted baptism, taking the name of "Robert" as his "Christian" name.

Hugh Capet (the founder of the great French dynasty whose last reigning sovereign was Louis Philippe) was very willingly chosen by his peers as king on account of his wealth, which rendered him well able to maintain himself with consequent less pressure upon them. His own fiefs comprised the territory around Paris, a large portion of Picardy and Champagne, the districts of Chartrain and Perche, with the counties of Blois, Touraine and Maine. He was also the more readily elected on account of his having been a great benefactor of the clergy.

By his elevation to regal rank, Hugh Capet obtained, as *king*, a claim to superiority and suzerainty over all Karolingia; yet, though he was rich and powerful as to the domains he held anterior to (as well as after) his elevation to the throne, he had very little real power beyond these domains.

Karl, the above mentioned duke of Lotharingen, rebelled against Hugh, and obtained possession of both Rheims and Laon, holding them for about two years. He afterwards died in prison on the Loire, and his son Otho made no further attempt to continue the royal line of Laon. Hugh Capet wore the crown but for nine years, being succeeded, in 996, by his son Robert II. (the Wise), who reigned till 1030. Having been compelled by Pope Gregory V., and a creature of Otho III.,⁴ to put away her whom he considered

¹ Who married Emma, daughter of Lothair, king of Italy.

² This Karl was duke from 977 to 991. He was succeeded by his son Otho, who died childless in 1006.

³ The dukes who succeeded him were William Longsword (927-942); Richard I., the Fearless (942-995); Richard II., the Good (995-1025); Richard III. (1025-1027); Robert "the Devil" (1028-1034); and William, known as "the Conqueror" (1034-1086).

⁴ See *l. c.*, *ante*, p. 25.

his wife (Bertha, a princess of Burgundy), he married Constance, the daughter of the count of Arles.

Hugh Capet's brother, who was duke of Burgundy, having died, King Robert bestowed that duchy on his son Henry, who succeeded him, in 1030, as King Henry I.

Henry's brother Robert rebelled, but was defeated by the king, assisted by Robert the Devil, of Normandy. Nevertheless, on the intercession of Fulques, count of Anjou, his brother Robert was made duke of Burgundy. During the reign of Henry I. France was, perhaps, at her very weakest, while Germany, under Henry III., was at its strongest. The king of France had little more than the greater part of the Isle of France and of the Province of Orleannais; Champagne, Anjou, and Maine having become very much detached.

Though the Seine and the Loire flowed through the king's territory, his domains were quite cut off from the sea by the domains of his great feudatories. Thus the small county of Penthieu shut him out from the sea between Normandy and Flanders, and the county of Poitou (a portion of the great duchy of Aquitaine) extended up to the southern boundary of Brittany.

So it came about that the kings of France, in the beginning of the eleventh century, had quite a shrunken territory compared with that of the *Duces Francorum* of a century previous. Nevertheless, they had become "kings" instead of "dukes," and this title gave them claims which were very fruitful in their consequences; for these claims by degrees had the greatest practical effect, as, little by little, first smaller and then larger vassal domains fell into, and became incorporated with, the king's immediate territory, *i.e.*, with that which had remained to him of his ducal domains as duke as well as king.

This Norman, Robert the Devil, went to the Holy Land,¹ leaving his young bastard William (the Conqueror) as duke, who was protected by his suzerain, King Henry I., against rebellious relations.

In 1060 Henry's son, Philip I., became king, Baldwin, count of Flanders, acting as his faithful guardian till he died,² at which time Philip was but thirteen years of age. Afterwards King Philip encouraged Noel, duke of Brittany, to throw off his allegiance to

¹ Normandy had already begun to send out knights to the south—to Spain and Italy. They founded the kingdom of the Two Sicilies (see *ante*, pp. 19 and 32).

² He left two sons, Robert, count of Friesland, and Baldwin VI., count of Flanders. Robert had killed Florent, count of Friesland, and married his widow, Gertrude of Saxony; and he afterwards killed his own brother, Baldwin. Baldwin's widow, Richilde, with her sons Arnoul and Baldwin, fled to France for aid, but in vain. King Philip married Bertha,—daughter of Florent and Gertrude,—and Robert became count of Flanders as well as of Friesland.

the duke of Normandy, and waged much war with King William (the Conqueror) till the latter's death, and he also engaged in many small wars with his own vassals. He intrigued with one Beltrade, and all his life he was debauched and more or less at enmity with the Church.

Louis VI. (the Fat) succeeded his father, Philip I., in 1108, and found his domains greatly reduced by his father's reign of forty-eight years. When he ascended the throne his domains extended but forty leagues by thirty, and his revenues were almost exclusively derived from Paris, Orleans, Etanges, Meaux, and Compiègne; he soon, however, began to extend and consolidate his power, rallying the townspeople and peasantry to him against his rebellious barons.

Nevertheless, Henry I., king of England, was a most dangerous enemy, for he not only obtained the aid of the count of Anjou, but also that of his son-in-law, the emperor Henry V., the husband of his daughter Matilda.¹ He vainly supported William, son of Robert Courthose, of Normandy, in an attempt on Flanders, but he effected one enormous, though, as it turned up, very transitory, success. This was the obtaining for his son Louis (afterwards King Louis VII.) the hand of Eleanor, the great heiress of the duchy of Aquitaine, who owned domains much larger than those which made up the kingdom of France.

King Louis VII. (called the Young) came to the throne in 1137. He went to the Holy Land, but lost, through divorcing his wife, all the great possessions his father had obtained for him,—Aquitaine, Guyenne, and Poitou,—so that his own provinces came to be bounded by the Loire, the Seine, and the Meuse.

While these kings were succeeding to the throne one after the other in France, the power of the Northmen, after they had once acquired Normandy, greatly increased, and long went on increasing, to France's detriment. In the first place, the conquest of England greatly augmented the Norman power, and this again led to vast acquisitions of French territory. William the Conqueror's eldest son, Robert, having lost Normandy, and Robert's son, William, dying without being able to obtain it, the duchy passed to the Conqueror's third son, Henry I.,² and, after him—through his daughter Matilda, who had married³ Geoffroy, count of Anjou—to his grandson, Henry II.⁴ This Henry not only became king of England and duke of Normandy, and succeeded to his father's county of Anjou, but he also added Poitou to his

¹ See *l. c.*, *ante*, p. 29.

² King of England from 1100 to 1135.

³ She had before married the emperor Henry V. See *ante*, p. 29.

⁴ King of England from 1154 to 1189.

domains, and the immense province of Aquitaine, through his marriage with Eleanor of that province, the divorced wife of Louis VII.

Thus to England there now belonged the Atlantic coast of France from Dieppe to Bayonne,—except the wild promontory of Brittany,¹—all Normandy, with the Channel Islands, Poitou, Auvergne, the Limousin, Guienne, and Gascony, with Anjou, Touraine, Maine, and Penthièvre.² Henry II. of England even acquired Nantes, and all the country lying between the Loire and the Vilaine, from Conan IV., duke of Brittany, and he ineffectually tried to acquire the county of Toulouse from its lord, Raymond de St. Gilles.

Thus the English king Henry quite overshadowed the French sovereign, although the latter was the lord and suzerain of the English king as regarded the latter's French possessions.

Louis VII. married, lastly, Adelais, niece of King Stephen of England, and sister to the counts of Blois, Sancerre, and Champagne. By her he had a most noteworthy son, Philip (called Philip Augustus), who succeeded to the throne in 1180, and was king of France when the emperor Frederick the Second was born. Thus, at the birth of our hero Frederick, the most powerful sovereign in Karolingia was by no means the king of France, but the king of England, who owned as much French soil as did the king of France and all his other vassals put together.

We have now passed in review what seems to us the most noteworthy facts with respect to the history of the whole empire of Charlemagne, from his time to the birth of the second emperor Frederick. The next step will be yet more briefly to notice certain facts concerning the history of some regions external to his empire, namely, (1) Scandinavia, (2) what is now Russia and the Polish parts of Germany and Austria, and (3) Spain up to the same date. After that it will only remain to consider the Eastern Empire, wherein a place will be found for a sketch of (1) its Mohammedan invaders; (2) the Holy Land, and (3) the Normans of Italy, the maternal ancestors of Frederick the Second.

SCANDINAVIA.

At the time when Charlemagne was restoring the Western Empire, the Scandinavian section of the Teutonic tribes had settled down into the three great kingdoms of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. Of these, both Norway and Denmark had an extensive

¹ Of which, nevertheless, he had practical possession through its duke, Conan.

² Which William the Conqueror had added to Normandy.

western seaboard, and thus naturally extended westward by piratical incursions, and by conquering and annexing expeditions. Sweden, on the other hand, made up of the two states of Swethiod and Gauthiod, was shut in by the two other kingdoms, and could only expand, as it did expand, over the Baltic lands of Fins and Slavs.

The western Scandinavians, or Northmen, made their incursions into Britain during the eighth century. After contending with Charlemagne, one of their leaders, Ragnar Lodbrog, ascended the Seine, and pillaged Paris in the middle of the ninth century. Subsequent incursions ultimately led, in 911, to the recognition of the duchy of Normandy, under the Northman Rollo, by King Charles the Simple, as before mentioned. Some of the Northmen also ravaged the southern coasts of France and Spain, and others became mercenary soldiers of the Eastern emperor. Finally, Northmen from Normandy, in 1016, settled in Italy, at Aversa, thus forming the germ of what ultimately grew into the kingdom of the Two Sicilies, as before mentioned, and the history of which will be given in some detail at the end of this introductory survey of Europe up to 1194.

DENMARK.

Of the three Scandinavian kingdoms, it was only Denmark which was at any time subject to the Empire. But Denmark, as we have seen,¹ was more or less distinctly so, and the emperor's supremacy fully admitted, at least at intervals and critical moments.

The boundary between Denmark and the actual empire was the river Eider.² The kingdom comprised the peninsula of Jutland and the neighboring islands, with a strip along the adjacent mainland, called Scania, and Halland,—a strip mainly of what is now Sweden,—and these were, in the tenth century, as truly part of Denmark as either Zealand or Jutland, which now constitute it almost entirely.

At the time of the coronation of Charlemagne, Sigurd Snogoje was king of Denmark, to whom succeeded, in 824, Hardiknut I., who introduced to his domains St. Anschar and Christianity, which his successor, Gorm, persecuted. Gorm, with the help of the Obotrites, invaded Saxony, but was defeated by Henry I. (the Fearless), who thereupon formed the "March of Schleswig." The next king, Harold II. (Bluetooth), was a Christian, but Svend I. (Forked-beard), who followed (985), dethroned his father and re-

¹ See *l. c.*, ante, pp. 25 and 31.

² During part of the tenth and eleventh centuries, the Danish frontier was withdrawn to the "Dannemark," the land between the two boundaries forming the *Danish March* of the Empire. Under Knut the Great the older portion was restored.

turned to paganism, conquering England in 1013. His son, Knut the Great (1016–1035), vastly extended his power, and became practically emperor of an enormous northern empire. From his capital city, Winchester, he ruled not only over England and Denmark, but also over Norway and Sweden and a large part of the Baltic coast. It was in his reign that the Danish state was at its maximum of importance as regards extent. With the death of Knut his empire fell to pieces, the Danish kingdom passing to a succession of sovereigns till we come to Waldemar I. (1157–1182), who, uniting with Henry the Lion against the Svends, received (in 1162) from the Emperor Frederick the First investiture of the countries conquered. In 1168 he conquered the island of Rugen, and subsequently (1173–1177) Stettin and part of Pomerania.

His son, Knut VI., avoided rendering homage to Frederick Barbarossa, and, making war on the lord of Pomerania, forced the latter to own himself his dependent. He also conquered the duchy of Mecklenburg and the lands of the Svends, from the Vistula to the Elbe, assuming the name of “King of the Slavs and Vandals,” a title retained by his successors on the Danish throne.

In 1189 messengers came to him at Roskilde with letters from Pope Clement III., inviting him to hasten to the delivery of Jerusalem, but with no great results. Another spiritual lord—Bishop Waldemar, of Schleswig—rebelled against him, claiming the crown, he being a natural son of Knut V. The rebellion, in which he was aided by Adolphus, count of Holstein, Otho, margrave of Brandenburg, the archbishop of Bremen, and others, was with difficulty suppressed. He vanquished them, however, and took possession of Lubeck, where he convoked an assembly of the nobles of Holstein, Stormarn, Dithmarsch, Vagria, Nordalbingia, and Schwerin, and received their homage. Knut VI. died in the first year of the thirteenth century, six years, therefore, after the birth of the emperor Frederick the Second. The Danish archbishopric of Lund was founded in 1151.

NORWAY.

The special country of the Northmen proper—“Norway”—was formed into a kingdom by Harald Harfager, about the middle of the ninth century. It was at its greatest extent in these early times, far larger than at present, reaching even to the White Sea. Hakon I. (936–950) was baptized, and tried to introduce Christianity, which was much furthered by Olaf I. (994), who sent missionaries to Iceland and to Greenland, which had been discovered about eighteen years. He built Drontheim, the seat of the Nor-

wegian archbishopric; to him succeeded Olaf II., a lineal descendant of Harald Harfager. Olaf, in early life, helped the Saxons in England to oppose the Danes, and subsequently harassed the coasts of France and Spain. He was a Christian, and zealous against idolatry, being so severe as to lead many of his subjects to aid the Danish invader Knut the Great, who, for a time, conquered Norway, as already mentioned. Olaf fled with his infant son Magnus to the Russian court, where his brother-in-law, Jarislaf,¹ entertained him hospitably. In 1030 he was slain in attempting to regain his throne, and was afterwards canonized. Soon after the death of Knut, Olaf's son Magnus (the Good) was recalled from his Russian exile and enthroned,² and reigned till 1047. After him came successively Harold IV., Magnus II., Olaf III., Magnus III. (1087-1103), with others, who need not be enumerated, till we come to Magnus V. The last-named sovereign, when only a child, was crowned at Trendheim, one Erling being Regent of the kingdom. But a youth with a singularly romantic history wrested the kingdom from him. This was Sverre, an illegitimate son of a former monarch, Sigurd II. Sverre's mother had taken him away to the Farøe Islands, where he was not only educated, but was ordained a priest. Nevertheless, he claimed the crown, and arrived in the kingdom and secured it. He did this in spite of the opposition of many of the clergy, of Papal excommunication and national interdict. His success was partly due to the help of John of England. He successfully maintained his power, in the teeth of all opposition, till he died in the year 1202, after a reign of twenty-five years. His ecclesiastical character and consequent knowledge, no doubt, helped him to resist the head of the Church, and he went far towards anticipating the subsequent schism of the sixteenth century. It was towards the end of the reign of this most antipapal northern sovereign that the emperor Frederick the Second saw the light.

SWEDEN.

With the end of the tenth century Christianity began in Sweden, and its King, Olaf, was, with his whole family, baptized in 1001. He temporarily conquered Norway, and annexed to his proper domain of Swethiod the lands of Gauthiod (or Gothland), assuming the title of "King of Sweden," instead of merely "King of Opeala," the title of his predecessors. Sweden was at this time of small dimensions. Even with the addition of the southern part of the modern kingdom—Gothland—it did not include any territory

¹ A prince of the house of Ruric.

² The Svend reigned for a short time before he fled at the advent of Magnus.

west of Lake Wener, nor extend more than half up the gulf of Bothnia, Helsingland being still external to the kingdom. In 1056 one Stenkil was raised to the throne, which was held by his descendants for the greater part of a century, till Swerker was elected in 1129. Upon the assassination of the latter, the two contending tribes of Swethiod and Gauthiod agreed that the united crown should be worn alternately by representatives of two dynasties. His first successor was St. Eric, who invaded, subdued, and converted the Finns in 1154. After certain contentions and two reigns, Swerker II., grandson of Swerker I., was raised to the throne, and married a princess of Denmark, thus gaining support against the disaffected portion of his subjects, namely, the men of Gothland. In order to secure himself against his foes, he put to death all the friends and relations of his predecessor, Knut Ericson, except Eric, who escaped into Norway, whence he returned later to avenge his slaughtered relatives. It was Swerker II. who was king of Sweden when the emperor Frederick the Second was born. At that epoch Sweden had extended its borders, having taken in the district to the west of Lake Wener, that is, Wermland (which was now finally annexed), and also the region bordering the gulf of Bothnia, called Helsingland. It had also extended largely in Finland.

We have now reviewed, very briefly, the history of the Western Roman Empire and the Scandinavian kingdom up to the time of the birth of our hero. Before surveying that of the Eastern Roman Empire and its dependencies up to the same date, it will be well yet more briefly to consider the races and regions of the northeastern and southwestern extremities of Europe.

Hitherto we have been almost exclusively occupied with the Teutonic (German and Scandinavian) races. The immense mass of Slavonic tribes and the non-Aryan races have been but briefly referred to in speaking of Bohemia and the Hungarians. We have seen that the eastern and northern borders of the Western Roman Empire fluctuated from time to time, some Slavonic peoples remaining permanently, and others but fitfully, subject to it.

We will, then, first glance at the Turanian and Slavonic populations to the east and north of the Empire, and then note the condition of the Iberian peninsula, to which, as yet, we have hardly referred.

TURANIAN TRIBES.

After the Celtic, Teutonic, and Slavonic races had possessed themselves of the greater part of Europe, there came successively a variety of tribes, which, as being Asiatic in origin, but neither

Aryan nor Semitic, have been conveniently distinguished as *Turanian*. Such were the Huns, Avars, Magyars, Chazars, Patzinales, Bulgarians, and Cumans. These tribes poured westward, in succession, into Europe, through the lands bordering the Euxine on the north.

The invasion of the *Huns*, who penetrated into Gaul, and were then defeated,¹ in the middle of the fifth century, is so remote from our history, that it may suffice to remind our readers that it was their destruction of Aquileia which peopled the Venetian islands with that city's fugitive inhabitants, and so laid the foundation of Venice.

The *Avars* have also little to do with our history. In the last quarter of the sixth century they pressed on the Northern frontier of the Eastern Empire, and subsequently founded a kingdom on the Danube, which was overthrown by Charlemagne. No more than the Huns have they left any recognized representatives in modern Europe.

The next tribe is represented to-day by the powerful and flourishing kingdom of Hungary,—the tribe of *Magyars*. Having settled to the north and east of the Euxine, and occupied much of the territory of the Avars, they were most imprudently called in by the Emperor Arnulf, in 893, to aid him in his struggle with the great Slav state of Moravia. Under his son, the child-king Louis, the Magyars invaded the empire, and ultimately their ravages not only extended widely in Germany and Italy, but even, in 927, to the shores of the Atlantic. They were finally expelled from Germany by the Emperor Otho I. They then settled in and occupied the central part of the modern kingdom of Hungary,—the lands on the Theiss and the middle Danube,—whence they extended north, south, and east, with varying boundaries, especially to the south and east. As we have seen, the German emperors claimed a feudal superiority over the sovereigns of Hungary, and sometimes succeeded in enforcing it. Nevertheless, the Hungarian kingdom, when once formed, always remained a separate kingdom. It was St. Stephen who received from the Pope, with the consent of the emperor Otho III., a royal crown, and his name begins the series of Hungarian kings.² King Coloman, who opposed, sword in hand, the first undisciplined bands of Crusaders, conquered Croatia and Dalmatia. The latter country was captured by the

¹ At the battle of Chalons, A.D. 451.

² Their names and dates were as follows: St. Stephen (1000-1038); Peter the German (1038-1047); Andrew I. (1047-1061); Bela I. (1061-1074); Geisa I. (1075-1077); Ladislas I. (1077-1095); Coloman (1095-1113); Stephen II. (1114-1131); Bela II. (1131-1141); Geisa II. (1141-1160); Stephen III. (1161-1173); Bela III. (1174-1195); Emeric (1195-1203).

Venetians in 1115, but Bela III. re-entered into possession of it, and held it, together with Croatia.

The *Chazars* we find, at the end of the seventh century, in the land between the Caspian and the Euxine, and they were still to be found in the Crimea and its vicinity at the beginning of the eleventh century. Part of them were converted to Christianity about A.D. 858. Having spread considerably northwards, they were repeatedly in conflict with the Russians, who deprived them of much of their territory in the latter half of the ninth century, and still more of it after the middle of the tenth.

The *Patzinales*, of whom, as well as of the Chazars, no known representatives now exist, invaded, about A.D. 834, the territory of the Chazars, and in 888 pressed into the region northeast of the Euxine (which had been inhabited by the Magyars), and in A.D. 1000 intervened between the Euxine and the Russians. In the latter part of the twelfth century the Patzinales were, in their turn, ousted by the Cumans. Before that, however,—*i. e.*, towards the end of the tenth century, and subsequently,—they were defeated by the Russians, and had many conflicts with the Greeks.

The *Bulgarians* made their appearance in Europe about A.D. 679, and settled between the Danube and the Homus. They soon blended with the Slavonic people of the country they invaded, and formed a Slavonic nation (with a Slavonic language) south of the Danube. This state grew greatly in extent between the beginning of the tenth century and the end of the twelfth, but its history belongs rather to that of the Eastern Empire.

Another Bulgarian immigration formed another Bulgarian state, which was distinguished as *Great* or *White Bulgaria*. It was situated on the Volga and the Kama, and was in full force at the beginning of the eleventh century.

The *Cumans* (known as the Polootzi or *Parthi* in Russian history) were to be found east of the Volga, in the year 1000, and half a century later they invaded Russia. Between A.D. 1114 and 1180 they advanced and took the lands antecedently occupied by the Chazars and Patzinales, and spread from the Ural River to the borders of Servia and the Danubian Bulgaria.

Besides these various tribes which invaded Europe after the Celtic, Teutonic, and Slavonic Aryan races had settled within it, there were, in Northern Europe, certain non-Aryan Finns, who were more ancient inhabitants of Europe, and who had been driven northward by the invading Aryans. The Laplanders and Finns of the land east of the Gulf of Bothnia have already been mentioned in speaking of the Scandinavian nations, but other Finnish tribes remained, inhabiting *Esthland* and *Livland* (the present Russian provinces of Esthonia and Livonia)—that is to say, the coast part

of the latter—with a strip of *Curland*, or the land west of the river Duna.

SLAVONIC PEOPLES.

Of the various members of the great Slav race, some became early and permanently connected with the German Empire, others were more or less occasionally subject thereto, while the rest remained permanently independent. These peoples may be grouped as those of the Baltic lands, Bohemia, Russia, and Poland, and that is the order in which, for various reasons, they may be here most conveniently considered.

THE BALTIC LANDS.

We have just seen that Finland, Esthland and Livland, with a strip of Curland, were the abodes of tribes of Finns. The other Baltic lands were inhabited by different members of the great Slavonic body. The inland part of Livland came, however, to be inhabited by the *Letts*, the most northern portion of the Aryan tribes which immigrated into these lands. Other Aryans dwelt in Curland, south of whom and of the Letts were the *Lithuanians*, properly so called, who, in A.D. 1000, occupied the region extending thence to somewhere south of the 55° of north latitude, but reaching to the coast for a short space north of the Niemen. South of them, again, came their kindred, the *Jaturages* or *Jatorugi*. The Aryan tribe called *Prussians* inhabited the coast between the Niemen and the Vistula, extending inland (in A.D. 1000) to the borders of Poland, and being bounded on the west by Pomerania, which, as we have seen, belonged to the German Empire. It was originally a dependency of Poland, but ended by being divided into two duchies, each ruled (like Mecklenburgh) by native princes under the empire. Nevertheless, from 1168 to 1189 it was under the supremacy of Denmark, nearly to the Gulf of Dantzic.

We have already seen¹ the extension of Teutonic power over the Slavs, between the Elbe and the Oder. In the first half of the twelfth century, however, no German or Scandinavian power had taken any lasting hold of the eastern coast of the Baltic or the Gulf of Bothnia. But in 1155 began the Swedish conquest of Finland, which led to the addition of a great eastern province to that kingdom. Down to the middle of the twelfth century, notwithstanding occasional Polish or Scandinavian occupations, the

¹ In the first part of this history, vol. ix., No. 33, January, 1884.

ancient Finnish and Lettish tribes kept their hold on the whole Baltic, northeastward from the mouth of the Vistula.

In about the year 1160, German mercantile enterprise extended to Finland, and was followed soon after the birth of Frederick II. by German conquests and occupation in Livland and parts adjacent thereto.

About the year 1158 some merchants of Bremen, bound for the island of Gottland, were wrecked at the mouth of the river Duna, which divides Livland from Curland. There they built a chapel, and converted some of the chiefs of that part to Christianity, through the preaching of a monk, named Meinrad, who was then consecrated first Bishop of Livonia by the Archbishop of Bremen. His successor, Bishop Berthold, failing to carry on the work of conversion by fair means, tried force, by which he lost his life. The third bishop, Albert, for purposes of defence at Riga and to aid conversion, founded a new order of military monks, called "*Brothers of the Sword*," ten years after the birth of Frederick II., *i. e.*, in 1204. These clerical knights had for habit a white mantle, with two red swords arranged, points downwards, as a St. Andrew's cross. At a later period, as we shall hereafter see, they united with the order of Teutonic Knights, owing to the union of the Danes with the Livonians in hostility to them.

BOHEMIA.

Although Bohemia was tributary to Charlemagne, and under Henry the Fowler became permanently an Imperial German fief in 928, yet it remained a Slavonic power under native princes.¹

A certain region, which was for the most part a portion of their domains, fluctuated between Bohemian, Hungarian and Polish supremacy. This was Moravia (in the main the same as the Moravia of to-day), which, under its king, Svatopluk (884-894), became "the great Moravian kingdom," stretching southwards to Sirmium and the northern boundary of Danubian Bulgaria, while northward it included Chrobatia (*i. e.*, Western Galicia and Southern Poland). It also took in a great part of the modern kingdom of Hungary.

¹ Before the thirteenth century they were mainly "dukes," but were sometimes kings. They were: *Duke* Borzivog (890-901); *Spitignev* I. (901-907); *Wratislas* I. (907-916); *Wenceslas* I. (916-936); *Boleslas* I. (936-967); *Boleslas* II. (967-998); *Boleslas* III. (999-1002); *Jaromir* (1002-1037); *Brzetislas* I. (1037-1055); *Spitignev* II. (1055-1061); *King* *Wratislas* II. (1061-1092); *Duke* *Conrad* I. (1092); *Brzetislas* II. (1093-1100); *Borzivog* II. (1100-1107); *Svatopluk* (1107); *Ladislav* I. (1109-1125); *Sobieslas* I. (1125-1140); *King* *Ladislav* II. (1140-1174); *Duke* *Sobieslas* II. (1174); *Frederick* I. (1178-1190); *Conrad* II. (1190); *Wenceslas* II. (1191); *Brzetislas* III. (1193-1195).

It was against this great Slav power that the emperor, Arnulf, called in to his aid (as already related) the terrible Hungarians—"Ogres" or Magyars. They came in, and, after their expulsion from Germany, they remained in the southern part of what had been "Great Moravia," forming, as it were, a Turanian wedge between two divisions of a *Croatian* (or *Chrobatian*) Slav population. North of the wedge was Chrobatia, with its capital, Cracow, while south of it were the Slavs inhabiting the banks of the Drave and the Save. Chrobatia, north of the Carpathians, became the province known as *Little Poland*, while the part south of those mountains fell under the dominion of the Magyars.

POLAND.

In the tenth century there arose a considerable Slavonic power, having its centre at Gnesen and its territory roughly bounded by the Oder and the Niemen, extending southward to Silesia and Chrobatia, and cut off from the sea by Pomerania and Prussia. This power was Poland—a power destined to undergo so many and truly great vicissitudes.

Mieczyslas I. (964-992), the first Christian prince of Poland, married Dembroska, the daughter of the duke of Bohemia, Boleslas I., with whose successor, however, he made war, with the aid of the emperor, Otho III., and first assumed the title of king of Poland. The next king, Boleslas I. (992-1025), warred with the emperor, Henry II., annexed Bohemia and Moravia, invaded Russia and took Kieff, made great conquests in Pomerania, and successfully warred with the Prussians. He also annexed Chrobatia north of the Carpathians, which remained Polish—as *Little Poland*—as long as Poland lasted, and there was situated Cracow, the second capital of the kingdom. His son, Mieczyslas II. (1025-1034), was a most unsatisfactory sovereign, after whose death a period of anarchy and misery ensued, terminated by the accession of his son, Casimir the Pacific (1041-1058), who obtained Silesia, paying Bohemia for it. His son, Boleslas II., called the Hardy (1058-1081), after various contentions in Russia and elsewhere, and after losing Pomerania, was excommunicated by Gregory VII. for murdering St. Stanislas whilst saying mass, being exasperated by the censures pronounced upon him for his vices by that saint. He died in exile in a monastery in Hungary.

King Wratislas II., of Bohemia, was now recognized by the emperor, Henry IV., as king of Poland also; but the younger brother of the excommunicated sovereign became Prince of Poland, as Ladislas I. (1079-1102), paying tribute to Bohemia, and

being both a weak and tyrannical prince. His son, Boleslas III. (1102-1138), called "the Crooked-Mouthed," married a princess of Kieff, and was a very redoubtable warrior, successfully contending with the Pomeranians, Bohemians, and Russians, and even with the emperors, first Henry V., and afterwards Lothair. Boleslas had carried on war with the Pomeranians in conjunction with Denmark, and forced their duke, Wratislas, to submit, and spread Christianity through Pomerania. Lothair attempted to subject the Polish king, and unsuccessfully invaded Poland to enforce homage and tribute.¹ Boleslas, however, consented to do homage at Merseburg (1135) for Pomerania and Rugen. Boleslas III., on his death, most unhappily, divided his kingdom amongst four of his five sons, who were: Ladislas (the eldest), Henry, Boleslas (the Frizzy), Mieczyslas (the Old), and Casimir (the Just). The eldest became Ladislas II. (1138-1146); he had for his portion Pomerania, Silesia, and the Grand-duchy of Cracow, and had married Agnes, the daughter of the emperor of Germany. Henry had assigned him the territory of Little Poland, and Boleslas (the Frizzy) reigned over the territory of Plock. These two latter brothers, being despoiled by Ladislas II.,—who called to his aid Bohemians, Ruthenians from Red Russia, Galicians, Lithuanians, and Hungarians,—took refuge with Mieczyslas the Old, who reigned over Posen and its dependencies. Then Ladislas was defeated, and had to take refuge in Germany, his brother, the Frizzy, reigning in his stead as Boleslas IV. (1147-1173). The emperor, Frederick I., supporting his son-in-law, Ladislas, forced Boleslas to do homage and pay tribute, and (in 1168) to cede Silesia to the son of Ladislas; and the province thenceforth became more and more separated from Poland. After the death of Boleslas, his brother, "the Frizzy," succeeded, as Mieczyslas III. (1173-1177), but was dethroned by a rebellion, to the advantage of his brother, "the Just," who became Casimir II., who instituted a senate and a system by which the already insubordinate nobles and prelates became fatally independent. After a short usurpation on the part of Ladislas III. (1177-1203), a son of Casimir, called Leszek the White, succeeded in 1203, and reigned till his assassination in Pomerania, in 1227.

RUSSIA.

The great territory between 50° and 60° N. latitude, and 27° and 43° E. longitude, with certain extensions therefrom, came in the ninth century to be inhabited by a number of Slavonic tribes, cut off from the Baltic by Finns, Letts, and Lithuanians; from the

¹ See *ante*, January, 1884, p. 31, note 4.

Ural Mountains by Tartar hordes and the Finns of White Bulgaria, and separated from the Euxine by Patzinales and Chazars. The struggles of these Slavonic tribes with one another, and especially dissensions which sprang up in their great city and republic of Novgorod, led to the intervention of certain Swedes, under their leader Ruric, who, in the year 862, obtained the government of that republic. It was from the name of these Swedish invaders and "Warangians," that the country then ultimately subdued obtained its name of "Russia." Soon the tribes that dwelt at Kieff, on the Dnieper, besought his protection against the Chazars. He subdued the latter, and at the same time made himself master of Kieff, as well as of Novgorod. He died in 879. His son, Igor I., succeeded in 913, the state being, till then, governed by his guardian, Oleg, who had invaded the Eastern Empire and forced its Emperor, Leo, into a very favorable treaty. Igor was assassinated in 945, after which his widow, Olga, assumed the reigns of government, and professed the Christian religion, after going to Constantinople to be baptized, when she received the Christian name of Helen, the emperor, Constantine Porphyrogenitas, being her sponsor. Her son, however, Sviatoglaf I., was a pagan; he fought with and overcame, but was finally killed by, the Patzinales, in 972. On his death the empire was divided between his three sons, Yaropolk, of Kieff, Vladimir, of Novgorod, and Oleg. By this time the multitudinous Scandinavian immigrants had quite blended with the Slavonian natives, and formed a true Russian nation. After sundry contentions Oleg and Yaropolk lost their lives, and Vladimir became sole ruler of Russia, the territories of which he notably augmented, conquering parts of Poland (in 983) the Jaturoges on the west, and the Bulgarians of the Volga on the east, his arms extending from Livland to the Caspian. He ultimately subdued the Crimea, where he was baptized (in 988), by the archbishop of Cherson—thus becoming the first Christian emperor of Russia—and married to Anne, the sister of the Eastern emperors Basil and Constantine. Becoming old, he portioned out his vast territories amongst his numerous progeny, which when thus weakened suffered from the incursions of the Patzinales. He died in 1015, when endeavoring to subdue some of his own insubordinate offspring. Of these Sviatopolk I. reigned (1015–1019) at Kieff, and called in the Poles, under their king, Boleslas I., against his brother, Jaroslav I., of Novgorod, who was aided by the Patzinales.

Sviatopolk lost his life in the struggle, and Jaroslav I. became sole sovereign (1019–1054), after a partial sharing of the sovereignty for a time with a brother named Motislav. Jaroslav was a most powerful prince and beneficent legislator. He conquered the

country of the Cossacks, and obtained all the land east of the Dnieper. In 1036 he defeated the Patzinales, and afterwards aided Casimir (the Pacific) of Poland to conquer the *Mazovians*, or tribes immediately south of Prussia. His sister became queen of Poland, and his three daughters-in-law were Greek, German and English princesses, while the queens of Norway, Hungary and France were his daughters. At his death he made his eldest son Isioslaf I. grand prince of Kieff, while to four others he assigned, respectively, Tchernigoff, Potolsk, Vladimir and Smolensk. This resulted in great disorder and weakening of Russia's power. In 1055 the Cumans made their first incursion and conquered in a dozen years a wide territory. Isioslaf had recourse for support to Boleslas II. of Poland, to the Emperor Henry IV. (in 1075), and to Pope Gregory VII.

Under the next grand prince, Vsevolod (1084-1093), there were other invasions of Magyars and Cumans, and the principality of Kieff wavered more and more (from disordered and divided powers) while the power of Novgorod increased. His nephew, Sviatopolk, (1093-1112), succeeded, who underwent further defeats from the Cumans—the daughter of whose chief he married. Vladimir II. (1113-1125), who was the son of Isioslaf, came next; after whose death a period of utter anarchy ensued. At last, about A.D. 1157, a prince named Andrew greatly raised and strengthened the city of Vladimir on the Kliasma, and within a dozen years subdued Novgorod beneath the supremacy of the former city. He was assassinated in 1176. The disordered and distracted territory of Russia then became divided between the two duchies of Kieff and Vladimir, and at the time of the birth of Frederick the Second Vsevolod III. was Grand Duke of Vladimir, and Sviatoslaf III. Grand Duke of Kieff.¹ Vladimir was become the great seat of power, but already another afterwards celebrated city, Moscow, had come into existence.

SPAIN AND PORTUGAL.

On the southwestern outskirts of Charlemagne's Empire was the great Iberian peninsula, which in many respects resembled and in others widely differed from the lands on that Empire's north-eastern borders. For the most part it had as little to do with the later Germano-Roman Empire as had Scandinavia; but in its earlier

¹ Andrew I. of Vladimir was succeeded by Michael II. (1175-1176), and Vsevolod III. (1176-1212). Kostoslaf, Grand Duke of Kieff (1157-1167), was succeeded by Metislaw II. (1168-1172), Roman (1173-1177), Sviatoslaf III. (1177-1195), followed by Rurik II., who died in 1211.

history it was an important part of the first Roman Empire, and its history is singularly varied and divergent from that of any region we have yet passed in review.

It still contains, in its northern provinces, many Basques, who are the remnants of its primitive Iberian people who were largely displaced by invading Celts in prehistoric times. To this early Celtic population was subsequently added a trifle of both Greek and Phœnician blood. The Phœnicians founded Gades (Cadiz), and also (between the first and second Punic wars) New Carthage, or, as it was called, Cartagena. The Greeks colonized its eastern coast. By degrees the country was slowly reduced under the dominion of Rome, the whole becoming Roman in the time of Augustus.

In the fourth and fifth centuries Spain was invaded by the Suevi, the Vandals and the Goths.

The Suevi, at first pagans, but Christians by the year 570, formed a kingdom which embraced (when at its greatest extent) the modern Spanish province of Galicia and also Portugal down to the Tagus. This kingdom, however, came to an end in 585.

The Vandals were Arians. They held for a time the south of Spain, and have left behind a trace of their presence in the name of the province "Andalusia."

The Goths entered by way of Barcelona and subdued the country, but the great West-Gothic kingdom included Aquitaine, and its capitol was Toulouse. They were Arians till 586. In 550 the southern part of Spain (including Cadiz and Cordova), with the Balearic isles, was won back for the Roman Empire under Justinian.

This region, however,—except the Balearic isles—was gradually regained by the Goths in the course of ninety years, and at the end of the seventh century the whole Iberian peninsula, with Roussillon and the adjacent part of Languedoc to the most western mouth of the Rhone, formed one great West-Gothic kingdom.

This kingdom had two very different seaboard. One faced the Atlantic, the other (from Gibraltar eastward) bordered the Mediterranean. It is thus evident *à priori* that the regions of the peninsula at either coast would have different destinies; and in fact this geographical divergence did, as we shall hereafter see, have the very effects which might have been anticipated.

This united Gothic kingdom was invaded and subdued by the Arabs with great rapidity, between A. D. 711 and 714, and they conquered afterwards the Balearic islands from the Roman Empire, to which, at the time of the Arab invasion, they still belonged. The Mahometans carried their arms into France; and Narbonne, Arles and Nîmes were Saracen cities till 755. The Christian

Goths were driven up to the Pyrenees and southern shore of the Bay of Biscay, where they continued to hold a fringe of independent Christian country on the northern border of the great Spanish Mahometan territory which formed a part of the Caliphate of Bagdad.

The Mahometans, however, soon lost the northeastern portion of the country. Charlemagne acquired it as far as the Ebro (including, of course, Barcelona), and made it into "the Spanish March" of his Empire. The Caliphate of Bagdad included Spain up to 755, when Spain became separated from it, under Abderahman I., forming at first the "*Emirate*," and afterwards the Omniad *Caliphate* of Cordova. The undivided Mahometan power of Spain was at its maximum in the tenth century; thereafter it waned till, in 1025, the Omniad Caliphate broke up into a number of separate Mahometan kingdoms, such as those of Cordova, Seville, Lisbon, Zaragoza, Toledo, Valencia, Granada, Jaen, and Murcia.

The quarrels between these kingdoms led to the invasion of other Mahometan tribes from Africa. First came the Almoravides (1086 to 1110), who conquered all the Mahometan kingdoms, save that of Zaragoza. To the Almoravides succeeded the Almohades who invaded Spain from Africa in 1146, established themselves, and turned back what had, by that time, become the advancing tide of Christian conquest from the north. The Moorish sovereign of the Almohades, who gained the great battle of Alarcos, was Jacoub Ben Jousouf (1184 to 1198), and that battle was fought in the year which succeeded the birth of the Emperor Frederick the Second.

Meanwhile the Christians in the north of Spain formed a kingdom of Asturias as early as 718, and Gijon, Artoya and Leon were won back by 730. King Alfonso I. (739 to 757) conquered Galicia and Portugal down to the Douro. Navarre also soon gained its independence, and the small kingdoms of Leon, Castile and Aragon also appeared upon the scene.

Between these rising Christian kingdoms were endless disputes, disunions and divisions; they agreed but in their common hostility to the Mahometans.

The Christian advance had been twofold: one advance was due to purely Spanish enterprise, and took place from the coast of the Bay of Biscay. It gave rise to Leon, Castile and Portugal. The other advance was due partly to Frankish invasion, and gave rise to Aragon, which thus by its origin, as well as by its geographical extension, contrasted widely with Castile. Their advance southwards was at very unequal rates—Toledo being won by Castile a generation earlier than Zaragoza was won by Aragon.

Navarre was intermediate between these great eastern and

western Christian states; but it, for a brief moment, overshadowed both. Under King Sancho I. (1000 to 1035) Navarre included Biscay, Guipuzcoa and the original Castile on the west, as well as Aragon on the east. Then Leon and Navarre comprised all northern, or Christian, Spain. In 1035, however, this Navarre broke up into Castile, Navarre and Aragon. Besides these kingdoms, there were the Counties of Portugal and Barcelona; and that of Barcelona extended into France. The County of Portugal of 1094 became a kingdom in 1139.

The extension of Portugal and Castile entirely cut off Navarre from the task of advancing on the Moslem, a task which Portugal, Leon, Castile and Aragon thenceforth shared between them.

Alfonso VI., king of Castile and Leon (1072 to 1109), took Toledo in 1105.

In 1135 Alfonso VII. (1109 to 1157) received the homage of the kings of Aragon and Navarre, and had himself crowned at Leon "Emperor of Spain." He passed the Guadiana and took Calatrava and Badajoz, and almost all the country north of the Sierra Morena.

Alfonso I. (1104 to 1134), king of Navarre and Aragon, took Zaragoza in 1118, also Tarragona.

Alfonso I. of Portugal (1112 to 1185) took Lisbon in 1147 and Silves, in Algarve, was taken for a short time by his successor in 1191.

At the time of the birth of Frederick the Second the king of Castile was Alfonso VIII. (1158 to 1214), while Alfonso IX (1188 to 1230) was king of Leon. The kingdom of Navarre was governed by Sancho (the Wise) VII. (1194 to 1234), and Alfonso II. (1162 to 1196) ruled over both Aragon and Barcelona. Sancho I. (1185 to 1211) was at the same time king of Portugal. All these sovereigns were, more or less, at war with the Almohades, who, in 1195, won the battle of Alarcos, which carried their power again beyond the lower Tagus and to the vicinity of Toledo.

The kingdom of Valencia was still Mahometan; so that at the time of our hero's birth all Spain was Mahometan south of the mouths of the Tagus and the Ebro, and of the Mountains of Toledo.

We have now finished our preliminary historical survey up to the year 1194, with the important exception of the Eastern Empire and its dependencies, that will next occupy our attention; and in treating thereof care will be taken to say occasionally what may be necessary as to the female ancestors of Frederick the Second.

THE IRISH QUESTION, PRESENT AND PROSPECTIVE.

WE are in the midst of a ministerial crisis in London. Before these words appear in America, we may be passing through the throes of a general election on this side, and the Irish people may at last have the opportunity of sending to the British Parliament a body of members who will truly represent the opinions of the overwhelming majority of the nation. This it is necessary to state by way of preliminary observation; not because the probabilities, on the whole, point to the immediate break-up of the Gladstone cabinet, but that the following remarks may be understood as written in the midst of a ministerial crisis not yet terminated.

The increase of the number of the members who will accept the leadership of Mr. Parnell and adopt the principles of the present Irish Parliamentary Party is a foregone conclusion. It is admitted by foes as readily as friends. In the course of the debates on the bill for the reduction of the franchise, the main objection to the extension of the measure to Ireland, from the Conservative side, has been that it would give Mr. Parnell ninety or ninety-five seats; and the ministerial answer is, that this is not a solid objection at all, for Mr. Parnell will have seventy to seventy-five seats whether the franchise be lowered or not. It is equally admitted that the disposal of a vote so large, in the House of Commons, will place in the hands of the Irish party the fate of every English ministry. The *Pall Mall Gazette* described Mr. Parnell's position in this respect by calling him "the master of the situation." A strong proof that the Irish members will be omnipotent in the next Parliament will be found by even a cursory examination of some of the important incidents in the history of the present House of Commons. There have been at least half a dozen occasions in which the ministry narrowly escaped a defeat that would have driven them from office. On the division on the Marriott amendment to the Cloture, which took place on March 3d, 1883, the government won by but a majority of thirty-nine, and they had declared that they would stand or fall by the result of this division. On the division on the second reading of the Affirmation Bill, the government were defeated by a majority of three; and they would have been dismissed from office if they had not beforehand declared that they would not make the division a question of confidence. On the last division on their Egyptian policy the ministry

won by a majority of but twenty-eight votes. Two observations must be made on these three divisions. First. The government, in the two cases in which it had a majority, would have been placed in a minority if all the Irish members returned on Home Rule principles had adopted the policy of the Irish Parliamentary Party and voted against the ministry. The ministry were saved, not by English Liberals, but by false Irish Nationalists. Second. The ministry, which has thus been often placed in a position of extreme risk, came into office with a majority of over a hundred over the Conservatives, and the Irish Parliamentary Party, which has so often almost succeeded in striking this powerful ministry down, averaged on divisions a vote of but thirty-five.

There is another and still more important inference to be drawn from the history of the relations between the Liberal majority and the Irish party in the present Parliament. One of the safeguards against the Irish party of the future, on which some Englishmen rely—one of the dangers which Irishmen fear—is a union of the two English parties against the Irish attack. Such a union is a dream—unless in one case, with which I will deal presently. Party spirit has always played a large part in the parliamentary struggles of the English people; it may be doubted whether it ever played a larger part than it does at the present time. At this moment, for instance, England is involved in a most serious and difficult foreign complication; peace or a terrible war, the safety or the endangering of her Indian empire, are held by both parties to be the stakes that are at issue in this mighty game; and what is the spectacle that the House of Commons exhibits? Fierce passions, a frenzied want of self-control, a complete absence of scruple or fairness,—ignorance, trickiness, personal rancor, political ambition, rule supreme in England's legislature. Of course, it would be easier to unite English parties against the Irish than on the question of distant Egypt; for national hate and the masterful spirit of a strong towards a weak country are passions which can be most potently worked upon. But England at the present moment has to think, not of Egypt only, but of France, dogging her every step and watching her every move with the fierce eagerness of a rival ambition; and yet the risk of a rupture with France, and the prospect thereafter of one of the most terrible of modern conflicts, cannot keep England united, or honest, or cool; and assuredly that is strong proof that no durable union can be reasonably anticipated against Ireland. There is one thing, and one thing only, that can unite all Englishmen against Ireland, and that is the destruction of life in some of these outrages by which London is occasionally shaken. These outrages bring terror to the Irish minority, whose lives and property are at the mercy of the

English majority around them; and to the Irish representatives appears one of the gravest obstacles to the early success of the national cause. The period which immediately followed the Phoenix Park murder furnishes an instructive precedent as to the effect of a great crime upon the Irish position. Before May 6th, 1882, Mr. Parnell was the most powerful man in this country. All the resources of the British empire—infantry, cavalry, and artillery, thirteen thousand police, and the wholesale right of arrest—had been brought against him, and had failed; and he came out of prison an acknowledged victor over the best and worst of the ministers who had all the British power at their back. The House of Commons literally crawled before him; ministers ran a race with open foes or treacherous friends among them, to shake his hand and offer him congratulations; coercion was a broken weapon, never to be tried again; the doom of the landlord was sealed; and home rule was within the measurable distance of three or four years. Then came the 6th of May, and Mr. Parnell was transformed from the omnipotent leader of a great national movement to the omnipotent opponent of the most cruel coercion bill ever proposed for Ireland. Those who passed through that period of bitter trial may well have sinking of heart in these hours of most sanguine hope, lest once again a successful crime should change the eve of overwhelming victory to an hour of disastrous defeat.

Taking another factor in the situation, the Irish people have never been more determined and never more united than at the present moment. The series of unbroken successes which the Irish party have had at recent elections show not merely a change but a revolution and a moral resurrection. To those who can remember the dreary days which immediately followed the treason of Keogh and Sadleir, the names of some of the Irish constituencies recently contested are but too familiar. They were the synonym for everything that was unusually degraded and politically corrupt. A successful shopkeeper in search of a title; a lawyer on the lookout for an office; a financier anxious to bait his plans for the promotion of bubble companies, with the *prestige* of parliamentary position,—any political adventurer who had money to spend was sure of being returned for one of those constituencies, though his opponent might be a man of fearless courage and of inflexible political honesty. Even as recently as the election of 1880, some of these same constituencies obstinately adhered to the old and evil ways. Mr. Parnell, going down to Mallow, to support a national candidate, was disastrously beaten by a government lawyer. Athlone returned, instead of Mr. Sheil, who was one of the first and most earnest supporters of Mr. Parnell, in his

days of early and painful struggle, a political nondescript without a particle of faith in national principles; and yet Mallow has since returned Mr. William O'Brien by an overwhelming majority over a ministerial officer; and Mr. Justin Huntley McCarthy has just been returned, even without a contest, for Athlone. All this points not merely to strength of political conviction,—for this has always been present to the minds of the majority of the Irish people,—but that true appreciation of the political situation which it is hard to impress upon the mind even of the most advanced nation. To put it briefly, Ireland is solid for the national policy of the National party.

Finally, the position of holding the scales between the two English parties, according to all fair probabilities, gives the Irish party a weapon for winning all the constitutional rights of their country. The British Parliament is, after all, the heart of the British empire. The man who is able to control the House of Commons is able to control England. The leader, then, of a large Irish party, holding the balance between the two English parties, may be truly said to be in some degree master of the fortunes and destinies of the British empire. With such a position it is for him to declare his terms. It may be that one or even two or three ministers may refuse these terms; but if the Irish leader be able to keep his party together, the final surrender is inevitable.

Such, then, are the present prospects of the Irish cause: The Irish people determined and united; the probabilities pointing to an immense Irish party,—such a party by being able to make or mar ministers,—in a position to win Ireland's rights. But is there no dark side to this fair prospect? It would be political optimism of the worst character to describe the present situation as all sunshine, and all safety. The very loftiness of the nation's hope at the present moment increases the danger of any defeat. As they are so certain and elated now, proportionately will they be depressed, in case they be defeated. It would probably happen that, if the present party were to fail from one cause or the other, as from treason or disunion, or the play of forces over which they have no control, a period of depression and inaction as profound and as prolonged would follow as that which succeeded the break-up of constitutional agitation by Sadleir and Keogh; and the consequences of such a break-up might be even more serious than those in the dreary period between 1855 and 1865. During those years there was, it is true, a terrible exodus of the people; a universal tyranny and a plunder by the landlords were exercised upon the tenants, which recent legislation has made forever impossible; but, on the other hand, there is no reason to doubt that emigration as large would follow the downfall of the national hopes. It must

be remembered that the whole world is daily becoming smaller ; that America is now incalculably nearer to Ireland than it was in 1855 and 1865, not merely by improved modes of communication, but by the more intimate association between the different countries of the globe.

There was a time when, to a certain portion, at least, of the Irish people, America was still a strange land of dark and unknown features ; but now every Irishman is more familiar with the names and situation of Chicago and San Francisco than with those of Newcastle and Greenock. There are now in Ireland no districts that have not dispatched their contingents to the new country, and the families are few among the peasant classes that have not, at some time or other, sent a member to the United States. The land agitation of the last few years has had an important bearing upon this question. The Irish people were dazzled by the spectacle of such large subscriptions—a thousand and two thousand pounds—coming in uninterrupted succession week after week ; and the idea was more than ever increased that America was a country where there was work, food, freedom, wealth for all. It is a great and terrible fact, in making this comparison between the emigration of the present and of the past, that Ireland now has fewer of its people to spare. When the diminution of its population began, that population was nine millions strong ; now it is barely five millions.

Another factor in considering this part of the question is the unfortunate fact that, at this present moment, there is a stronger feeling against Ireland in England than there has been at any previous period. The English nation is being slowly brought face to face with the problem of a change in the relations between the two countries which to many of them seems the beginning of the end of the empire.

Their passions, besides, have been excited ; their anger roused by the fierce collisions which the last four eventful years have brought forth. The evil to Ireland which this change in the temper of the English people has created, is evidenced by the fact already alluded to, that the strongest coercion act ever passed was passed in the eighty-second year after the Union, and by a Liberal ministry pledged to do justice to Ireland.

It is, therefore, highly probable that the break-down of the national party would be followed by a sterner era of coercion than any that has existed in the present century. And what does this involve ? A large part of the emigration in the last few years has been due to the fact that Ireland was made a country absolutely intolerable to any man who had taken an active part in popular movements. The liberty, the property, sometimes even the life, of every prominent man in a district was at the mercy of the policeman or

the informer. It can easily be imagined how fair must have appeared the prospect of America to a man in such a position; and if they saw at the same time the destruction of an Irish Parliamentary Party, and a sterner coercion in Ireland, no one can calculate how many people would find their country intolerable and fly with hope and eagerness to the land which has already sheltered so many millions of their race. Finally, on this point, the money which has been placed at the disposal of the Irish authorities by the Imperial Parliament for the purpose of emigration, has found eager prayer for its assistance in every part of Ireland in which it has been spent. The English authorities would only be too willing to spend millions of money for the purpose of stimulating emigration from Ireland. Within the last few years they would have spent probably five times as much as they have, were it not that they were confronted by an Irish party that doggedly resisted every emigration proposal; remove or dissolve that hostile force, and money would be poured into Ireland for the purpose of bribing its people to leave by wholesale.

I think it absolutely necessary to point out these various dangers to the Irish cause, as these dangers are to my mind very real, and as they form one of the material considerations of the hour. If the view be correct, if these perils really exist, they obviously increase to a vast degree the importance of the present struggle. To have a movement which may be temporarily defeated and then go on again, is one thing; it is a much more serious matter when the movement has no choice between great success and terrible and abysmal failure. The present situation, then, may be summed up, not as Ireland's hour of approaching triumph, but as the hour which will decide whether her immediate future shall be greatly happy or greatly miserable. The present movement has as its possibilities, not merely the making but also the marring, for a considerable time, of the fortunes of Ireland.

It is a serious duty, in face of a problem so momentous, to take note of the dangers that beset the present Irish party. The first and greatest of these is the danger of disunion. The members of the present party feel this so strongly that they have practically come to the conclusion that the pledge to be taken by every candidate must be to sit and act and vote with the Irish Parliamentary Party, to abide by the decisions of the majority, and in case unable to do this, to hand back to the constituency the seat given on the promise of union with the party. This pledge may appear stringent enough; any man acquainted with Irish history would wish that it could be possible to make it even more stringent. The history of Ireland—the observation is so trite that one ought to apologize for making it—has been a history of national effort beaten by disunion.

In parliamentary parties this sad moral has been pointed out with emphasis by more than one tragic episode. It might appear to the person viewing Ireland from without that there was no chance of any such disunion in the present hour; but to those acquainted with what is going on in Ireland this will appear much too sanguine an estimate. If there be union in Ireland, it is not because the most energetic attempts have not been made to create disunion; if union endure, it is not because there will not be the materials for creating discord. This should not be matter of surprise. The existence of political activity in any country involves the existence of difference of opinion; one party cannot exist without another party, a certain amount of political imbecility is as inevitable as a certain amount of political wisdom; and as there will be a tendency towards unity and discipline, so will there be a tendency towards faction and disunion. While, therefore, one may view the factionists with hatred, the existence of faction may be accepted without surprise.

The factionists in Ireland, at the present moment, belong almost entirely to the class of men who think that nationalization of the land is the only true and fair settlement of the land question. It would be a waste of space to argue with any man of intelligence and education against this theory. The only point of view from which I wish to look at it, in your pages, is as to its effect on the national struggle in which Ireland is engaged. Everybody knows that Ireland is a country of farmers. At least half the population is made up of farmers with their families. It need scarcely be said that this vast proportion of the population would be opposed, to a man, to nationalization. To them it means—not that they shall get rid of the landlord altogether—which was the programme of the Land League and which was promised to them from hundreds of platforms and in thousands of speeches—but that they shall exchange one landlord for another—that the state shall take the place of the individual landlord. Then, instead of rent being abolished, it is to be perpetuated; and the perpetuation of rent means, likewise, the perpetuation of the power to evict. Then, while the Irish peasant is known to have a stronger sense of his rights of property than almost any other peasant in the world, he is asked by the nationalizers to admit that there should be no such thing as private property in land. Finally, this doctrine, that the land should be the property of the state, is preached in no new country with millions of virgin and unoccupied soil; it is preached in an ancient nation, where every acre, every rood, has been in private hands for centuries, and every rood is guarded by a blunderbuss. It is scarcely necessary to say, under these circumstances, that nationalization and nationalizers are tolerated by the farmers as long as they do

not understand what they mean, and as long as there seems no chance of these projects coming to anything. The moment the farmers understand what is intended, they will rise against the theory, and the theorizers will separate themselves from any political party which represents such views. The adoption of the theory of nationalization by the Irish Parliamentary Party would, then, mean the hostility to that party of all the farmers of Ireland—in other words, a party professing to be national would be opposed by half the nation. The case has only to be thus stated to show to any reasonable mind that the adoption of nationalization would mean the immediate break-up of the Parliamentary Party and the downfall of the national cause.

A nationalizer might be disposed to declare that even this terrible price would not be too great to pay for the success of a cause so sacred as the nationalization of the land. But, unfortunately, the probability is that there would not be even that compensation; the national cause would be lost, and nationalization would not be won. Nobody in his senses believes that nationalization of the land is a doctrine which has the least chance of being accepted by the English Parliament within any period that can be foreseen by man; and, therefore, the break-up of the Irish Party would not imply the nationalization of the land by the British Legislature. The only change in the situation would be that the domination of England in Ireland would be perpetuated. If a nationalizer object that it is his hope to have nationalization carried by an Irish and not by an English Parliament, the answer is that the spread of the doctrine of nationalization among the Irish people means the postponement, if not forever, at least to a very remote period, of the advent of an Irish Parliament. This is the plain issue; if the nationalizers succeed, the cause of self-government is lost.

It might be supposed that a pernicious craze of this sort does not deserve such serious treatment as I have given to it. But the American public ought to be warned that the nationalizers in Ireland, though a small and, of course, unintelligent section, are carrying on a propaganda with the zeal and energy that so often characterize the apostles of a mischievous craze. This propaganda takes the form, very often, of covert attack and active intrigue against the Irish Party. There have been numerous manifestations of this spirit during the last two years which cannot have escaped the notice of any careful observer of the signs of the times. It is, too, an unpleasant feature of the nationalizers that—as so often happens—there exist, side by side, the blindness of fanaticism and the unscrupulousness of very wide-awake intrigue. Proposals are made, not in the name of nationalization, but in its interest; projects are denounced because they seem to erect a barrier against nation-

alization, but the reason given for the opposition is very different; and forms of organization are suggested, in the name of democratic principles, with the real purpose of promoting disorganization in the plans of the leaders of the national movement. The condition of mind is certainly curious which permits many of these gentlemen to take an active part in the management of the National League, which has peasant proprietary and national government—and, as I think I have shown, nationalization of the land is as destructive of the second as of the first of these two principles—for its cardinal doctrines, and at the same time to work night and day against the success of the organization and of its central principles.

A difficulty of the situation is that a good many persons may be drawn into support of the nationalizers, not from any faith in that theory itself, but from the restlessness of ungratified ambition. It must always be remembered, as one of the pregnant facts of the situation, that while the Irish party are in opposition to the government in England, they occupy the position of the government to an opposition in Ireland. In England, they are hostile to the men in power; in Ireland, they are the men who enjoy power; or to put it briefly, in England they are the "outs," in Ireland they are the "ins." This implies that there are throughout the country a certain number of men who have to the Irish Party that envy which is natural and human. These men offer material to the apostles of discord, and are ready to follow a flag, even though they do not care for it particularly, from the one feeling that it is the flag of revolt against the men in power.

Another class for whose support the nationalizers are making a great bid, are the laborers. Here again the materials are ready for any man unscrupulous enough to preach a class war between different sections of national Irishmen. The laborers are poor—terribly poor; are full of a sense of wrong; have gained but little from the present agitation, although they did much towards its success; and as they are brought into contact with farmers in the relation of employed to employer, bear the farmer, in many cases, anything but friendly feelings. It is this class that before long is to be emancipated in Ireland—that will soon have a vote and a voice in the political representation of the country. The creation of a new class of voters implies the rise of a class of politicians who will seek to control that class, and will try to obtain that control by appeals to their passions and the advocacy of unreasonable and impossible demands. It is not hard to teach any body of men to make extravagant and unjust claims; and the Irish laborer may well be taught to put forward demands which the farmers would be justified in resisting. And here, again, it is part of the case against the nationalizers that they would, while injuring those they dislike,

not succeed in benefiting those they pretend to serve. In the same way as the success of the nationalizers would, while destroying any chance of national self-government, at the same time not win nationalization, so the success of the nationalizers in setting the laborers against the farmers would, while hurting the farmers, not help the laborers. The two classes are strictly interdependent; an impoverished farmer means an impoverished laborer. Still more are the two classes dependent on one another as soldiers in the same army fighting for national rights. The first essential of real prosperity for both the laborer and the farmer—as for every class of Irishmen—is the restoration of an Irish Parliament to foster and develop the resources of Ireland; and as an internecine struggle between the farmer and the laborer would postpone the creation of a native parliament, such a struggle would tend to prolong the poverty alike of the laborer and of the farmer.

The prospect of a rupture between the farmer and the laborer has not been unnoticed by English statesmen. It furnishes one of the stock arguments to Liberal speakers for the reduction of the franchise. The Marquis of Hartington, who is known as one of the very bitterest enemies of Irish rights, said in a debate on the Franchise bill: "I think it possible that the immediate effect of this measure will be to increase the number of the party which is opposed to the British connection. . . . That may be the result of this measure; but I by no means admit that it will be the certain result of it. Some of us may be inclined to take a more hopeful view of the matter. The Parliamentary constituencies of Ireland are, under existing circumstances, extremely easy of manipulation; and, as has been stated in the course of this debate, in a great number of constituencies the honorable gentleman, the member for the city of Cork (Mr. Parnell) and those with whom he acts, are enabled almost to dictate the choice of members. . . . I am not at all certain that *the constituencies enlarged, as is proposed by this bill, will be quite so easy to manage by one political party as the existing constituencies.*"

Mr. Shaw Lefevre, who, during the "No Rent" struggle, called upon the Irish landlords to evict their tenants in order to save a Liberal ministry trouble, was even more cynically candid. Dealing with the same Conservative objection as the Marquis of Hartington—that the reduction of the franchise would increase the power of Mr. Parnell—Mr. Shaw Lefevre used these significant words: "One of the principal features in the present condition of Ireland is, that the constituencies are made up of one class, namely, the tenant farmers. The effect of this extension of the franchise *would be to add a large class of agricultural laborers; and I cannot but think that after a time questions would arise of differences between these*

two classes of persons. . . . and my belief is that the giving of the franchise to the agricultural laborers of Ireland would have a steady-effect upon the tenant farmers themselves, and that *we may see before long* a difference of opinion between the tenant farmers and the laborers of Ireland. That difference is already beginning to show itself; and I may quote the different policies propounded by the honorable member for the city of Cork (Mr. Parnell) and by Mr. Davitt as an illustration of that difference. I cannot but hope, therefore, that differences of this kind may, in the future, *have a very important effect upon the elections in Ireland."*

I will not pause to examine the morality of the doctrines suggested in these words. Suffice it to say that they are the modern application of the very ancient English principle of ruling Ireland. They propose to divide and conquer. It is not, of course, very surprising that English statesmen, remarkable beyond their fellows for their hatred of Ireland, should preach such a gospel; the persons who excite surprise, in spite of these warnings from enemies, as to the expected and inevitable result of their teachings, are those who, while claiming to be Irish nationalists, persist in efforts that would once more lay Irish nationality prostrate and helpless at the feet of English despotism.

Another point in the present situation which gives grave concern is the selection of proper candidates for election. Here again the Parliamentary Party are confronted with the work of the intriguers. Several instances could be given of attempts to force on Mr. Parnell, through a popular meeting, nationalizers or other craze-mongers, the presence of whom in a Parliamentary Party would be a source of the gravest danger. The peril of the next party will come—it must be borne in mind—not from corruption, but from folly. There will be too many men to buy; and besides, the English authorities have found out that the purchase of an Irish traitor is a very bad bargain. It only results in the return, by the betrayed constituency, of a more violent or a more trustworthy type of politician. A cynical member of the present Parliamentary Party remarked that the next party would consist of seventy-five men, and that in these seventy-five there are certain to be ten traitors. This, in my opinion, is a complete misapprehension of the facts. I doubt if there will be one traitor in the whole number; but there may be—if great care be not taken—ten crotcheteers; and ten crotcheteers would be perhaps as fatal as ten traitors. The motives with which a politician acts are of importance, as a rule, to himself only; to the nation whose prospects are destroyed, it is a matter of absolute indifference whether the work of destruction has been done by the wickedness of arrant knaves or the imbecility of sincere fools. It will be necessary, then, to have, not merely a party which numbers

seventy-five men, but a party of seventy-five honest and capable men.

And this naturally leads me to the discussion of the payment of members. This subject has perhaps by this time passed out of the region of controversy, and has been practically decided by the instinct and good-sense of the Irish race at home and abroad. It is well known that the men who will truly represent national feeling in the House of Commons are not taken from the ranks of the wealthy; they must be taken from the ranks of the people. It is also known that the expenses of a member of Parliament are great; and it is notorious that the demands on a member of Parliament are so great as to leave but little time and less energy for the pursuit of a business or a profession. It is evident from these facts that the only way to obtain a sufficient number of representatives will be to have a fund for their remuneration. In connection with this part of the subject, attention should be drawn to the fact that the amount of attendance a member gives to the House of Commons is one of the most serious elements in his usefulness. The present party is known to be numerically small; but the complete significance of that fact can only be gathered by looking at the ordinary attendance of the party. There are frequently weeks when the number of Irish members on each day in the House of Commons does not exceed a dozen; and the average attendance does not exceed twenty. Now this is a very bad state of things. The real fact is, an Irish member should always be in his place in the House of Commons. There is not a day nor an hour of any day on which he may not be able to do something for Ireland—not so much directly as indirectly—not through what he does himself, but what he can prevent others from doing. The House of Commons is so overweighted with work, and is still hampered by rules so antiquated and imbecile, that every minister and every measure is still at the mercy of even a few members. One single Conservative member—Mr. Warton—by constant attendance in the House, and by an unscrupulous use of the power of “blocking,”¹ does more to embarrass the Liberal ministry than any hundred members of his own party; and is, in fact, a more potent dictator of the fate of legislation than the Prime Minister. In short, the House of Commons in nineteen-twentieths of its work is still at the mercy of a single determined and attentive member. As a single member has this enormous power, it will be seen what might be effected by a body of twenty or thirty men who would always be in their places, and would always watch the ministers. Such a body confronting

¹ If a member put a notice of objection to a bill on the Order Book, he is said to “block” it; and a “blocked” bill cannot be taken up after half-past twelve at night. This is fatal to most measures.

ministers, if it only acted with judgment, would wring many concessions from the needs of Government. But this constant attendance can only be obtained by having a fund for the payment of members. The reason why so many members of the present party are irregular in attendance is not want of patriotism or zeal or energy. It is that, being men engaged in business and dependent on business for their livelihood, they are unable to leave Ireland except at distant intervals; and then at serious risk to their interests.

The indirect effects of the raising of such a fund are almost as important as the direct. Nothing succeeds like success. A cause that has the power of rewarding its adherents strengthens its hold on large sections of society both inside and outside Ireland. These sections may be weak and time-serving and mean; they may have all the vices which French *littérateurs* are fond of ascribing to the *bourgeoisie*; that does not alter the fact that they are a very influential portion of the population of Ireland as of every country. Who doubts that while a great part—probably the greater part—of the success in the smaller Irish constituencies of the last few years is due to lofty motives—patriotic purpose and the advance of political education—who doubts that a part of the success was due to the fact that the Irish Party were seen to have behind them the financial resources of the Irish race in America and Australia? And the effect of these vast subscriptions on England and the rest of the world was also enormous. The world will not stop long to listen to the tale of the weak and the oppressed; it has all its ears for the strong and combative. The financial assistance given to the Irish at home by the Irish abroad was one of the chief means in the last few years of convincing not only England, but all other nations, that there is still an Irish question that has to be settled. It shows that the struggle in which England is engaged is not with a small, poor and helpless country, close to her own shores and within reach of her rifles and ironclads; it shows that the struggle is with a great and ubiquitous race—numbering millions of men, free from English control—wealthy, generous, passionately devoted to the cradle-land of their race.

Finally, as political men are but human, it is an advantage to a cause that the material interests of those concerned should not be in antagonism to the honest and fearless discharge of their duties. English ministries are able to agree with each other and to keep their party together, partly by the fact that they have wealth and honor to give away; and an opposition is maintained through years of depression and defeat by the hope of some day gaining the same privileges. In Ireland, too, English rule has been maintained by the fact that England was able to buy most of the talent of the

country. It is something to see the day when the Irish race can say to the men of ability in Ireland that their kinsmen are wealthy and generous enough to offer a career of honor to those who serve Ireland faithfully and well.

I cannot do better than end this article with a remarkable quotation from an English journal. The burden of my remarks has been the dangers of discord—the necessity of union. On that text the following remarks of the *Pall Mall Gazette*, of London preach a sermon that every Irishman may study with profit. These are its words: "We may therefore assume, that at the next general election, whoever loses, Mr. Parnell will improve his position. He will command the support of sixty or eighty Irish members, and if he can avoid one great danger he will, as he declares, be able to make or mar ministries. There never yet has been a compact Irish Parliamentary party of eighty members, and there are many who declare that there never will be. The fissiparous tendency of the English Radical is nothing compared with the passion for independent action that has always been the bane of the Celt. Mr. Parnell may get his eighty members into St. Stephen's, but how long will he be able to hold them together after they arrive at Westminster? If Irishmen had been capable of acting together, if the Celt had shown the cohesion of the Saxon, Ireland would not now have been lamenting her evil destinies. Should Mr. Parnell really unite Irishmen and teach them submission and loyalty to their own leader, he will do more for Ireland than anything he has yet even attempted."

This is the keynote of the situation. Ireland is advancing steadily to the restoration of her Parliament—she is united, she is determined, she is skilfully and honestly led. Division, and division alone, can drive her back again into the horrors from which she is escaping. Can it be that fools and factionists will be permitted by the Irish race to bring back the night of slavery at the very moment when the hills are aglow with the first rays of freedom's dawn?

MARTIN LUTHER AND HIS AMERICAN WORSHIPPERS.

ON the 21st of May last, a statue, erected in honor of Martin Luther, was unveiled in the city of Washington. And this was done amidst the ringing of bells, the pealing of trumpets, and the gay plaudits of a vast multitude—in a word, with all the pomp and pride and circumstance of a public festival. Not only the brazen effigy of the apostate monk, but the very place where it stands—to be known henceforth as the “Luther Place”—is doomed to perpetuate his name and memory to all coming generations. The Lutheran clergy are very much elated at what they consider a great triumph for their cause; and their newspaper organs are not yet tired of boasting how signally their religion has been honored, in the person of its founder, by the statue thus solemnly dedicated in the so-called “national” capital.

To all this we have nothing to say. It has very little significance, and contains no ground for just quarrel. The members of any religious sect, that can afford it, have a legal right to set up a statue of its founder on ground which they have purchased, or come by in other honest way, as we are willing to suppose was the case with the Lutheran corporation in Washington. And besides, when it is question of such a city, *quo cuncta undique atrocia ac pudenda confluunt celebranturque*—as was well said of another great capital no less wonderful for outward splendor and inward rottenness—and where within a few decades of years we are likely to see statues of Voltaire, Tom Paine and other reforming worthies unveiled by their admirers for public veneration—no citizen need feel either morally shocked or legally hurt at beholding amongst the rest a likeness of the Saxon Reformer.

Modern taste unfortunately—and we may thank Luther's teaching for it—is no longer Christian, but pagan. Our heroes, too often nowadays, are made and held up for worship, not on the score of religion, virtue, or love of country, but because they are of the world, worldly, mouthpieces in word, or patterns in deed, of the bad passions and corrupt inclinations that belong to unregenerate man. They have their use, too; for they are put up by a few bad men, and stand on their pedestals mute but eloquent witnesses of the cowardly servility that is an unfailing mark of all degenerate communities and peoples. Thus Greece of old, in her halls, groves, and highways, for one bust of Plato or Leonidas, had full twenty of Aphro-

dite, Eros, Priapus and adulterous¹ Jove. Rome publicly paraded her Flora and Venus, her Antinous and Sejanus by the side of her deified Neros, Domitians and Adrians. And in our day France and Italy, paganized by their rulers, have exchanged their old heroes for Voltaire, Gambetta, Cavour and Garibaldi. Germany erects altars to refined lust, self-love, nihilism, atheism, brute force and other monstrous developments of modern *Kultur*; and in her Goethes, Virchows, Schopenhauers² and Bismarcks finds worthy hierophants of the new worship. Even those Catholic lands that have been infiltrated by the subtle, deadly poison of Free-Masonry and *Kultur*, fare little better. While the Tyrol, true to her Catholic traditions, shows through her mountains and valleys only pictures or statues of Him who redeemed us, or of the Saints who followed in His footsteps, or of her Christian heroes and patriots, Hofer, Haspinger, etc., the Catholic King of Bavaria, a country in great part Catholic, gives a place in the Ruhmeshalle³ of his capital to Franz von Sickingen and Schelling, thereby teaching his people that high-born cutthroats and windy pantheists are worshipful heroes when born on Bavarian soil.

The mistake made by the Lutheran clergy of Washington was that, instead of contenting themselves with using the occasion simply to glorify the father and founder of their name and sect, they attempted to turn it into a half-civil, half-religious American festival, "a national event," as the Washington papers have it, "for the Protestants of the whole country." The Protestant clergy of other denominations do not seem to have looked upon it in this light. For it appears that the reverend gentlemen who figured at the ceremony were all, or nearly all, Lutheran ministers; and of the few laymen in attendance, all, with one noble exception, may be set down as either mere politicians or adherents of the Lutheran creed. The ministers, however, and their lay associates who addressed the crowd before the unveiling took place, did their best to make their hearers believe that there was some mysterious connection between the honor given to Luther's statue and homage done

¹ This was the fitting epithet given him by the early Christian writers when they would ridicule the gods of paganism. Thus Prudentius (Hymn to St. Laurence):

Discede, adulter Jupiter,
Stupro sororis oblite, etc.

² The infidel Max Müller, who once talked so sweetly that we almost took him for a Christian, is out with a proposal to erect a statue to this gloomy Atheist. If Max and his fellow philosophers could only root Christianity out of the world as they wish to do, they would make Schopenhauer's dream become practical truth.

³ There are many non-Catholics in this Hall, but to them we can have no objection. Whatever their religion may have been, they have deserved well of letters and the arts. Such are Hans Sachs, Franz Holbein and others. But we do object to honoring men whose only title to honor is their immorality or their irreligion.

to the cause of American civil and religious liberty. They had no easy task before them; but, succeed or fail, they had to attempt it. Otherwise the ceremony, for all its pomp and show, would have been idle and unmeaning. The key-note had been sounded in the preliminary meeting of the same day by Rev. Mr. Henninghauser, of Baltimore, when he said:¹ "We would hardly as a people rejoice on the 4th of July as the birthday of our civil liberty, if the 31st of October, 1517, had not preceded it as the birthday of our spiritual liberty. It is no exaggeration to refer our political and civil liberty to that source. The existence of this great republic, with its freedom of religion and conscience, its liberty of speech and of the press, would have been impossible without the Reformation, of which Luther was at once the leader and, with the help of God, the inspiring centre and source of its power and success." Before the ceremony, Senator Conger proclaimed that "Christians of a common faith, all who desire the regeneration and exaltation of the human race, who demand complete toleration of religious belief, who trust in the limitless expansion of intellectual vigor, who hope for perpetual growth of freedom and faith in the soul, are assembled here to render their tribute of respect to the memory of the great Reformer, and to dedicate his enduring monument in the court of this Lutheran Memorial Church." And again: "Conspicuous in the capital of a nation whose possibility of existence hinged upon his (Luther's) labors in life, and the adoption of the principles he taught till his death, we this day place this memorial of our veneration." Judge Miller comforted his audience with the assurance that they were soon to behold the likeness "of a man who presented to the world the right of free thought—a lover of the human race, whose name shall stand as the emancipation of humanity—Martin Luther."

The laymen, to their credit, confined themselves to their subject, and avoided giving unnecessary offence. But Rev. Dr. Morris, of Baltimore, who was another of the speakers, seems to have been blinded to all sense of propriety by the conviction that he would be false to his cloth, false to the pattern of his spiritual progenitor, if he did not improve the occasion to pour out his intolerant bile, and stir up the religious feeling of his audience by abuse and misrepresentation of the Catholic Church. Had he done nothing more than gratify himself and his hearers by this pitiful effusion of Lutheran zeal, we should have nothing to say, as these things have become too common for notice. *Usu viluerunt.* But what necessity did Dr. Morris find in the occasion for coining facts that never had an existence outside of his imagination, and further for coining

¹ For this and the following extracts our authority is the Philadelphia *Lutheran Observer* of May 30, 1884.

sinister motives to color still more luridly these unworthy actions? Had he not all history to draw from, history old and new, the romantic D'Aubigné, the veracious chronicler Mathesius, or the edifying records of the Tisch-Reden? No. He was determined to be original, forgetting that originality is not a commendable quality in the history that is taught outside of the sectarian Sunday-school or pulpit. After extolling the "loyalty and obedience" of Lutherans towards the government under whose protection they live, he publishes the following dreadful discovery of Catholic disloyalty: "He claimed that the Church of Rome recognized no authority but that of its temporal head, and refused to obey the proclamations issued by the chief magistrate of this nation because they emanated from a republican government. He claimed that he had himself made an investigation, and had found that on Thanksgiving Day, or on any national holiday, there were no special services in any of the Catholic churches, while in all others such were held in accordance with the proclamations of the President of the United States and the Governor of the State."

There is only one proper word in the language by which to designate the whole of this vile stuff, invented facts, imputed motives and all the rest. He "claimed"—a very suitable word to impose on the public—his right to the discovery of his chimerical religious facts—something like the British commander's discovery of Graham's Island in the Mediterranean, or the finding of imaginary Antarctic continents by American and French commodores in the southern Polar Seas—"he claimed that the Church of Rome recognized no authority but that of its temporal head." Now, Dr. Morris knows as well as we do, and it would be slandering him to suppose otherwise, that the Church of Rome may mean two things. In the first place, it designates only the small body of Catholics, a million or two, confined within the petty area of the Papal States, and who have Rome for the centre of their political government. As their "temporal head" is the Pope, by divine and human law they owe him allegiance, and if they cling to him, though dispossessed by temporary violence, it does them credit in the eyes of all honorable men. Brute force does not annul principles, nor extinguish legitimate rights. This was once a part of the American creed, and if belief in it has been sadly impaired, we have only to thank our politicians, lay and clerical, whose teachings have been for a long time corrupting gradually the American mind.

The "Church of Rome," in the second place, is often used for the great body of Christians, two hundred millions and more, who profess the Catholic faith and live in communion with the successor of St. Peter, the Bishop of Rome. They style him the Head of their Church, but have always believed and declared that the bond

that unites them with him is spiritual, not temporal, and that their allegiance of the latter order belongs exclusively to the land in which they live, whether it be in Europe, Asia, Africa, North or South America. Does Dr. Morris know better than these immense multitudes where their allegiance is owing? Or, is it in his power to steal it away without their consent or knowledge, and assign it where he will? It would be great presumption were he sincere in his statement; but no amount of Christian charity, unless it will risk the imputation of being counted blind and unreasoning, can admit this plea of sincerity. Dr. Morris is a faithful disciple of his master, the great Reformer; and the latter taught (in a private letter which he never expected would come to light) that in the school of Wittenberg all weapons were held good and lawful against Popery, provided souls could be saved thereby from the wicked deceits of Antichrist. (Letter to John Lange, Aug. 18th, 1520.)

He assumes that Catholics will only obey "the temporal head" of their Church, and in proof alleges that "they refuse to obey the proclamations issued by the chief magistrate of this nation, because they emanated from a republican government." Any one who has ever read a Catholic catechism must know that Catholics are taught to obey their temporal rulers, and not only to obey for fear but for conscience's sake, as the Apostle tells us. If Catholics, therefore, do not obey the laws, they do it, not because of their religion, but in spite of its teachings. The silly remark that they disobey the chief magistrate, because he is the executive of a commonwealth, "a republican government," is too contemptible to need an answer. Our religion makes no distinction between the obedience due to him who rules by hereditary right, and that to another who holds his place by the choice of his fellow-citizens. But Dr. Morris claims that he has made an investigation, and has found, as the result of it, that no special services are held in any Catholic church on thanksgiving days or national holidays, whilst Protestant churches hold them in conformity with the proclamations of the President or Governor of the State. His investigation and its results will be news to most of our Catholic readers. We can only speak of our own knowledge, when we affirm that our hard-worked clergy at the South used to fast up to mid-day in order to sing High Mass and preach, not on one Thanksgiving day, but on two and sometimes on three occasions; for very often the Mayor issued his proclamation for thanksgiving in addition to those of the President and Governor—the two latter having been, in the good old times, always separate days. If they now coincide, we are entitled to the opinion, which we entertain in common with others yet living, that change and improvement are not always one and the same thing. And this was done not only in large cities like

Charleston and Savannah, but in the humblest hamlet of the two Carolinas and Georgia that could boast of a church or enjoyed the presence of a priest. And passing to the theatre of the Lutheran pastor's investigation, we remember distinctly the beautiful document by which Archbishop Eccleston, of Baltimore, called the attention of his clergy and people to the Thanksgiving day (December 14th, 1842) recommended by the Governor of Maryland, and enjoining solemn service with mass and chant of the *Te Deum*. We have also under our eye, while writing, a similar circular of the same Prelate in reference to Thanksgiving day, 12th of December, 1844; and if we had copies of the Catholic papers and magazines of the years previous or following, we could, no doubt, quote a great many more of the same kind. Though we have not the documents to allege, it is very unlikely that the good Archbishop's successors, the Kenricks, Spauldings, Bayleys and Gibbonses, yielded to him in patriotic feeling or in discharging their duty of encouraging their people to fulfil St. Paul's desire (I. Tim. ii., 1, 2), and make "supplications, prayers, intercessions and thanksgivings for all men; for kings and for all who are in high station, that we may lead a quiet and peaceful life." (I. Tim. ii., 1, 2.) In Charleston, and generally at the South, we are convinced that the old practice remains substantially unchanged. For though we may not have all to be thankful for that we may desire, all the good may yet say from their heart of hearts, with deep thankfulness, in the words of Jeremy: "*misericordiae Domini, quia non sumus consumpti.*"

In Pennsylvania, as far as we can learn, the rule is this: Pastors in country churches are left to their own discretion. They sometimes serve more than one church, and cannot always be at home during the week. Consequently, it will depend on their zeal and prudence when, how and where they are to have Thanksgiving devotions. In the city of Philadelphia, the late Archbishop Wood always gave public notice to his clergy and people that such a day had been recommended by the civil authorities as a day of thanksgiving and prayer. In the principal churches, or some of them at least, special services are held at a later hour than the ordinary service of each day. In the others, where no special service is appointed, it is always understood that the great Eucharistic sacrifice, the very name of which implies *thanksgiving*, is offered up in acknowledgement of God's great mercies during the year that has gone by, and in supplication for a continuance of those mercies for the coming year.

In all this what ground is there for blaming us, or what evidence for the charge that we perversely disjoin ourselves from our fellow-citizens and refuse to thank God, because we are recommended to do so by a republican government? The reverend gentleman

talks of loyalty and obedience to these proclamations, as if they were so many spiritual ukases or disciplinary decisions formulated by a theocratical government, that has a right to bind the soul and body of its subjects. Now, in this Dr. Morris betrays himself a thorough Lutheran, but at the same time he betrays himself utterly unacquainted with what are generally supposed to be the first elements of an American freeman's education. It is a standing maxim of the Lutheran creed, formally enunciated by the princes and theologians of that church assembled at Passau some three hundred and thirty years ago (very soon after Luther's death), that the ruler of a country owns the souls as well as the bodies of his subjects, and has a right to impose his religion on them by force, or as they tersely put it, *cujus est regio, illius est et religio*—in plain English, "Whoever owns a country owns its religion too." If, indeed, a Lutheran monarch owned our country, Dr. Morris might see his Wittenberg ideal realized, might be superintendent of the Lutheran Consistory; and write his prince's religious decrees and proclamations, and we should have to be loyal and *obey* them under penalty of life and limb. But (what Dr. M. has forgotten or studiously ignores), none of us, thank God! whether Catholic or Protestant, are the spiritual subjects of any president or governor. And none know it better than themselves. They never use the formula of dictation or command. They *recommend* these days to public observance, for they can do no more, and all good citizens, Catholic and Protestant, seeing that the recommendation is highly proper, cheerfully comply with it.

To return from this rather long digression into which we have been led, not from choice, but by Dr. Morris's Lutheran rhetoric, let us examine the grounds of this so-called American glorification of Luther. The last-named gentleman epitomized the substance of what his fellow-speakers had said by praising Luther as "the Father of religious liberty," and stating boldly his opinion that "it was becoming that the American admirers of the mighty Reformer should follow the bright example" of other lands, where "numerous statues have been erected to his memory." May we venture to ask, in no captious spirit, but merely as an American citizen who reads the newspapers, and takes an interest in all the events of the day, and prefers as a rule to get to the bottom to what floats upon the surface—is all this mere rhapsody, religious or political clap-trap, designed to tickle the ears of an ignorant crowd, who neither know nor care to know what runs counter to their prejudices? Or is it meant for veritable history? Charity would incline to the former supposition; for at first sight it looks very unkind, and almost cruelly unjust, to imagine the speakers so utterly ignorant of Luther's life and teachings, and of European history for the last

three hundred years and more, as they must appear did they really mean what they said. There is no doubt, however, that they would indignantly reject our charitable view, and maintain, *unguibus et pugnis*, that all their statements are true to history. Very well! We accept their decision, and if they have, in the end, cause to complain, we can only remind them that the alternative was of their own choosing.

Hence, it becomes worth while to examine their statements by the light of that history to which they appeal, and if her torch can so far dispel the gloom of the last three centuries as to reveal even one particle of solid truth in what was said by the Henninghausers, Morrises, Congers, Millers and other orators of that festive day, we shall readily give in and cheerfully join in the plaudits elicited by their eloquence, even "wave our umbrella and throw up our hat," as was done (so say the enthusiastic reporters) by the electrified crowds who did homage to the Washington statue of the great Martin of Wittenberg.

Since Luther is invoked by Dr. Morris as "the father of religious liberty," and Senator Conger tells us that his Washington statue was honored by all "who demand complete toleration of religious belief," and Rev. Mr. Henninghauser bids us hail the 31st of October, 1517, as the forerunner of July 4th, 1776—the question we have to discuss is naturally two-fold: First, did Martin Luther know of such a thing as liberty of conscience? And if he knew of it did he believe in it himself, or proclaim it to the world as his doctrine, or that of the new church which owes to him its name and its teaching? Secondly, did this doctrine or principle, supposing it to be his, ever influence the belief of European or American Protestants? Or did his teaching help in any way to bring about the American Revolution, the Declaration of Independence, or the religious liberty that came of these two events?

It may be answered, without a moment's hesitation, that Luther knew nothing of religious liberty, much less believed in it, as we understand the phrase. He certainly believed that he had a right to understand and explain the scriptures as he pleased, and to publish as certain truth his own opinions in defiance of what the Christian world had believed for fifteen centuries. But, whatever merit there may be in this, he shares it in common with every heretic, innovator, or "reformer," who has troubled the church of Christ, from Alexander the Coppersmith or Simon Magus, down to George Rapp and Joe Smith, the only American we can boast of as founder of a "new religion."¹ No doubt, he used his private

¹ We ought, perhaps, to make an exception in favor of the "Christians" or Christians (first vowel with sound of long *i*, as the common American pronunciation will have it, though this horrid cacophony is indignantly rejected by the sect); but, though

judgment freely enough; indeed, with Rationalistic boldness, in deciding not only on the sense of Scripture, but on the authors of the Books and their respective merits, retaining or rejecting what pleased or offended him. And this it is that endears his memory to the Bretschneiders, De Wettes, Stanleys and other enlightened Protestant theologians,¹ who cunningly hold to the name of Christianity the more effectually to bring about its ruin. No doubt, he pushed freedom of thought or assertion, and pride of understanding, to an extreme limit by his revolutionary break with the Christian traditions and established faith of fifteen centuries; and this has made him a hero forever with all infidels, materialists, and unbelievers of every class. Of course, they sneer and laugh at his Solidifian whims and Impanation theories, as heartily as they do at the Catholic mass, the decalogue of Moses, or the morality of the Gospel. But they feel, nevertheless—and they are logically right—that he was their precursor, the first to make possible the overthrow of the Christian superstition and open the way for the triumph of reason and the new era of light that is to succeed Gospel darkness. Hence, it is readily understood why the Virchows,² Michelets and other enemies of God and His Christ, are amongst Luther's most ardent devotees and admirers.

appearing simultaneously in New England and Ohio about the year 1803, they seem to have had no distinct paternity. They boast of having no founder, no Luther or Calvin, no Whitfield or Wesley, as the Presbyterian author, Rev. Dr. Baird, mournfully remarks in his book, "Religion in America" (New York, Harpers, 1856, p. 562). This is the sect, we believe, to which the assassin, Guiteau, belonged both as member and preacher. The Sunday after his crime all the Methodist pulpits at the North resounded with denunciations of the misdeed and its author, whom they designated as one "M. Dohertie, a French or Irish Papist." And the pious conclusion drawn was that all foreign Papists, especially French and Irish, ought to be exterminated. But in a few days it leaked out that the imaginary French or Irish miscreant, "M. Dohertie," was no other than "Mr. Guiteau," an American by birth and ancestry, and not only no Papist, but professor and preacher of a thoroughly native American religion. His victim, Mr. Garfield, may be called almost his co-religionist and fellow-preacher, for he too was a professor and minister of the Campbellite body, the principles of which, if we are to believe Dr. Baird ("Religion in America," p. 501), were originally identical with those of the so-called Christians. Dr. Baird, to his credit be it said, hesitates whether he should count either of those sects amongst "Evangelical Christian" denominations. (*Ibid.*)

¹ De Wette in his "Worte Luther's" has a very instructive chapter headed "Luther als Rationalist." Or (as we have lost our copy of the work), it may perhaps read "als Naturalist," since the correlative chapter is headed "Luther als Supranaturalist." The book was printed in 1817 to commemorate the third century of the Reformation.

Dean Stanley said in his New York sermon (1878), "Martin Luther first loosed the shackles of the old restraint and taught us *what the Bible really was*." The author's meaning is well known; but the veil of ambiguous words was required by the decencies of an evangelical pulpit.

² The first name on the subscription list, to erect a statue to Luther in front of the great church at Berlin, is that of Prof. Virchow. And this homage from an atheist is accepted with thanks and newspaper puffs by all Lutherans, lay and clerical.

But, granting that Luther loudly proclaimed and even exercised to the full extent what he may have counted or called *his* right of private judgment in matters of religion, did he ever dream that it was a right belonging to all Christians? We will be content with less. Did he ever in any way acknowledge that the Protestant crowds, whom he drew out with him from "the bondage of the Roman Antichrist," possessed that right? We will narrow the question still further. Did he ever allow that his followers and fellow-religionists—we will not say in far-off regions like Switzerland, France, Denmark or the Hanse-towns, nor even in Hesse, Suabia, Pomerania, Wurtemberg, Ducal Saxony, etc.,—but his own personal devotees and disciples in Electoral Saxony, in the very precincts of Wittenberg, those whom he had under his immediate spiritual charge and supervision, had the privilege of following their own private judgment in any religious matter whatsoever? History answers *no*. He never did. We defy any of his admirers to produce from his works one passage, one single line, or even an obscure hint, that they had freedom of conscience or that "religious liberty" of which Dr. Morris calls him "the Father." And even if he had so declared a thousand times in printed books, or by word of mouth from the pulpit or the professor's chair, it would signify nothing, for his practical teaching was everlastingly the reverse. But he never so declared. All men were free to differ with the Pope, to reject his teaching, to curse him to the lowest depths, were even invited and encouraged to slay him like a wolf or robber, and wash their hands in his blood and that of his cardinals and other adherents—but they must not dare differ from Martin Luther. The great Reformer (says Sir William Hamilton) had "an assurance of his *personal inspiration* of which he was, indeed, no less confident than of his ability to perform miracles. He disclaimed the pope, he spurned the Church, but varying in almost all else, he never doubted of *his own infallibility*. He thus piously regarded himself as the authoritative judge, both of the meaning and of the authenticity of scripture" (*Discussions on Philosophy and Literature, Education and University Reform*, second London ed., p. 505). He compelled, with unrelenting rigor, all his friends and disciples to subscribe to his doctrinal views, and even to his capricious changes of opinion. Some, like Melancthon, submitted outwardly, but repined in secret and groaned in confidential intercourse

Michelet wrote a life (or panegyric) of Luther, and an edition of his Table-Talk, with a translation of which, judiciously toned down, Mr. Hazlitt has regaled the refined ears and nostrils of the English and American Protestant public. Michelet passes for a Catholic, or rather is paraded as such for effect by Luther's admirers. He has his baptism, wretched man! which he cannot efface; but his opinion of Christian baptism is plain from the polite words by which he designates it. He calls it "the mark of eighteen centuries of slavery."

over the shameful slavery (Melanchthon's own words) in which their master held them. Some had the courage to rebel, and they became the objects of his relentless hate. Karlstadt, Lemnius, Wickel, Agricola, Schwenkfeld (or Grickel and Stenkfeld, as this evangelical Thersites loved to call them), incurred his enmity by presuming to dissent from his opinions. His persecution of them never ceased until he had them deprived of their charge, imprisoned, or banished from German territory. He stirred up to mutiny and sedition, by his furious revolutionary pamphlets, the peasants of his native land. But when they took up arms to put an end to their grievances, learned from his teaching and formulated almost in his very words, he bade them lay aside their weapons. And because they would not obey him, he urged princes and peoples to exterminate them. There is nothing in history more shocking than the atrocious and revengeful spirit with which he preached the crusade for the destruction of those unhappy victims whom his own teachings had led into their evil courses. He would have them choked like mad dogs. "Let them have their due, scourging and shooting. Let artillery rattle amongst them. Let no mercy be shown them, no pity. To pity them is to deny and blaspheme God. And not only princes and soldiers, but every one else must take a hand against these robbers and murderers. Let all strike, stab and slay to the best of their power, and whoever dies in this good cause can have no happier death."¹

If there was any class of men whom Luther hated, because of their religious belief, it was the "ungrateful rabble" of theologians who had received the new gospel from him as their master, and then rebelled against his authority by denying what he considered a fundamental point, his doctrine of the Real Presence. The Henninghausers, Morrisers and Butlers, who glorified him in Washington at the ceremony of unveiling, were they living in his day, would soon feel, by sad experience, to what extent he deserves the title of "Father of religious freedom." They contemptuously reject his doctrine; and therefore for him would be only Zwinglians,

¹ Sie hören nicht das Wort und sind unsinnig; so müssen sie die Virgam, die Büchsen, hören und geschieht ihnen recht. Bitten sollen wir für sie dass sie gehorchen: wo nicht so gilt hie nicht viel Erbarmens; lasse nur die Büchsen unter sie sausen, sie machens sonst tausendmal ärger. . . . O Herr Gott wo solcher Geist in den Bauren auch ist, wie hohe zeit ists, dass sie erwürgt werden, wie tolln hunde (Letter to John Rühel, May 30, 1525. Apud de Wette, *Luther's Briefe*, Berlin, 1826, vol. ii., pp. 669, 670). And in a letter to Amsdorf of same date "Hos (rusticos) justificare, horum misereri, illis favere est Deum negare, blasphemare et de coelo velle dejicere." Ibid., pp. 671, 672. And in his book against the peasants: "Drumb, lieben Herren, loset hie, rettet hie, helft hie: erbarmet euch der armen Leut, steche, schlahe, würge hie, wer da kann. Bleibst du drüber todt, wohl dir! seliglichern tod kannst du nimmermehr überkommen." Wider die Mörderischen und Ruberischen Rotten der Bauern. Erlangen ed., vol. xxiv., p. 294.

Sacramentarians, Zurichers, or, as he loved to call them, fanatics and factious sectarians (Schwärmer und Rottengeister). Whoever held this doctrine was his sworn enemy, a soul-murderer, a damned blasphemer, a lying-mouth with a heart thoroughly possessed by the devil.¹ Either he or they must be damned on the last day. Hence, with such men he could hold no commission, have no speech, nor even interchange of letters.

If Luther was thus intolerant towards his fellow-Protestants, damning to hell's lowest depths even those who now call themselves Lutherans, what must have been his frame of mind towards Catholics. It is little to say he was in favor of persecuting them. They were such outlaws in his sight that judicial murder or private assassination were lawful and commendable in their case. We have his own printed word for it. See his letter to Melanchthon (Dec., 1535 in De Wette, vol. iv., p. 655), where he brutally triumphs

¹ Literally "an *insatanized*, *persatanized*, and *supersatanized*, wicked heart and lying mouth." But this Latinized phraseology is too weak to express the vigor of the original. Ein eingeteufelt, durchteufelt, überteuft, lästerlich Herz und Lügenmaul. "Kurzes Bekenntniss," Erlangen ed., vol., xxxii., pp. 404, cf. pp. 397, 403. A fishwoman might envy Luther's vocabulary. This foul-mouthed evangelist has forever on his tongue the words "hell, devil, damn, rascal, thief, fool, ass, villain" with many others that cannot be repeated to ears polite. It is often said by his admirers that this was the fault of his time. It is false. Nothing but sheer ignorance, or the will to defend him at all hazards, even by deliberate trampling on the truth, could invent such an excuse. It was the fulness of his heart that was perpetually bursting through all bonds of conventional decency. The cesspool seems to have been the garden that furnished his choicest flowers of rhetoric. The devil, too, seems to have ever been uppermost in his thoughts, for there is no word that occurs as frequently in his books as hell and the devil. In his dirty little tirade "Against Hans Wurst" (Jack Pudding, so he called Henry, Duke of Brunswick), the Devil's name is mentioned no less than one hundred and forty-six times, though the book be of small compass. In his book "On Councils" in merely four lines the Devil's name is repeated full fifteen times. Perhaps, the same thing may be true of the words "lie, liar," etc. He acknowledges himself that he used the words "Hans Worst" (Wurst) in writing, and *above all in preaching* (sonderlich und allermeist in der Predigt). "Wider Hans Wurst," Erlangen ed. of Luther's Works, vol. xxvi.; p. 4). Here is a specimen of his style from the same book (page 6). "You lie, you devil! O Jack Pudding, how you lie! O Harry of Brunswick, what a shameless liar you are! You spew a great deal and say nothing; you revile and prove nothing." Zwingli, in one of his tracts against Luther, has the following happy hit at Luther's coarse style, his filthy, doggish eloquence (*obscoenam et caninam facandiam*, as another famous Swiss Reformer called it. See Hess, "Lebensgeschichte Bullingers," Zurich, 1826, vol. i., p. 404). We give it in the unchanged original, that the reader may have a sample of the rough Swiss dialect of Luther's great rival. The idea is, Luther will not reason from God's word; he can only use bad words and call names. "Es wird hie Gottes Wort oberhand gwünnen, nit Schwärmer, Tüfel, Schalk, Ketzer, Mörder, Uprürer, Glychsner (Gleissner) oder Hühler, Trotz, Potz, Plotz, Blitz, Donner, Po, Pu, Pa, plumb und dergleichen Schelt, Schmutz-und Schenzelwort." We quote from a Lutheran source: Luther's "Leben aus den Quellen erzählt von Moritz Meurer." Leipzig, 1870, p. 420.

Hallam remarks that Luther, "in all his attacks on popes and cardinals, disgraces himself by a stupid and nasty brutality." *Introd. to the Literature of Europe*. New York (Armstrong & Sons), 1880, vol. i., p. 306.

over the execution of Bishop Fisher of Rochester, and expresses the pious wish that there were more Henrys in the world to kill more of his cloth. See again his letter to Spalatin (Nov., 13, 1520, De Wette, vol. i., p. 522), in which he expresses his regret that Ulrich Hutten, his lay friend and fellow apostle (one of those reformers whom Sir William Hamilton calls "syphilitic saints"), had failed to lay hands on the Papal legates for whom he lay in wait with murderous intent. We have already seen how he encouraged the princes and all good Christians to wash their hands in the blood of the Pope and his cardinals (Lutheri Opera Latina, ed. Henrico Schmidt. Francofurti, 1865, vol. ii., p. 107). But it is useless to quote any more. Perhaps the Lutheran speakers at the Washington festival do not believe that Catholics have any rights of conscience, and that being idolators they are not entitled to the "religious freedom" which Luther brought into the world.

As was the father and teacher, so were the children and disciples. Luther had, in 1528, with the aid of the Elector John and his visiting commission, banished from all Saxony Calvinism and the Sacramentarian heresy, which, strange as it may sound, is the Lutheran doctrine of to-day. And the theologians who succeeded engaged the princes of their day to hold it under the strong hand of repression. They taught the people to look upon Calvinists as "Turks and Mamelukes," and to call cats and dogs by their names. Their gospel was the gospel of hate; and as Menzel says, this intolerant hatred was as truly a part of their religion as belief in the infallibility of their Church was for Catholics. Their pet maxim (to which we alluded before), *cujus regio illius est et religio*, was no genuine creed of their heart, but good only inasmuch as it afforded a plausible shield and cover to their bitter intolerance. For, if any Lutheran prince adopted Calvinism, his divines forgot their allegiance and stirred up the people against him. This happened to John Sigismund, Elector of Brandenburg. Though he renounced his *Lutheran* right of forcing his own religion on his people, and wished merely that Calvinism should be tolerated, the angry Lutheran preachers denounced him with ferocious invectives from their pulpits, moving their blind dupes to rioting and violence so as to endanger the life of the princely family. No doubt these preachers talked as glibly as their Washington descendants of the "religious freedom" conferred upon mankind by the great Luther. But what did they mean? The poet has told us:

The factious band agree
To call it freedom, when themselves are free.

Let Catholics and Calvinists wear chains or go live elsewhere; but we Lutherans must be not only free, but reign and triumph in the State.

The idle boast that our political liberty has any connection with Martin Luther or his Reformation is sufficiently disproved by the fact that the liberties of Germany were effectually lost after Lutheranism had brought Germany under its influence, and nowhere more thoroughly than in Scandinavian Europe, where it became supreme without a rival. This was noticed nearly two hundred years ago (1692), by an acute observer, Lord Molesworth, British ambassador to the court of Copenhagen, who not only observed the fact, but discovered its reason. "In the Roman Catholic religion," he says, "there is a resisting principle to absolute civil power from the division of authority with the head of the Church at Rome. But in the North, the Lutheran church is entirely subservient to the civil power, and *the whole of the northern people of Protestant countries have lost their liberties* ever since they have changed their religion for a better."¹ Mr. Hallam says: "It is one of the fallacious views of the Reformation, to which we have adverted in a former page, to fancy that it sprang from any notions of political liberty, in such a sense as we attach to the term."²

Luther, then, deserves no statue at the hands of the American people, nor in their chief city, for his teachings or any influence they may have exercised on civil and religious liberty. And all the rhetoric expended by the Washington orators at the unveiling of the statue was worse than wasted. It was intended, or at all events its effect must be, to lead the ignorant into error or confirm the delusions of existing prejudice.

But are there no teachings of Luther that might be commemorated by a statue, no parts of our soil where its erection would be appropriate? Luther taught that polygamy was no sin, that it might be permitted to Christians; and he actually gave a dispensation to a profligate prince to have two wives at the same time. This shameful fact, which Luther publicly denied, and in his private letters (while admitting its truth) declared his intention

¹ Quoted by Rev. Dr. Baird in his "Visit to the North of Europe." New York (Taylor & Co.), 1843, vol. i., p. 329. It is quoted also by another Preysbyterian tourist, Mr. Laing, in his "Notes of a Traveller."

² As to his ideas on toleration of the Jews, if any one wishes to know whence Stocker, the present court-preacher of Berlin, and chief promoter of the "Iudenhetze" or anti-Semitic crusade, that finds such favor just now in Prussia, let him read Luther's two wicked, as well as coarse and filthy, books; one entitled "Against the Jews and their Lies," the other, "Von Schem-Hamporas." They may be found in the thirty-second volume of the Erlangen edition. In them from beginning to end he storms and rages with pitiless invective and scurrilous abuse against God's former people. The kindest terms he has for them are "ass-heads, devil's brood, devil's damned to hell." He encourages Christians to burn down their houses with pitch and brimstone, and help the flames with hell-fire, if possible. The Jews either do not read Luther, or they have more charity than Christians; for in Germany they are foremost in contributing, with praise and purse, to Luther's honor. Or does the feeling lurk in their minds that he has done his share of the good work—the attempt to overthrow Christ's religion?

ever publicly to deny, was carefully hidden from the light of day for many years. But it has come out at last from the darkness in which it was so cautiously and so long shrouded, to cover the Reformers with everlasting infamy. Let Luther have his due. Let his statue be raised in those northern and western halls, legislative and judicial, where divorce and virtual polygamy are hallowed by the sanction of law and authority. Let his statues grace the temples, courts and dwellings of Salt Lake City, and adorn the highways of Utah, where his theories are carried out to their full extent. Let his bust be carved on the prow of every vessel that daily bears to our shores from their Lutheran homes the proselytes of Mormondom. Like Castor and Pollux of old, let him be the tutelary deity invoked to prosper their course and guide them safely to their polygamic elysium in the west.

Rev. Dr. Butler, a Lutheran minister who joined in the glorious Washington unveiling, tells us in the *Philadelphia Lutheran Observer*, of June 20, 1884, that forty per cent. of these Mormon pilgrims are directly from northern Lutheran Europe. It is not likely that he has understated the percentage. He has not told us how many more have come from Lutheran Germany. Enough, perhaps, to fill up half the number or more. The Mormon seed finds no congenial soil in dark, benighted Italy, France, Spain or Ireland. It is only where Luther prepared his way that the Mormon evangelist finds willing ears to hear his message, willing feet to follow him to the happy Western land, where he will set them down safe from the galling restraints of Gospel morals.

Dr. Butler thinks that the "gospel" ought to be preached to these Lutheran new-comers; that they need it. What! after four centuries of Luther's gospel enjoyed in its fullness, with no "damned"¹ Jew, no Calvinist Gentile, no Catholic idolator, no wicked Jesuit,² to darken the splendor of its light, they yet need the gospel! What an admission! Dr. Butler will *not* admit that Luther is not the father of "freedom of conscience," "religious liberty," "American Independence," etc., but *does* and must virtually admit that the gospel of Luther is not the Gospel of Christ.

Is there no other place in our land which might justly claim Luther's bust or name, or some other token of his moral presence? We could scarcely bring ourselves to add these few lines were it not for the disgust we feel in seeing the profound ignorance—disgraceful alike to Catholics and Protestants—which prevails everywhere, as to Luther's moral teaching as regards the sexual relation of man to woman. We touch on a delicate subject, and re-

¹ This, be it remembered, is Luther's favorite epithet.

² The Second Article of the Norwegian Constitution reads: "No Jew nor Jesuit shall ever set foot upon the soil of Norway."

gret that we cannot speak of it as professional men generally do, in one of the learned or dead languages. The virtuous sages of paganism, even the professional votaries of false gods believed that continence was not only possible, but acceptable to the Deity. Martin Luther, however, who had studied more of Plautus, Ovid, Petronius, Martial (we doubt if he knew anything of Aristophanes or his lewd Greek predecessors or successors), and the Priapeia, than of Plato, Plutarch or Epictetus, was a thorough pagan of the vilest school. With the gospel in his hand, he taught his German disciples, male and female, in the world, and in monasteries, and female convents, that no man or woman could be chaste in primitive, much less in fallen nature. Chastity or continence, said he, was physically impossible. The gratification of sexual desire was nature's work (God's work as he cynically calls it), as necessary, aye, much more so than eating, drinking, digesting, sweating, sleeping, etc. (we dare not go through with his filthy catalogue). Hence, said he, to vow or promise to restrain this natural propensity, is the same as to vow or promise that one will have wings and fly and be an angel, and morally worth about as much as if one was to promise God (we are giving the vile man's own words), that he would commit adultery. The way in which he explains all this in his coarse Latin, and still coarser German, is such that it cannot be reproduced before American readers.¹ As a Catholic, we dare not sin against St. Paul's warning by mentioning, even for a good purpose, what no Christian ear should listen to. As a man and a citizen of a southern commonwealth, what else could be our first irresistible impulse than to lift cudgel or other weapon upon the theological Rabelais who teaches, in virtue of his new gospel, that all our women, Catholic or Protestant, outside the few that are married, are necessarily unclean and impure. If Protestants hearing Luther's language can keep cool and restrain their indignation, it only shows how far religious bigotry can control all natural impulses of decency and honor.

Any one who has travelled in the old world must have come upon the disinterred cities of paganism. They reveal treasures of art on which we gaze with interest and admiration; pictures of moral and social life on which we look with horror. By the side of the temple, the patrician's ambitious dwelling, the shop of the trader or

¹ Nothing could induce us to give the original passages, Latin or German, in which the Saxon evangelist propounds his beastly theories—so full are they, to adopt Hallam's mild language, not only of indelicacy, but of gross filthiness. We refer the intelligent reader to Döllinger's summary in his work "*Die Reformation, ihre innere Entwicklung und ihre Wirkungen*," Regensburg, 1848, vol. ii., pp. 426-442. But if any one will cast doubt on our assertion, we hold ourselves ready to give the original documents even more fully than they have been given or quoted by Döllinger.

the artist's studio, revealing every variety of domestic and commercial life, we come across dens of infamy where moral turpitude revelled without a blush or any attempt at concealment. Jove and Danae adorn the inner walls; the entrance bears the hideous emblem of a false god, in order that iniquity might be consecrated by a shadow of false religion. Have we any such abodes of vice or temples of sin amongst us? If we have, what more appropriate ornament could they have for their portico than the bust of a man who taught, on theological grounds, that unchastity was a necessity of nature?

BOOK NOTICES.

PHILOSOPHY IN OUTLINE. By *W. T. Harris*. New York: D. Appleton & Co. (Reprint from "Journal of Speculative Philosophy.")

No little wonder has of late been excited by the revelation that, in our days, philosophers have succeeded not only in explaining, but even in strictly demonstrating, what the Church has thus far considered as absolutely unattainable by unaided human reason. Some ardent pursuers of wisdom regarded such a victory as an irrefragable proof of the truth of modern philosophical systems; others are transported with delight, imagining themselves to be lifted up to an intuition into things which heretofore were hidden from the eyes of even the wisest.

We allude to the *Philosophy in Outline*, of Mr. Harris, reprinted from the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*. We are indebted to the author for his effort to oppose agnosticism, and to support religion by reason; and we fully acknowledge the sincerity of his intentions. Yet we cannot avail ourselves of his services in behalf of Christianity, as the Church has never accepted the help offered by systems similar to his. For the attempt made by Mr. Harris to demonstrate from philosophical principles the mysteries of revealed religion is by no means new. In the beginning of this century Schelling and Hegel clothed their idealistic tenets in the terms of Christian theology to such an extent that there is scarcely any religious dogma which did not find its place in their systems. Malicious tongues, however, soon spoke evil of the philosophical piety of the two great modern thinkers, and suggested that the use of this Christian phraseology was due to an insidious design to introduce their doctrine into the schools, having been adopted by them when, after the publication of their first writings, they saw the world at large partly shocked by their pantheistic views, partly disgusted with their utter abstruseness. Of course, malicious tongues should not be heeded, nor would they have gained any hearing had not the very nature of the two philosophical systems confirmed this suspicion. The mysteries of the Blessed Trinity, of the Incarnation and Redemption, of the destiny of man, as explained by idealists, were something alto-

gether different from the dogmatic truths which were the real objects of Christian belief; nay, more, these tenets had been changed into a form of pantheism as impious as it was absurd and unreasonable. Schelling and Hegel used theological terms, but underlaid them with a meaning absolutely anti-Christian; they pretended to make Christianity accessible to reason, but tried, in fact, to convert it into a labyrinth of absurdities and self-contradictions.

We are sorry to be compelled to say that Mr. Harris, in his attempt to bring down the mysteries of the Christian religion to the grasp of unaided reason, has borrowed all his views from Hegel. As a natural consequence, he arrived at the very same results as his teacher and pattern. A brief review of some points of his *Philosophy in Outline* will substantiate our assertion.

At the root of all questions concerning the Divinity lie the conceptions of the infinite and the absolute. What are they in Hegelian philosophy? What in it is the infinite, and how is it opposed to the finite or limited? According to Mr. Harris, a thing is limited by the surroundings that exist outside it, act on it, and, conversely, are acted on by it. The infinite, consequently, must be conceived as something that has no more environments, or is self-environed. The infinite is thus to be thought of as the whole, and the finite as a component part of it; for one part is surrounded by the others with which it is connected, whilst the whole is not subject to environment. This confusion of the "infinite" and the "whole" is an obvious mistake. In metaphysics the notion *limit* is not to be thought of as something positive, but as something negative; not as the surroundings that act on a thing, but as the absence of further perfection, whether real or possible. One hundred dollars are a limited amount of money, not because they are surrounded by other coins, but simply because they are not all the money that is or can be. We may, therefore, well conceive a thing to be whole, since it has all the parts due to it, and still to be finite, because it has not all perfection possible. Leaving aside the infinite which is but relatively such, that is, which possesses all perfection only within a determinate species or order, let us consider the infinite which is absolutely such because it comprises all perfection conceivable within the scope of being, the most universal of all conceptions. Of this it is most certain that it cannot at all consist of component parts. For, parts essentially imply limits, however many components therefor we add; by such addition we necessarily impose other limits, and thus obtain a whole that is limited. Besides, since the whole has no other perfection than that of all the components united, whatever intrinsic or essential deficiency is found in the parts must be predicated also of the whole composed of them. Brutes will never by their addition or union form a rational being, because from each and all of them reason is excluded.

A heap of lead will never be a lump of gold. But components are essentially limited, and range under the species of finite beings. Hence the infinite cannot be made up of parts, but must needs be absolutely simple; it is a being that has all reality, all perfection, without distinction or multiplicity of constituents, not only with unity, but also with absolute simplicity. Any confusion, therefore, of the whole and of the infinite is self-contradictory; but in the confusion of the whole and the infinite, as made by Hegelian philosophers, we meet "confusion worse confounded," for they suppose the component parts to be but phenomenal and unsubstantial, yet maintain the whole, composed of them, to be real and substantial.

No less than the conception of the infinite was that of the absolute falsi-

fied by pantheistic philosophy. Absolute, in general, is that which is unconditioned or independent; the absolute being, as considered in metaphysics, is that which exists of itself, and, consequently, possesses all its perfections by virtue of its own essence, without any dependence on an exterior cause. In this definition all agree. It is likewise generally granted that the infinite and the absolute are the same being viewed under different aspects; for the infinite, which has all conceivable perfections, necessarily has also that of supreme independence, and *vice versa* the absolute involves in its conception no limit, but rather, that it be self-existent, requires the highest degree of reality. This, also, Hegel's school will readily concede. But how do they develop the notion of the absolute so defined? In their opinion the absolute is the independent, self-activity, self-cause, self-effect. The independent is the whole, which of itself, hence by its self-activity, separates itself into parts; for every action, they say, implies a separation of a portion of influence from the cause. By thus producing parts which surround and confine one another, the absolute determines itself and becomes self-determined. Furthermore, it is self-cause, because the acts of self-separation and self-determination proceed from it independently of any exterior cause; and it is self-effect, because the effect wrought by its activity is its own determination. The dependent beings must, consequently, be conceived as portions of the absolute, as phases or phenomena of the self-active and self-determined.

Every word of such speculation is in startling contradiction with the nature of the absolute. The whole is here supposed to be anterior to the parts, to be their very source and origin. Yet what can be more preposterous than this? True, parts may in the order of intention (*i. e.*, in the mind of the maker) be referred to the whole as their end or final cause, but in the order of nature they produce the whole by their very reality as its constituent cause. Does man produce his own components, soul and body, or do soul and body, by their mutual union, constitute man? Self-separation itself, on which Mr. Harris insists so much, presupposes the parts already existent in the whole, since to separate something is nothing else but to disconnect components; but to disconnect elements not yet existing is clearly impossible. The parts, therefore, are, as to existence, prior to the whole; and for this very reason the absolute cannot be composite, but is essentially simple. For if composite, it would not be independent, but depending on something anterior, not first and self-existent, but secondary and owing its existence to the union of its constituents.

Still worse is it that in the pantheistic theory above expounded the absolute, by self-activity, in which it is self-cause and self-effect, undergoes an evolution, a transition either instantaneous or progressive, from potentiality to actuality, from indetermination to determination, from unity to multiplicity, and from multiplicity to perfect unity, by self-consciousness. The absolute, it is granted, is identical with the infinite. But the infinite has no development because it possesses all perfection; no potentiality from which it should start, because potentiality itself essentially implies an imperfection, and the actuality that accrues to it effects in it composition; it has no separation and distinction, because it is perfectly and altogether simple. The absolute also as such, abstracting from its infinity, excludes evolution. The potential, in so much as it is such, cannot actualize itself, nor can the indistinct or indeterminate give itself distinction and determination, nor the manifold reduce itself to unity. The reason is very simple. As nothing can give what it has not, a cause or an agent cannot produce a perfection which

it does not pre-contain. Now the potential as such lacks actuality, the indeterminate and indistinct as such lack determination and distinction, the many as such lack unity. Development is, consequently, possible only in those things which are under the influence of exterior causes, that is, independent beings; but it is impossible in a nature altogether independent. The absolute cannot develop itself; it is actual and perfect by virtue of its own essence; without any potentiality it is a pure act or perfection. The developed and the absolute are as much opposed to each other as are darkness and light.

After these explanations it will not be difficult to understand, on the one hand, how Hegelian philosophers come to speak of the triune nature of God, and, on the other, how repugnant to Christianity their speculations are. Mr. Harris gives us the following conception of the Divine Trinity: By self-activity the absolute distinguishes itself into the determining and the determined, into the active and the passive, into subject and object, and thus becomes living, thinking, and self-knowing. But that it may be pure self-activity and pure self-knowledge, it must also determine itself as self-active and know itself as self-conscious. Furthermore, in the infinite, knowing and willing are identical, and, therefore, its knowing is effective or creative. Hence the primordial self-active one by its self-knowledge begets a second independent, free, and perfect self-activity; and this second again, since it must know itself to be self-active, creates a third equal in all respects to itself. But the second self-active, the Son, since He is begotten from the first, the Father, who is unbegotten, must know Himself not only as He is but also as He is derived. Yet derivation is passivity. In the Son, therefore, there is passivity, such, however, as was reduced to actuality at once and from all eternity. Consequently He produces by his self-knowledge a world of finite beings, extending from the most passive up to the most active; a world in which there is first and at the bottom of everything passivity—space, and in which there is a continuous process of evolution from the lower to the higher. All in it passes away constantly until by degrees man is reached, who, being self-conscious, tends in social institutions, particularly in the visible Church, to even greater union with others. At last the souls of all human beings that ever lived, not only on earth but also on the stars, will be united by the bond of perfect charity in the Invisible Church. This latter is the Third Person, the Holy Spirit, who, as He becomes actual through a progressive and not an instantaneous evolution from the finite to the infinite, exists not by generation but by procession. The intervention of the Second Person in the world, in order that it may not perish in its finiteness, but develop itself from matter into man, and that men may rise by charity to absolute unity in the Invisible Church, is perfect grace, the work of Redemption. This exposition should, it is thought, afford us a wonderful insight into the Divinity heretofore denied to man, presenting us with a strict and philosophical demonstration of the Blessed Trinity as taught by Christian Revelation.

Unhappily, the whole theory is based on the conceptions of the infinite and the absolute which we have just proved to be utterly false and self-contradictory. All that was said by Mr. Harris to demonstrate the Trinity of the Divine Persons, supposes composition, division, potentiality, development in the infinite. This alone suffices to overturn his system completely. Of many other suppositions equally absurd that underly his speculations we shall not speak. We shall but mention the incorrectness of his saying, or supposing, that all action is ultimately based on self-separation, as if by acting we should divide ourselves into

parts ; that creation is the production of a thing by self-activity, and not production from no pre-existing subject ; that passivity is space and space and time exist from all eternity as a necessary condition for the existence of the material world, as if they were anterior to matter, and did not follow from its extension and successions ; that the component parts of space and time act on one another as if the present moment could act on the non-existing past or future moment, and be acted on by it ; that, since thinking and willing are the same in God, He effects or creates whatever He thinks, as if by the conceptions of intellect, will, and creating power we did not view the same absolutely simple and infinite Being under three altogether different aspects. It is evident from this that the entire foundation on which the Hegelian explanation of the mystery of the Blessed Trinity rests, is lacking in truth and reality. Is it possible to build on such a basis any other than a false theory, or to draw from such premises other than unwarranted and groundless conclusions ?

But this is not all. The natural product of false premises is a fresh harvest of contradictions and absurdities. That this holds true of the system under discussion a few simple questions will show : Does the absolute Being know at present or in general at any given moment all evolutions that take place in the world, or does It know them only when they really happen ? If It knows them from eternity, and if in It knowing is effecting, then there is no progressive evolution, no succession and no time, which is in open contradiction with Mr. Harris's views and our own experience. If the absolute, the Second Person, knows the evolutions in this creation only in time and successively as they happen, then there is progressive evolution, a development of self-consciousness, also in the Son, which is likewise contrary to Mr. Harris's position. Again, if knowledge is creation or production, the question arises, whether or not as to being the First Person is identical with the Second ; and the Second with the Third. If all Persons are identical, we should have to admit that something produces and knows itself before existing : a supposition which Mr. Harris himself considers as absurd. If the three Persons are not identical, but distinct from one another, none of them obtains self-knowledge, because knowing only the other which by cognition He produces, and yet self-knowledge is quite essential to the absolute Being. Moreover, each Divine Person is thought to know Himself by producing His own perfect likeness equal to Himself in every respect. But between the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, as described by Mr. Harris, there is an immense difference. He does not say distinctly whether the Father is developed from potentiality or not, yet his words seem to imply absence of any development in Him. For the potentiality or passivity of the Son consists in His being derived or begotten, whereas the Father is essentially underived and unbegotten. But if the Father is a pure act, free from all potentiality, how is the Son, who is essentially potential and developed, His equal in every regard ? If the Son is from all eternity instantaneously developed from potentiality, how can He see his equal and His perfect likeness in the world, which progressively and in time evolves itself into the Invisible Church ? And if the Father and the Son have self-knowledge only by producing an object, a new person, how is it with the Holy Spirit ? Has He no self-knowledge ? Then He is neither the likeness of the Son, nor is He absolute and pure self-activity. If He has self-knowledge, He must, like the others, produce a fourth Person. The fourth, for the same reason, must create a fifth, and so on, and thus we shall have not three Persons in the Divine Nature, but an endless procession of Persons.

Lastly, what unity exists between the Father, the Son, and the Spirit? Is each of them an all-comprising whole? Is each perfectly and actually infinite? This, indeed, cannot be. We should then have three all-comprising wholes, each being distinct from the other, not in its relativity, but in its absolute being. Who cannot see the absurdity of such a position? We should be compelled to say that the produced is self-existent, absolute, and independent, and that a Divine Being is infinite without self-knowledge. No, none of the different Persons is ultimately determined and absolutely perfect with the others. Only, if taken all together, they, in Mr. Harris's system, constitute one complete and absolutely perfect being. Yet, if that be so, there are not three Persons in God's nature, but only one, consisting of three parts, of which each is in itself absolutely incomplete. And can this one Person really be conceived as Divine? Not in the least. For it is composed of finite parts, and, consequently, is finite itself; potential, because implying evolution; dependent, because existing by the union of pre-existing components. The entire Hegelian theory, therefore, results, not in the Three Persons taught by Christian Revelation, but in a being, that, as it is not absolute and infinite, is not at all divine, is a false, fictitious god that bears no closer resemblance to the true Divine Nature and Trinity than do Saturn, Jupiter, and Vulcan.

There cannot be the least doubt about this last inference. Whoever has but the slightest knowledge of Christianity and of the essence of the Infinite Being, must see at once that the Holy Ghost we believe in is not the supreme evolution of the world, the bond of perfect charity among men; that the Son is not perfect and self-conscious by necessarily creating this universe, or becomes our Redeemer by elevating matter to man's nature, and uniting all men in one Invisible Church; and that the Father is not ultimately completed by the necessary process going on in creation. All such views and teachings are a hundred times worse than the heresies of Arius, Macedonius, Nestorius, and Pelagius, condemned already in the first ages of the Christian era.

Hegelian philosophy, then, in treating of God and the Trinity, starts from false notions and suppositions, draws contradictory conclusions, and ends in a kind of pantheism, by which the human and divine, the finite and infinite, the dependent and the absolute, are absurdly confounded.

Hegel's system, if there was any possibility of understanding it, certainly was best understood and appreciated in Germany, its native place. But even there it was long ago looked upon with contempt on account of its utter abstruseness and inextricable self-contradictions. What shall we, then, say of those who now in our country, the much praised home of practical common sense, take up the absurdities already rejected by the learned world; who admire theories the more the less they can be seen through; who imagine they have penetrated the deeper the more repugnant to the ordinary understanding, the more destitute of meaning, the more intricate, those tenets are which are proposed to their views. They remind us of certain eyes which, not being fitted for the perception of the light of the sun, delight more in the darkness and confusion of the night than in the clearness and beauty of the day.

SIX CENTURIES OF WORK AND WAGES; THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LABOR. By James E. Thorold Rogers, M.P. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1884.

To the literature of English history no more important addition than this large octavo volume has been made in a very long time. Professor Rogers is almost, if not entirely, alone in the field of investigation which

it covers, and that field he has cultivated to the best advantage, as far as he knew how. His book is not simply a history; it is a treatise on political economy, the more valuable because it is based on the practice of centuries instead of the ephemeral theories of speculators that go to make up so great a portion of the text-books on the subject that are in such general use in our schools and colleges.

The one blemish of the work is a fault which it seems next to impossible for a Protestant writer, especially if he be a member of the State Church, to avoid committing; its references to and treatment of the relations of the Church with the State are purely Erastian, assuming that the former should be subservient to the interests and even the selfishness of the latter. There is an apparent divergence from this view in the references to the Lollards and Wickliffites, but for the most part it is only apparent, and due, as far as it really exists at all, to the writer's unconscious, innate hostility to every religious influence coming from Rome. Otherwise, the writer is remarkably, almost phenomenally, impartial. He shows most clearly, without expressing, or even implying, his intention to do so, that with the change of religion effected in England by Henry VIII. and his immediate successors came a ruinous, if not a disastrous, change for the English masses, the peasantry and the artisan class, who, having reached their highest point of prosperity under Henry VII. and in the first half of Henry VIII.'s reign, began to sink gradually and sometimes rapidly after this time until they found themselves in their lowest degradation at the beginning of the present century. Since then, as Protestantism has declined, the condition of the working classes has somewhat, but far too slowly, improved. This is the conclusion which the thoughtful reader will draw, though our author only claims to have traced "the causes which brought about the misery and degradation of labor to acts and persons which are historical," and thinks "that the process of restoration is retarded by privileges and practices which are still dominant,—privileges and practices which, unless they are relinquished and abandoned, will give occasion in England, which has hitherto been quit of it, for an extension of that spirit of communism which finds its origin and its apology in the injuries, some real and some imaginary, which the many suffer at the hands of the few." Previously he had said: "I have attempted to show that the pauperism and the degradation of the English laborer were the result of a series of Acts of Parliament and acts of government, which were designed or adopted with the express purpose of compelling the laborer to work at the lowest rates of wages possible, and which succeeded at last in effecting that purpose. These Acts have become historical, and except in so far as they are responsible for the existence of much that is difficult and regrettable in the condition of the working classes now, they have no existence at the present time."

We have no space to give an outline of this work, even were such desirable. Every person desirous of having a correct knowledge of English history should read it. Professor Rogers has put within easy reach information which he himself collected under the greatest difficulties; for he has almost always had recourse to the archives, the original contemporary documents. On this account, principally, there is not a footnote in the whole book. Incidentally, he also refutes many a pet theory, notion, and impression taught and conveyed by most of the previous writers of "standard" authority, especially many of those concerning the condition of the lower orders under the feudal system with which law students are made familiar by the perusal of the historical portion of Blackstone's "Commentaries."

The subject here treated, so generally neglected by other writers, is one to which our author has given many years of diligent study. Nearly twenty years ago he published two volumes of a history of agriculture and prices, and out of this the book, just issued, on work and wages has grown. "I have been frequently urged," says the author, "to extract and exhibit those parts of my researches which illustrate the history of labor and wages. To have done this to any purpose it was necessary that I should have in my possession such a continuous record of wages actually earned as would enable me to traverse the whole of the six centuries which intervene between the time at which the first information begins and that at which our present experience concludes. I have already published the facts which bear on more than half the whole period, *i. e.*, for 324 years, and I have collected evidence, as yet unpublished, for 120 years more, *i. e.*, for the 444 years which begin with the forty-third year of Henry III., 1258-9, and conclude with the first of Anne, 1702-3. Sufficient information for the residue has been supplied from the writings of Arthur Young and Sir Frederic Eden in the eighteenth century, and from numerous writers in the nineteenth, the principal authority in the latter period being Porter."

In explanation of the true significance of the facts and figures which he has collected, and so clearly and interestingly set forth here, he says: "It would have been of little value to have collected evidence as to the wages of labor, unless I had also been in possession of adequate information as to general prices from which to estimate precisely what was the purchasing-power of wages. Now I have published the prices of food from 1259 to 1582, and from 1582 a record of wheat and malt prices has been registered every six months at four important centres, Oxford, Cambridge, Windsor, and Winchester, under the statute 18 Eliz., cap. 6. Besides, for the purposes of my inquiry, I am sufficiently provided with the evidence of such other prices as enables me to translate money-wages actually paid into the necessities of life."

It must not be inferred from these statements that the book is merely a compilation of dry statistics. It no doubt abounds in the information of which statisticians are fond, but its figures are so skilfully, delicately, and intricately interwoven in a most interesting narrative, as to make them seem indispensable to the integrity of the work, whose purely narrative portions would be uninteresting without them.

Having collected all the available information bearing directly or indirectly on his subject, prior to the middle of the thirteenth century, and carefully sifted it, as well as all that has since been preserved; having not merely outlined but detailed the vicissitudes of industrial and agricultural labor in England through the centuries of prosperity and comfort before the change that took place under Henry VIII., and having chronicled the events of its degradation and downfall since the introduction of the so-called Reformation, together with its partial revival in our own century, our author devotes a chapter to the present situation and another to the remedies for the existing evils, the last two chapters in the book. The views and theories which he here propounds will not all be accepted or approved by all his readers. Here after summarizing the statements which he has made, and reviewing the inferences of the best known writers on political economy, to whom, as well as to trades-unions, he devotes considerable space, he speaks lucidly on the distribution of wealth, systems of land tenure, rents, taxation, and again of wages in general and their bearing on the other economic issues that engage the attention of statesmen. His chapter on remedies we should have more space to discuss in detail, so important are the issues with

which it deals. But no student of political economy, which, reduced to practice, is here treated of by Professor Rogers, should fail to study this as well as the other portions of the book. Valuable time can be far less profitably spent on the productions of other publicists, most of whom are only sciolists compared with the author of *Work and Wages*.

GOVERNMENT REVENUE; Especially the American System. An Argument for Industrial Reform, against the Fallacies of Free Trade. By *Ellis H. Roberts*. Boston; Houghton, Mifflin & Company. 1884.

This volume contains the substance of a series of lectures on Political Economy, which were first delivered to the two higher classes of Cornell University, and afterwards to the students of Hamilton College, N. Y. They comprise the results of studies of the author, commenced, he tells us, in early boyhood when Henry Clay was in his sunset splendor, "extended at Yale College when President Woolsey drew out from undergraduates criticisms upon the text-books then in use there on Political Economy, still further prosecuted in connection with "labors on the Ways and Means Committee of the House of Representatives at Washington," and subsequently enlarged by still more searching investigation of the economic history of different countries, and examination of various writers upon Political Economy.

The work throughout bears evidence of careful and extensive research on the part of its author, and of his familiarity with the different policies, judicious or injudicious, of various nations in ancient as well as modern times, to acquire revenues and promote their own internal prosperity.

In his introductory chapter the author defines the scope of his work as broadly comprising the subject of revenue, or "the getting of money for the public treasury." The cognate topics of spending the public moneys, and of the principles of production and of exchange are touched upon incidentally and only as they relate to the income of States.

He then briefly discusses the origin of governments, showing that the idea that a social compact is the basis of the State is entirely false. He argues that its basis is an inherent necessity of human nature; that the idea of government originating in a social compact involves a patent contradiction. For "when man is possessed of sufficient intelligence to form such a compact, government already exists;" that in its crude forms it is as natural a development as the association of the lower orders of existence. He refutes and summarily dismisses Herbert Spencer's notion that society is simply a stock company for protection, with the remark that "that, again, presupposes the organization which can form the company."

In all this, the author is unquestionably correct, and we are glad to see that he not only recognizes this necessity of human nature, but traces its origin to God. He pertinently and correctly says that "the early peoples all start from a theocracy in some form. To the Hebrews God spake directly, and bore rule over their commonwealth. Gods were the original rulers of the Eastern as well as the Western States." . . . "*Society* is the normal condition of man, and the State, rude it may be, but real, must co-exist with it." Thus "freedom is no outgrowth of convention; it springs from a divine right in as complete a sense as any human condition can claim to rely upon a divine title."

It is as gratifying as it was unexpected to find our author, in a work prepared under the circumstances we have briefly adverted to, thus ex-

pressing himself. The idea that society owes its origin to a social compact seems to us absurd on its very face. It is contradicted, too, by all the facts of history, and by the interior consciousness of mankind. Yet this false and delusive notion seems to have permeated public opinion. Not only demagogues and pettifoggers, and men of high official positions though of narrow education and superficial minds, entertain it, but persons of eminent repute as profound jurists or statesmen.

The writer then gives a rapid exhibit of ancient methods of obtaining revenues for the State. He examines and describes the financial legislation of ancient Egypt, Judea, Assyria, Phœnicia, Greece, Rome, China, the Italian Republics, the German States, France, England, Spain, and the Netherlands; and their respective methods, both in former times and at present, of obtaining money for the public treasury. The conclusion he arrives at, from this comprehensive examination, is that the only countries which now levy imposts for the support of government with a view to favor commerce primarily, are Great Britain and the Netherlands. These are examples of "Free Trade." The revenue systems of the Asiatic countries are protective, and systematically aim at fostering home industries. So, too, are those of all the European countries, excepting the two just mentioned. And though Great Britain maintains a free-trade policy, yet her colonies, without exception, insist for themselves on rigid protection. Thus, while the commercial policy of free-trade is maintained by Great Britain and the Netherlands, with an aggregate population of less than 40,000,000, the system of protecting home industries is enforced by all other Western nations, with a population of not less than 340,000,000. The Eastern nations, too, are solidly on the side of the industrial system. It may be added, also, that recent legislation in Germany, Austria, Russia, France, the several British Colonies, and in Japan, looks to the strengthening of the protective policy, and even Great Britain seems to be wavering in her adherence to free-trade.

In his fourth chapter the author gives a historical resumé of the various methods adopted, changed, abandoned, or re-adopted in our own country for obtaining public revenues. He reviews the policy of Great Britain towards her American colonies, its purposes and its consequences. He refers to the difficulties that existed during the days of the confederation, in raising money to carry on the struggle against Great Britain, and points out the fact that the second statute which Congress enacted and Washington signed after the adoption of the present Federal Constitution, declared that it was "necessary for the support of the government . . . and the encouragement and protection of manufactures, that duties be laid." For three-quarters of a century our statesmen, almost without exception, accepted this doctrine, and our legislation, with little variation, embodied it until the disastrous tariff of 1846, followed by that of 1857, which was conceived and enacted in like spirit. Both of these tariffs were hostile to the protective principle, and produced disastrous effects upon our home industries.

In subsequent chapters the author develops his subject in a wider field, under the respective titles of "The Incidence of Imposts," "Freedom of Production," "Commerce broader than Barter," "Fallacies about Markets," "Duties, Wages, and Prices," "Alternatives of Protection," "The Rivalries of Commerce." In the discussion of these subjects he reviews the ideas of Quesnay, Adam Smith, Locke, Burke, Say, Mill, John Bright, Henry C. Carey, and others; supporting and illustrating his own ideas by frequent recurrence to the financial and

industrial condition and statistics of different countries, American, European and Asiatic, at various periods of their history.

In his final chapter he gathers together the results of his investigations into the general conclusion, that our country owes its unexampled material prosperity and rapid accumulation of wealth to its protective policy, and, citing Mr. Gladstone's prediction of our future commercial supremacy, expresses the conviction that it will be "but the echo of our home industries."

As it is this point—the effect upon commerce of a policy protecting home manufactures—that forms the central issue in the battle of free-trade and protective theories, we summarize the author's chief arguments. He first contrasts the British system of free-trade with the protective policy of the United States.

In Great Britain the policy is to impose all charges upon the land, upon homes, and farms, and plants of industry, and their earnings and savings. Commerce is not content with the favoritism which has enriched it. It strives to cast upon production every charge of government.

In this country just the opposite course has been pursued. The policy has been to favor industry here on our own soil. To that end duties have been levied upon commerce, with the design of drawing from commerce its due share of the revenue. Even if these imposts should eventually come out of the people, it would be quite as easy for the people to pay them as it would be to pay taxes upon land or other property, or on consumption, or occupations. But experience has demonstrated that always a large part of the customs-duties is thrown upon the foreign producer or his agents. In every instance, after a period varying with the character of the commodity, for every industry established in this country lower prices have come to exist than prevailed before the duty was imposed. Foreign commerce must always be a concern of a few; production enlists the many. The British system claims a monopoly of favor for trade by sea; the American system gives foreign trade a rank after domestic industry.

In direct answer to the argument that the protective system interferes with commerce, and that protective duties should be abolished in order that we may find a foreign market for our wares, the author insists that the argument is delusive, and that the removal of duties upon importations will not re-tore our flag to the ocean. We lost a share of the ocean carrying-trade by the war of 1812, which succeeded in checking for a time our maritime progress. We had made vast gains when our late civil war enabled foreign powers to strike a deadly blow at our merchant navy, and we have not yet recovered the lost ground.

But the promotion of commerce with foreign countries is not the first, nor the most important task which devolves upon American enterprise. Until we have still further extended our home production, we have labors quite as imperative as any foreign rivalry can prompt. Capital and industry are getting better returns in these home enterprises than ocean service can now promise. When these fields are fully tilled, American courage and foresight will tempt the seas once more.

The author then shows that the policy of fostering home-production is the true way to eventually win commercial supremacy, and that to strive to secure it by the course by which Great Britain won it, would be to pay too high a price for it. No nation, he says, has ever yet secured the control of commerce by any change in revenue systems or adjustment of government charges. The story of commerce has been a story of violence, grasping greed, and costly wars. Great Britain has acquired her commercial supremacy, not by her revenue policy, but by

diplomacy and incessant wars, destroying the commerce of rivals, and forcing her wares upon reluctant nations at the mouth of the cannon or the bayonet's point. It was trade rivalry that prompted the war of the English Commonwealth with Holland, and that kept England involved in war, with short intermissions, from then until the fall of Napoleon, on the continent of Europe, in Asia, and on our Western continent.

We do not want commercial supremacy acquired in this way, and at this cost. We refuse to maintain a costly navy to force our commodities on reluctant peoples. We refuse to maintain armies strong enough to penetrate the heart of Asia or the valleys of Africa. We are unwilling to build iron-clads numerous enough and powerful enough to cover all the seas, to bombard Alexandria, to hold the Suez canal, to stand off and observe the movements, now of France, now of Russia, now of England upon China, India, Egypt, Tunis, Eastern and Western Africa, and the islands of the South Seas. Foreign commerce, won by the old methods, presupposes a large navy, and brings with it a costly army. If we seek to force our products on countries which do not seek for them, we must not only reduce the wages and degrade the condition and character of our working men, in order to reduce prices, but must pursue the traditional policy by which alone in the past nations have held control of foreign markets. We must be strong enough to defend our competition in Asia and Africa. We must have ships of war to convoy our merchantmen when hostilities threaten. We must be able to compete with Great Britain in diplomatic force and naval power, in Constantinople, Alexandria, and Peking, in Rio Janeiro and at the mouth of the Congo and the Zambesi.

Even at this price, and in this way, we could not secure foreign commerce. The centuries have advanced in their march, and commercial supremacy cannot now be won by parodying the policy of Great Britain. The trident of the ocean must pass into the hands which production makes powerful to hold it. We must win it in the future, if we win it at all, not by the methods of the past, weak and rusty with age, but by methods of the present and future.

The world comes to us for food because we produce it abundantly. Our agricultural implements, our clocks and watches, are sent to far-off lands, because of their excellence. Our cotton and our leather, our sheetings and our calicoes and cutlery, are bought because no one else can furnish equal quality so cheaply. Multiply your productions and the world will come to you to buy. Share the money which armies and navies cost, and leave it to fructify in the pockets of the people, and you will provide the conditions, the cheapest because the most efficient industry; and you will establish the most attractive markets in which to buy and sell that civilization has ever offered.

Upon our diversified production foreign commerce must be developed. With agriculture so productive, with manufactures so masterful, with mining industries outstripping the world, we must be able to win a share of the carrying trade. On the sea as well as on the land, we will conquer the balance of trade, caused by high wages to working-men which the protection of home industry promotes.

PILGRIMS AND SHRINES. By *Eliza Allen Starr*. 2 vols. Illustrated. Chicago: Union Catholic Publishing Company.

It is a difficult thing now to throw a new light upon the ever charming face of pictured Europe. The natural yearning to know more of the land which is, in reality, the motherland of most of us has been so

thoroughly understood and so fully ministered to by poet, painter, journalist, novelist, and moralist, that every feature appeared to have been presented to the eager public in every possible guise and under every possible reflection. But Miss Starr has certainly offered us a new aspect of *Catholic in Pilgrims and Shrines*. Struck by the fact, during her own travels, that if in classic Rome and classic Italy mediæval romance and early art engrossed the attention and aroused the enthusiasm of even Christian tourists to the exclusion of more hallowed interests, she determined to set about remedying the defect. In her own delightful manner she has described the various churches of Rome, the Catacombs, the Vatican, the churches of Paris, Orvieto, Siena and Pisa, and has told the story of the saints whose shrines they are, the events which make holy the ground too lightly trodden by careless feet.

The sketches are not connected by any thread of romance, or woven into a chain of events. They are each perfect in itself, but are vividly and pleasantly individualized as the visit of certain youthful travellers—not always the same party—to the spot under discussion. The descriptions are minute and beautiful, the amount of information something remarkable, while at the same time there is an absence of all display of learning, such as often mars the beneficial influence of instruction offered in this form. Catholics who have a knowledge of general literature and whose surroundings and circumstances force upon the man acquaintance with the tastes and opinions of "people of culture" outside of the Church realize the value of Miss Starr's writings. Too great care cannot be exercised by Catholic writers of to-day. The country is flooded by such a torrent of evil, yet beautiful—deadly beautiful—literature that the one who attempts to set forth the truth in any guise save an elegant and finished style struggles against bitter odds. Miss Starr has an easy, graceful, yet vigorous pen, and into every line she writes she infuses the earnest truth of her living faith, and offers proof of the intellectual freedom of Catholics. The highest praise is due to her present effort.

With many of the sketches the readers of Catholic periodicals have been familiar in the past and will be glad to possess them in more lasting form. The work is beautifully gotten up—paper, type, and outside dress—while the illustrations—etchings by Miss Starr herself, are new and original in every sense of the words. The sketches were made upon the spot by Miss Starr, and are not the hackneyed outline of the oft-repeated favorite view, but were chosen by herself. There is an account of the stormy and dangerous passage to Europe, during which Miss Starr experienced the lengthened horrors of anticipated shipwreck with good cause, and an account of an interview with the Holy Father, Pope Pius IX., either of which is full of interest, and the only examples of the ordinary tourist recitals of personal adventure. The other pages are an admirable comment upon the indifference Miss Starr deplors, in common with other Catholic thinkers. It is to be hoped the harvest of good intentions sown between these covers may be a full and plenteous one.

HISTORY OF THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR. By *Anton Gindely*, Professor of German History in the University of Prague. Translated by Andrew Ten Brock, formerly Professor of Mental Philosophy in the University of Michigan. With an Introduction and a Concluding Chapter by the Translator. Complete in Two Volumes. With Twenty-eight Illustrations and Two Maps. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1884.

The "Thirty Years' War" forms one of the most intricate and confused chapters of Modern history. Starting in Bohemia, and occasioned, though not caused, by the opposition of Bohemian Protestants to the accession of Ferdinand II. to the throne of that country, it spread

through central Europe, carrying devastation and desolation with it, and involving in indescribable misery and wretchedness the inhabitants of the regions through which it extended, and adding the horrors of famine and pestilence to those of war. But not only central Europe was involved in this war. Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, France, Denmark, and Sweden, all severally took part in it, and were all at different times, and most of them during its whole continuance, actively engaged in it. It also involved Hungary, and the ambitious, false, and treacherous Prince of Transylvania was at different times an active and influential agent in complicating its issues and intensifying its horrors. While the immediate causes of the war, or wars—for it was a series of wars rather than one waged between distinct combatants and with a defined purpose—were simple and easily understood, the questions it involved and the issues they drew with them became so numerous, so far-reaching, intricate, and complex, and the interests of the parties on each side so interwoven with those of parties on the other side, that it seemed that a permanent adjustment could be reached neither by the sword nor by diplomacy. And this indeed was the case. For while the "Peace of Westphalia," in 1648, restored peace for a time to Northern Europe and Germany, it was a treacherous truce, rather than a peace, and France and Spain still continued hostilities against each other. The "Thirty Years' War" is commonly looked upon, at least in its earlier stages, as a religious war. Yet this is an incorrect and very superficial view of it. Religious questions, it is true, entered into it. Yet these, at bottom, were questions of property and of political supremacy rather than of doctrine. Nor is it at all certain that, if Ferdinand II. had succeeded at the commencement of the war in completely subduing his opponents, the rights of Catholics and the prosperity of the Catholic Church would have been promoted. The probability is that he or his successors would have adopted the policy, often adopted by the Hapsburgs, of endeavoring to subjugate the Church to the State, and attempted to make the Sovereign Pontiffs of the Church subservient to their ideas. In all probability they would have undertaken to play the part in Italy which the emperors of Germany so often performed in the mediæval times, and which Bismarck and the Emperor William have undertaken in Germany in our own times.

Then, too, while the forces arrayed against each other were chiefly Catholic or chiefly Protestant, they were not exclusively so. During the latter part of the war the Protestant Prince of Saxony, one of the most powerful principalities of Germany, was an active and prominent supporter of what is called the Catholic side of the conflict, while France, Catholic France, under Richelieu and Mazarin, did its utmost to aid the Protestants. Nor did the Sovereign Pontiffs of the Church exert themselves to aid Ferdinand; and the German Prince Bishops gave Ferdinand but feeble assistance. As for Gustavus Adolphus, commonly called the Saviour of German Protestantism, his object was conquest and the acquisition of territory. Bethlen, the Prince of Transylvania, really cared no more than a Turk for any religions between Catholics and Protestants. His object in entering into the war was to conquer Hungary. Richelieu's, and after him Mazarin's, real object in the war was to destroy or weaken the Hapsburg dynasty. As regards the questions of ecclesiastical rights and property, the motives of the Catholic princes and of Ferdinand were political rather than religious, and as for the Protestant princes, they were to retain the vast revenues and estates which by violent spoliation of the Church they had acquired.

To unravel, therefore, the intricate and complex combinations that

were involved in the constantly changing issues and fortunes of this period of blood and confused conflict, and still more to clearly explain and describe them, is a task of extreme difficulty. Professor Gindely brings to his attempt to perform this task long and careful study of the subject and laborious examination of the official records and diplomatic correspondence during the period of the "Thirty Years' War," of the different German principalities, of Bohemia and Hungary, Sweden, France, Spain, and the Netherlands. He is a non-Catholic and his prejudices are evidently opposed to the Catholic religion. This has unquestionably influenced him, unconsciously to himself, at various points in the course of his work. But he has endeavored to be impartial and just in his statements, and on the whole he has succeeded as well as could be reasonably expected. Exceptions may be taken to his descriptions of the personal characters of different Catholic Prelates, particularly those who were in immediate contact with Ferdinand II. and his successor, Ferdinand III., and also with his allusions to the Sovereign Pontiffs of the Church. He fails, too, to bring out the full truth of the devouring ambition of Gustavus Adolphus, his cold selfishness and cruelty, while he paints in darkest colors the atrocities committed by the forces which were arrayed on the side of the Emperors of Germany. In like manner he fails to do justice to the personal character and distinguished military abilities of Tilly, while he throws into the background the tergiversations, treachery, and deceit of the Protestant German Princes and their grossly immoral lives. In like manner in frequent references to the questions of ecclesiastical property throughout his work and his summing up at its close of the results of the "Peace of Westphalia," he keeps entirely out of view the fact that the estates and revenues which the Protestant princes insisted on retaining were acquired by spoliation and plunder. So, too, he fails to bring out, except it be very obscurely, the fact that the religious rights those Protestant princes contended for were not the rights of conscience, but the right for them, the Protestant princes, to impose whatever religion they chose upon the inhabitants of their principalities.

The translation is simply a butchery of good English and grammar. Frequently there is utter confusion of the tenses of verbs and gross misuse of auxiliary verbs. In other respects, too, the style is poor. The translator in his preface seems to be obscurely aware of this, for he claims as merits what are gross defects, under the plea that, perhaps, in the opinion of some of his readers he has followed too closely the idioms of the German language, but that he did not wish to "conceal the author under the mask of a translation." The truth is, he has neither followed the German idioms nor the English, but mixed and confused both. Whatever his acquirements or ability in other respects may be, he evidently lacks the qualifications of a faithful and successful translator. Then, too, either from laziness or inability—the latter, we are inclined to think—he has failed to translate, but leaves in their original German or Latin, explanations of a number of the rude pictures of cities and battles, we cannot call them "illustrations," which are contained in the work.

CHARACTERISTICS FROM THE WRITINGS OF JOHN HENRY NEWMAN. Being Selections, Personal, Historical, Philosophical, and Religious, from his Various Works. Arranged by *William Samuel Lilly*, of the Inner Temple, Barrister-at-Law. With the author's approval. New York: D. & J. Sadlier & Co., 1884.

It is gratifying, though not at all surprising, that the demand for this work is such that it requires the publication of successive editions to satisfy it. We know of no writer in the English language whose writings

have exerted a deeper influence, and can be read and re-read with greater profit and pleasure than those of John Henry Newman. Acknowledged now to be the most scholarly living Englishman, he combines extensive and accurate erudition with keenest logical acumen, and a profound philosophical insight into the interior meaning and relations of facts and truth. There is, too, a transparent simplicity of intention in all that he writes, an honest sincerity that cannot fail to impress his readers even when they take up his works with hostile preconceptions. His style is the perfection of purity, grace and vigor, united. Language with him is simply an instrument for the expression of thought and feeling, and he employs it with the ease and precision with which an accomplished master-at-arms wields his sword. In his hands it is like a magician's wand, bringing forth at will the images he evokes; or like a mighty organ under the command of a master musician, responsive to his slightest touch and inspiring his hearers with his own sublime ideas. Polished irony, incisive sarcasm, gentle humor, sparkling wit, a prolific yet ever pure imagination, combine in his works with varied but accurate erudition, with keenest logic and profound philosophy. Along with this there is an evident abhorrence of falsehood and deceit, a transparent candor, an instinctive perception of fallacies, and an unvarying gentleness and charity, even in rebuke, and then, perhaps, most conspicuous, which win the hearts even of those who oppose him, and have often converted hostility into admiration and esteem.

But Newman's writings make up almost a library within themselves. A catalogue of his works published many years ago—the only one immediately at hand—mentions thirty-four volumes. Since then a number of others have been given to the public. But latterly increasing age, together with absorption in religious devotions, though leaving his intellectual vigor unimpaired, have lessened the activity of his pen.

On this account a work like the one before us, which gathers into the compass of a single volume carefully selected extracts from his writings on subjects which are of immediate and deep importance, cannot fail to be highly useful as well as interesting.

This usefulness, too, we think, goes far beyond the compiler's immediate object, as he states it in his modest preface. It was "to contribute to the wider and more accurate knowledge of a writer concerning whom an amount of ignorance and misunderstanding still prevails, which is especially surprising, considering the high place he admittedly holds, both as a thinker and a master of style." If by this Mr. Lilly means ignorance and misunderstanding of John Henry Newman, personally, we differ from him. There was a time when he was most grossly, cruelly misunderstood and misrepresented. But that time has passed away. He has conquered his enemies by the power of truth, shining forth in his gentle unaffected humility and consistent life. And, however correct Mr. Lilly's estimate was of public opinion as regards Newman in former years, it is not so now. The misconceptions once entertained of him have passed away, and to-day no living man is more generally respected, admired, and esteemed, and by multitudes loved, honored, and revered, than is John Henry Newman.

The task which the compiler set himself to do he has done admirably well. It was a work of extreme difficulty on account of the immensity of the material from which he had to select, and it is a matter of surprise to us that he has succeeded in comprising within a single volume extracts from Newman's writings which convey so clear and complete an idea, first of his personal history and character, and next of his philosophical, historical, and religious writings.

But the usefulness of the work goes far beyond this. The extracts are not *dissecta membra*. Each forms a whole of itself, conveying a distinct idea, with clearness and force. Nor is there one which we would not regret had it been omitted.

Much of the volume will be of great interest to Protestants as setting forth and exposing with utmost faithfulness and invincible logic, yet with utmost gentleness, also, and charity, the fallacies with which they delude themselves, and resolving and clearing away the difficulties that rise up in their minds to accepting the Catholic faith. Catholics, probably, will be most deeply interested in the first and last parts of the volume; the first dealing with Newman's personal history and character, the last treating of subjects intimately connected with the Catholic religion.

THE RELIGIOUS STATE. A Digest of the Doctrine of Suarez, Contained in his Treatise "De Statu Religionis." By *William Humphrey*, Priest of the Society of Jesus. London: Burns & Oates. New York: Catholic Publication Society Co.

There is scarcely any other subject, if any, connected with our holy religion, respecting which deeper ignorance and more inveterate prejudices exist than the nature, obligations, and ends of the Religious Life. This ignorance, to a great extent, is wilful, and is both an antecedent to and a consequence of prejudice and misconception. The non-Catholic world hates and abhors on principle the very idea of a religious life, and denies the possibility of religious practically actualizing what that life involves. This hatred and abhorrence result from the fact that the example of religious, in their detachment from self and from all worldly interests and their undivided devotion to religion are a constant rebuke to non-Catholics and a testimony that they are in error. The vows which religious take they assert are impossible of fulfilment and beyond the power of weak human nature to keep, even when strengthened by divine grace. But their scepticism on this point is a consequence of their unwillingness, even, to attempt, to practice the self-abnegation and mortification these vows require. And this scepticism leads on the one hand to unwillingness to learn what the religious life really is, and on the other to more inveterate prejudices, and in many cases to satanic hatred of it.

Nor are this ignorance and prejudice confined exclusively to non-Catholics. The number of Catholics is not small who have very imperfect, and, to the extent that they are imperfect, erroneous conceptions of the religious life.

To remove this ignorance and prejudice was the primary motive of the author in preparing this treatise. It is not a translation of Suarez's classic work, but a *digest* of it, carefully made, designed to give the marrow of Suarez's doctrine "separated," to use the author's words, "from the dry bones of controversy." He publishes it, he tells us in his preface, in the hope that "it may be of service, not only to religious, but to seculars, and not only to Catholics, but to others, who, although not Catholics, desire to have information with regard to an essential constituent and salient feature of the Catholic Church."

In the first part of the work the state of perfection and its various modes or species are considered. Its essence, its author or efficient cause, its origin and antiquity, the vows by which it is constituted, and what those vows comprehend, are examined and explained, along with a variety of other kindred questions growing out of those we have mentioned. In the second and concluding part the Society of Jesus, its institution and vows, the manner and conditions of entrance into it, the scholastics of

the Society and their studies, the public schools of the Society for externs, the profession of the four vows, the probation which precedes that profession, the means which the Society employs for the spiritual progress and perfection of its members, the means it employs for the salvation of externs, the government of the Society and the mode of severance from the Society, are all considered in detail and lucidly explained.

THE WORKS OF ORESTES A. BROWNSON. Collected and Arranged by *Henry F. Brownson*. Volumes VII., VIII., IX. Detroit: Thorndike Nourse, Publisher.

Volume VII., forming the third part of Dr. Brownson's writings in defence of the Church, contains a number of papers criticising various erroneous theories of religion and refuting various objections of Protestants and infidels against the Catholic religion. These erroneous theories are chiefly those which in Dr. Brownson's time commenced to obtain vogue in New England and since then have spread and supplanted the previous phases of Protestant belief with the present existing forms of transcendentalism and liberalism. He dissects those theories with masterly skill, subjects them to keen logical analysis, and points out their fundamental fallacies and pernicious consequences.

The papers contained in Volume VIII. treat chiefly, though not exclusively, of subjects positively and directly connected with Catholic doctrine and practice. Among these are profound discussions of the relation of "Faith and Theology," the "Mysteries of Faith," "Worship of Mary," "Moral and Social Influence of Devotion to Mary," "Saint-Worship," "Heresy and the Incarnation," "Reason and Religion," "The Church Accredits Herself," the "Constitution of the Church," "Authority in Matters of Faith." The article on "Our Lady of Lourdes" is a masterpiece of powerful, profound reasoning. In other articles, such as "Steps of Belief," "The Great Commission," "Catholicity and Naturalism," "The Protestant Rule of Faith," "Protestantism Anti-Christian," and the "Evangelical Alliance," he exposes prevailing Protestant and infidel errors of his own time and of the present.

"The Spirit-Rapper" makes up the first part of Volume IX. Under the form of an autobiography Dr. Brownson narrates succinctly the early history of spirit-rapping in this country, and, widening his field, he traces out and exposes its connections with modern philanthropy, visionary reforms, socialism, and revolutionism. The latter two-thirds of the volume contain criticisms and refutations of recent erroneous scientific theories. The pretensions of phrenology, and the fallacies and sophisms of Draper, Spencer, Darwin, Tyndale, and other modern sceptics and materialists, are ably and thoroughly exposed.

SOME OF THE CAUSES OF MODERN RELIGIOUS SCEPTICISM. A Lecture delivered in St. John's Church, St. Louis, on Sunday evening, December 17th, 1882, by Right Reverend *P. J. Ryan, D.D.* Published by D. Herder, 17 South Broadway, St. Louis.

Seldom have we read a lecture which impressed us so strongly with a sense of its opportuneness and adaptation to the prevalent current of thought at the present time. That it is instructive, interesting and eloquent, goes without saying. For that, the distinguished reputation of the author is a sufficient guarantee. But apart from all this was the strong conviction of the great usefulness of the lecture, and the powerful influence it would exert, if widely circulated and read, in correcting pernicious prevalent errors.

The plan of the lecture is direct and simple. The author first distinguishes between scepticism and infidelity, showing that men do not so much reject revelation as they doubt it. He then points out four chief causes of the prevailing scepticism: First, ignorance; "ignorance of religious truth on the part of men who are regarded as leaders of modern thought." This point is proved and felicitously illustrated by numerous instances and examples. The second cause is the rejection of Church authority and the assertion of the assumed right of private interpretation of the Sacred Scriptures. The third cause is the Puritanical training in religion of children. The fourth cause is the war between conscience and the sophistries of passion. In the development of this last point the lecturer briefly and concisely, but very clearly, proves that indulgence of the passions, and particularly of those of impurity and pride, "blind the soul," and "have made more sceptics and infidels than all the arguments of all the Agnostics of the nineteenth century."

He then concisely but forcibly shows the disastrous effects upon society of scepticism, and concludes by pointing sceptics who are honestly desirous of reaching truth to the only way and means. The final appeal to sceptics is a masterpiece of eloquence, embodying a most profound yet most lucid and simple application of Scripture, and one would think irresistible from the unaffected, evident, affectionate earnestness of the Most Reverend speaker's concern for his sceptical hearers.

The usefulness of the lecture goes far beyond its immediate occasion and purpose. It may be read with great profit also (as we are sure it will also be with intense pleasure and delight) by Catholics whose minds are unclouded by doubt.

FOOTPRINTS: OLD AND NEW; OR, A NUN'S MISSION. By *L. J. B.*, Author of "The Queen's Sieges," "Lost or Sold," "Guile and Simplicity," etc. London: Burns & Oates. New York: The Catholic Publication Society Company.

This records the observations and impressions of the writer in the Australian colonies of New Zealand, Sidney, and Victoria, of her voyage from Australia to Italy by way of the Red Sea and Egypt, and her observations and experiences in Rome. In connection with these she interweaves a large amount of information respecting the physical features, climate, scenery, industrial, moral and religious condition of the Australian colonies and the work which the Church is doing there. Two-thirds of the volume are given to Italy, and particularly to Rome. She describes its ruins and monuments, churches and other ecclesiastical buildings, its art-treasures, educational and charitable institutions, often minutely, and with many interesting and important details.

A TRIBUTE OF DEVOTION TO ST. MARY MAGDALEN DE PAZZI. By *Rev. Antonio Isolero*, Miss. Ap., Rector of St. Mary Magdalen de Pazzi's Italian Church, Philadelphia, and Honorary Advocate of St. Peter. Philadelphia. 1884.

We have here a seasonable offering to the renowned Florentine Saint who was elected by God to be the Second Teresa of the reformed Carmelite Order. Father Isolero's "*Un Tributo di Divozione à S. Maria Maddalena de Pazzi*" appeared last year in the vernacular, and as it was pronounced at that time by one of the most learned of our American bishops, "*a treasure of spiritual reading*," it has been recently translated into English by the reverend compiler. The work is divided into six parts. The first is a compilation of the life of the Saint from the writings of Rev. Alban Butler and Rev. Placido Fabrini. The second

and third parts embrace the sayings and miracles of that wonder-working ecstasica. The fourth and fifth are devoted to the indulgences and privileges granted to our local shrine of St. Mary Magdalen de Pazzi by his late Holiness, Pius IX., as well as to the prayers of the Saint, and the devotions and order of Novena in annual use by the members of the Italian congregation. The sixth and last part is truly Father Isoleri's own *Tribute of Devotion* to the illustrious patroness of his parish, inasmuch as it consists of the panegyric of her virtues, an eloquent and glowing eulogy of one of the most remarkable and valiant women ever elevated to the altars of the Church. *Laudate Dominum in sanctis ejus!* says the royal prophet, and the perusal of this instructive book cannot fail to lead the reverent reader to praise the Lord in all His saints, but more especially in that virgin saint who was the flower of Florence and the glory of Catholic Italy.

SIX SEASONS ON OUR PRAIRIES AND SIX WEEKS IN OUR ROCKIES. By *Thomas J. Jenkins*, of the Diocese of Louisville. Published by Charles A. Rogers, 167 West Jefferson Street, Louisville, Ky. 1884.

Under this somewhat eccentric title the reverend author narrates his observations, experiences, and adventures during extensive excursions in Minnesota, Dakota, Iowa, Nebraska, parts of Wyoming, and the mountains of Colorado.

The work is valuable to persons desirous of obtaining the impressions respecting those regions of one who evidently is a close and keen observer, as well as a reliable and trustworthy narrator. His accounts of their climate, agriculture, and industrial advantages, and social and moral and religious condition, may be the more implicitly accepted as correct, from the fact that those accounts are made up from his daily jottings in a carefully kept diary.

Independently of this, however, the work is exceedingly interesting, owing to the easy, off-hand style in which it is written, the descriptions of localities, scenery, climate, and personal adventures and experiences, always graphic and evidently written at the time and on the spot of their occurrence, alternating with sallies of humor and serious reflection. A more readable little volume has seldom fallen into our hands.

ORIGINAL, SHORT, AND PRACTICAL SERMONS IN HONOR OF THE BLESSED SACRAMENT. Thirty-six Sermons in Twelve Divisions: Three in Each. By *F. X. Wenninger*, S. J., Doctor of Theology. Cincinnati. 1884.

These discourses are specially adapted for delivery during the "Forty Hours" devotion. They are prepared and published with a view to aiding Parish Priests whose time is so pre-occupied with their labors on the mission that they cannot command the leisure necessary for the careful composition of sermons suitable to the solemn occasion.

As the title-page of the volume suggests, these sermons are short and practical. They treat of subjects directly connected with the Blessed Sacrament, and will materially assist many of the Clergy in imparting suitable instruction and edifying exhortations to their flocks during the holy period of the "Forty Hours."

ADVANTAGES AND NECESSITY OF FREQUENT COMMUNION, ASSERTED AND PROVED FROM SCRIPTURE AUTHORITY AND TRADITION. By *A. C. L. F. Kilroy*. Detroit, Mich. 1883.

This is a reprint of an old work published in London, England, in the year 1780. It treats in an exhaustive manner of one of the most

practically important points in spiritual life. "The bread which I will give you," says Christ, "is my flesh for the life of the world." Consequently the better the nature of this heavenly food is understood, and the more clearly our Blessed Redeemer's designs regarding it are known, the more certainly will it produce the effects intended by its divine giver.

Those designs are plainly and forcibly placed before the reader in this work. In the first chapter the author exposes the fallacy of those who abstain from frequent communion under the pretence of respect for the Blessed Eucharist. He then in successive chapters gathers the material for the main topic of his treatise—the advantage and necessity of frequent communion—from the words of our Divine Lord, from His actions relating to the Eucharist, from the doctrine and practice of the Apostles and of the early Christians, from the doctrine and practice of the ancient Church Fathers, of the leading scholastic doctors, the examples of eminent Saints, from the decisions of Church Councils and the authoritative utterances of sovereign Pontiffs.

In subsequent chapters he dwells upon various considerations which show the great spiritual advantages of frequently receiving the Bread of Life.

ACADIA. A Lost Chapter in American History. By *Philip H. Smith*. Published by the author at Pawling, N. Y. 1884.

This is a work of deep interest and of great historical value. It is the story of a greatly wronged people about whom there is little knowledge in the popular mind, beyond the impressions made by Longfellow's beautiful poem of *Evangeline*. In the compilation now under notice the whole story of the peace-loving Acadians, and of the cruel wrongs inflicted on them by England, is well told. We here learn of the early explorations of the country, the first attempts at colonization, and the permanent settlement; the transfer from French to English rule, and the terrible and unprovoked outrage which followed. At the close of the volume, which is well and copiously illustrated, several deeply interesting legends are given, and a few corroborative documents in the form of an appendix.

NOTES ON INGERSOLL. By *Rev. L. A. Lambert*, of Waterloo, N. Y. Preface by *Rev. Patrick Cronin*. Second edition, revised and enlarged. Buffalo, N. Y.: Buffalo Catholic Publication Company. 1883.

Many replies have been attempted by Protestants to Ingersoll's sophisms and blasphemies, yet none of them can be regarded as satisfactory. For reasons growing out of the errors of Protestantism and its false basis, they all are failures in one respect or another. It has been reserved for a Catholic clergyman to demolish Ingersoll, though it is not so much the Catholic religion that his attacks are really aimed at as the false ideas of God and divine revelation which Protestantism has diffused.

Father Lambert meets Ingersoll on the broad grounds of reason and common sense. With cold, passionless logic, he follows him step by step, and successively drives him from each of his positions, exposing his inaccuracies and false statements, refuting his sophistry, and turning the keen edge of sarcasm, in which Ingersoll vaunts himself master, against him by wit and irony sharper than his own.

Father Lambert shows up the falsehoods which Ingersoll unblushingly deals in, his plagiarized objections and perversions, long ago uttered and long ago refuted, but palmed off upon ignorant and unthinking audiences as original. He points out his violations of logic, his ignorance of his-

tory, his fraud, deceit, and constant resort to misrepresentation in his blasphemous utterances.

We heartily wish that more books like the one before us, lucid, concise, logical, were given to the public, and we hope that Father Lambert, as he has proved himself such a master in work of this kind, will not let his pen lie idle.

THE SINNER'S GUIDE. By *Ven. Louis of Granada, O.P.* A new and revised translation by a Father of the same Order. Boston: T. B. Noonan & Co. 1884.

The author of this work holds a high place among the spiritual writers of the Church. He lived in an age of saints, and occupies a distinguished place among those who, during the sixteenth century, were brilliant lights of the Church by their sanctity and learning, particularly in Spain. He was held in high esteem by Pope Gregory XIII. and St. Charles Borromeo, the former of whom, in a letter addressed to Father Louis, warmly commended his sermons and writings. Pope Sixtus V. offered him a Cardinal's hat, which he declined, and also the Archbishopric of Braga, the Primatial See of Portugal.

Among his numerous writings, the *Sinner's Guide* is the most practical and one of the most highly esteemed. It has been translated into almost every European language, and also into the Chinese and Persian. The edition before us is a new translation, revised and rearranged.

Its intrinsic merits claim for it wide circulation, which we sincerely trust it will obtain.

SHORT MEDITATIONS TO AID PIOUS SOULS IN THE RECITATIONS OF THE HOLY ROSARY. Translated from the French by a Member of the Order of St. Dominic. New York and Cincinnati: Fr. Pustet.

A most excellent work of small compass, yet very comprehensive in its scope, comprising suitable methods for meditating on the Holy Rosary on different occasions, and under different circumstances; such as methods of meditating during one's work, to aid in preserving the spirit of recollection while going through the streets, method as used by St. Dominic, meditations on the manifestations of our Divine Lord's natural life, of His Eucharistic life, of his Mystical life, as a preparation and thanksgiving for the Sacrament of Penance, before and during Mass, as a preparation for Holy Communion, to obtain resignation, to obtain peace and welfare for the Holy Church and the Sovereign Pontiff, in times of sickness, as a preparation for death, and for Communion on the fifteen Saturdays preceding the Feast of the Most Holy Rosary. Also meditations on the mysteries of the Rosary as prefigured in the Old Testament.

An appendix to the work contains a catalogue of the principal Indulgences attached to the Most Holy Rosary.

LIFE AND REVELATIONS OF SAINT MARGARET OF CORTONA. Dedicated to her Brothers and Sisters of the Third Order of Saint Francis. Written in Latin by her Confessor, Fr. Giunta Revegna, of the Minor Order. Translated, with Mgr. Luquet's Introduction to his French Version, by F. McDonough Mahony. London: Burns & Oates. 1883.

The publication of this excellent work is very timely. Now that sins against holy purity are so common, and the excellence of chastity seems to be almost lost sight of by the world, the account this volume contains of St. Margaret of Cortona is calculated to do great good by inspiring to penitence and guiding into a better way of life those who

are susceptible to correction and reformation. Now, too, that there is a revival and extension of devotion to St. Francis, a serious perusal of the extraordinary virtues attained by St. Margaret, who was a member of the Third Order of St. Francis, of her meditations on the Cross and of the special revelations made to her, will aid in deepening that devotion.

POPULAR LIFE OF ST. TERESA OF JESUS. Translated from the French of L'Abbé Marie Joseph, of the Order of Carmel. By *Annie Porter*. With a Preface by Right Rev. Monsignor Thomas S. Preston, V.G., LL.D. New York, Cincinnati, and St. Louis: Benziger Brothers. 1884.

Many lives of this wonderful saint have been published. Among all that have fallen under our notice we know of no one which equals the volume before us in its conciseness, and yet in the graphic view it presents of St. Teresa's heroic virtues. The knowledge which it will impart to devout readers cannot fail to lead them to a higher appreciation of the supernatural ways of God among His chosen servants, and thus more clearly reveal to them the grandeur of the Christian life, by showing them what divine grace can effect in souls that are willing subjects of its mighty power.

JOSEPH HAYDN: The Story of his Life. Translated from the German of Franz von Seeberg, by the Rev. J. M. Toohey, C. S. C. J. A. Lyons: Notre Dame, Ind. 1884.

We heartily wish that more such books were written and published. They would furnish entertaining and edifying reading matter to those whose tastes are not already vitiated by sensational literature, and would serve also to divert from such literature many who now resort to it simply for the sake of amusement and relieving ennui.

The chief incidents of Haydn's life are brought out in clear, beautiful, and attractive colors. The narrative style is preserved throughout. It is a "*story*," yet a true story, told in most charming manner.

ALLOCUTIONS, OR SHORT ADDRESSES ON LITURGICAL OBSERVANCES AND RITUAL FUNCTIONS. With Appendices on Christian Doctrine Confraternities, Lending Libraries, the Sodality of the Living Rosary, Ladies' Associations of Charity, Purgatorial Societies, Mutual Benefit Societies, etc. By the author of "Programmes of Sermons and Instructions," etc. Browne & Nolan, Nassau Street, Dublin. 1884.

This volume consists chiefly of short explanatory discourses intended to be used by the clergy, for instructing their parochial flocks on the Festivals of the Church and the Ceremonies used in the administration of the sacraments. They are concise, yet clear and sufficiently comprehensive, and, though didactic, are interesting.

GROWTH IN THE KNOWLEDGE OF OUR LORD. Meditations for every day of the year, exclusive of those for each Festival, Day of Retreat, etc. Adapted from the French original of the Abbé de Brandt by a *Daughter of the Cross*. Vol. V. London: Burns & Oates. 1883.

The volume before us of this excellent series of meditations comprises those parts of the Church-year which extend from the eighteenth to the twenty-fourth week after Pentecost, and from the last week but four to the last week but one before Lent; also, special meditations for a number of the feasts of the Church, for Thursdays, Fridays, and Saturdays of each week, and for Retreats. Appended to it is a copious index of all five volumes, which make up the entire series.

EDUCATION: "Intellectual," "Moral," and "Physical." By *Herbert Spencer*, author of a "System of Synthetic Philosophy." New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1883.

Mr. Spencer gives his views of the subject which forms the title of his work, under four heads. I. "What Knowledge is of Most Worth." II. "Intellectual Education." III. "Moral Education." IV. "Physical Education." Those who are interested in the subject of education will find in this volume many useful practical suggestions. As for the principles laid down by Mr. Spencer, they are those which pervade all his writings, and which no Christian can accept as true.

SERMONS FOR THE SPRING QUARTER. By the late *Very Rev. Charles Meynell, D.D.* Edited by H. I. D. Ryder, of the Oratory. London: Burns & Oates. 1883.

This is a volume of sermons, partly doctrinal, but chiefly practical. They are scholarly; very carefully elaborated both as to thought and expression. Yet there is such simplicity of treatment, such directness of scope, and such clearness of explanation, that, while in style and finish they seem exclusively intended for persons of education, the uneducated may read them understandingly and with benefit.

THE CHILDREN'S BOOK. Songs and Stories. Imitated from the German of Julius Sturm. By *Agnes Sadlier*. With Illustrations from Original Designs, by German artists. New York: D. & J. Sadlier & Co., publishers. 1884.

This is indeed a "Children's Book," and with what delight they will read its songs and stories, and look at its pictures, all spirited illustrations of the text, is more easily imagined than told. It is a beautiful volume, beautiful in binding, beautiful in its letter-press, and this external beauty is a fit setting for its charmingly interesting contents.

THE COURSE OF EMPIRE. Outlines of the Chief Political Changes in the History of the World (arranged by Centuries). With Variorum Illustrations. By *Charles Gardner Wheeler*. Boston: James R. Osgood and Company. 1884.

It is difficult to conceive that this work has been gotten up for any other purpose beyond that of selling it. It is a crude compilation of materials gathered from every quarter, and arranged or rather thrown together at hap-hazard. Such books as this do harm by lessening and restricting the sale of works of real merit.

A THOUGHT OF SAINT TERESA'S FOR EVERY DAY IN THE YEAR. Translated from the French Edition by Miss Ella McMahon. New York, Cincinnati, and St. Louis: Benziger Brothers. 1882.

This little book, as its title indicates, consists of brief extracts from the writings of St. Teresa. These extracts are judiciously selected and form an excellent volume for use in daily meditation. It is published with the *Imprimatur* of his Eminence Cardinal McCloskey.

CATHOLIC FLOWERS FROM PROTESTANT GARDENS. Edited by *James J. Treacy*, Compiler of "Historical and Biographical Stories, Sketches, Anecdotes," etc. New York: P. J. Kennedy. 1882.

This is a volume of extracts from the writings of non-Catholic poets, of different degrees of merit, in praise of certain features of the Catholic religion and Catholic practices.

